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Introduction to Special Issue on Flood Risks in Europe
Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer1∗ and Aniello Amendola1
1. INTRODUCTION
Flooding in Germany, Austria, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Russia in August 2002 may re-
sult in the highest flood damages ever recorded in
Europe. An independent commission has an-
nounced a loss estimate of over U.S. $16 billion
solely for the German state of Saxon.(1) Even be-
fore these flood disasters, the risks from floods of
all types, including flash floods, river floods, and sea
surges, were high on the political agendas of almost all
European governments.
In comparison with many developing countries,
the fatalities from floods in Europe are low, approxi-
mately 500 in the past decade, and the death toll is de-
creasing due to improved forecasting and early warn-
ing technologies. At the same time, economic losses
appear to be soaring. There are no reliable estimates
of the full direct and indirect damages from European
floods, but many of the over 20 major flood events in
Europe in the 1990s are unprecedented in terms of
economic damage. For example, loss estimates from
the Italian floods of 1994 were over U.S.$9 billion,
which came close to the U.S.$11 billion estimated
losses from the inundation of nine U.S. states in
the midwest in 1993.(2) Particularly for the transition
countries of central and eastern Europe, floods pose
a significant risk to economic development and can
be devastating to the usually uninsured victims and
to governments that are ill prepared to provide flood
relief and recovery. For example, economic damages
from the 1997 floods in Poland and the Czech Repub-
lic were U.S.$3.7 billion and 1.5 billion, respectively,
which is 2.9 and 3.5% of their respective GDPs.(3,4) To
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put these losses into perspective, the U.S.$110 billion
loss from the 1995 earthquake in Kobe resulted in a
nearly equivalent 3.2% of Japan’s GDP.
Europe is not alone in its recent experience of
large economic losses from flood disasters. World-
wide, floods are responsible for a greater number of
economic damages than any other type of natural
event. Although loss estimates from natural disasters
must be viewed with great caution, in the period 1985
to 1999 Munich Re estimates total global losses from
all natural disasters to be U.S.$896 billion. As shown
in Fig. 1, Europe’s approximate share of these losses
is 13%, or U.S.$116 billion. At least one-third of these
losses is roughly estimated to be from flooding,(5) and
this proportion is higher in Europe. More disturbing
than the absolute value of the losses is their increase in
the last decades. Again according to Munich Re, eco-
nomic losses from floods, storms, and other disasters
have increased about 14-fold from the decade of the
1950s; however, the number of flood events has not
risen significantly, indicating that the main culprit for
rising losses is increased vulnerability of people and
capital.(6) Global social and environmental changes,
such as shifts in land use, population and migration,
energy use, and climate warming, will likely increase
the costs of natural disasters and raise the potential
for more severe catastrophes.
Attribution of blame for the escalating flood
losses to human activities has generated a wide de-
bate on issues of responsibility and liability, as well
as on the appropriate measures for mitigating losses
and providing relief to victims. Throughout Europe,
governments have traditionally spent large sums on
protective levees and other structural mitigation mea-
sures. These measures have recently come under at-
tack from environmentalists and others, who argue
that they are costly and detrimental to local ecosys-
tems, that they often displace the flood risk from
upstream to downstream countries, and that they
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Fig. 1. The global distribution of natural
catastrophe losses and insured losses
(1985–1999).
encourage more development in flood-prone areas.
With important exceptions, for instance, the United
Kingdom and Germany, governments also assume
major responsibility for losses to private individuals,
in addition to their post-disaster expenses for repair-
ing public infrastructure. In some countries, notably
Hungary and Italy, the central government compen-
sates up to 100% of private structural losses. Com-
pensating flood victims is discouraging local efforts to
reduce flood losses and is also causing serious prob-
lems for many governments, especially those striving
to meet the Maastrich conditions for EU membership.
These governments would welcome more private re-
sponsibility and insurance.
In Europe, and worldwide, the proportion of dis-
aster losses covered by insurance and reinsurance is
relatively small in comparison with that reimbursed
by governments.(7) As shown in Fig. 1, only about
18% of European disaster losses are insured, which,
however, is above the global average. In the past, in-
surers have been reluctant to enter many catastrophic
markets, but this is changing with improved computer
modeling for estimating the risks. The potential for
catastrophe insurance is enormous, especially as in-
surance markets become more international, but this
market is constrained by the large capital require-
ments on the part of insurers. A unique feature of
catastrophe insurance is that spreading risk cannot
be achieved just by having a pool of premium payers.
The problem is the timing, since a rare catastrophic
event can occur before enough premium income has
accumulated to cover the claims. Therefore, insur-
ance companies rely on both reinsurance and capi-
tal reserves to meet very large, dependent claims. To
overcome the finite nature of insurance capital, re-
cent attention has been given to novel risk-transfer
or hedging instruments, including catastrophe bonds
that transfer the risks to the global capital markets.(8,9)
There is also interest in exploring whether govern-
ments could insure their infrastructure with the use
of these instruments.
The policy debate on issues of responsibility and
liability for flood losses, as well as on the appropriate
measures for mitigating losses and providing relief to
victims, raises an important set of research questions:
What is the role of anthropogenic phenomena on cur-
rent and potential future losses from flood events?
How should governments, businesses, and the pub-
lic manage or cope with their increasing risks of flood
damages? What are cost-effective and socially accept-
able mitigation strategies, and how should the remain-
ing losses be shared or pooled? How can governments
cooperate with insurance companies, other private
entities, and NGOs in mitigating flood damage, pro-
viding relief to the victims, and ensuring economic re-
covery? What is the potential role of novel financial
instruments, such as catastrophe bonds, for transfer-
ring risks? What types of democratic institutions can
cope effectively with the escalating risks?
These questions have motivated the selection of
articles presented in this special issue. The articles
originate from two conferences held at IIASA in
Laxenburg, Austria in 1999 and 2001: Global Change
and Catastrophe Risk Management: Flood Risks in
Europe, sponsored by the European Commission,
and Integrated Disaster Risk Management, jointly
sponsored by IIASA and the Disaster Prevention Re-
search Institute (DPRI) of Kyoto University. The se-
lected articles focus on three highly topical and largely
unexplored issues raised by European flood risks. The
first is the respective roles of climate change and
human interventions in hydrological and economic
systems on flood risks in Europe. Armed with infor-
mation on the causes of the damages, European gov-
ernments and publics can better proceed in reducing
and coping with the losses. This raises a second im-
portant issue on public participation and democratiza-
tion of flood risk management processes. There are no
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singular solutions to managing flood risks, but many
different paths for reducing losses, providing relief to
victims, and restoring public and private infrastruc-
ture. Because of the different views and values of the
stakeholders, a challenge is to design trustworthy risk
management institutions and processes. A third and
very new issue is the financial management of disaster
risks by public or sovereign entities. Especially in the
case of Europe’s transition countries, governments of-
ten have difficulty raising sufficient funds after a disas-
ter to finance their obligations of providing relief and
repairing public infrastructure. A question addressed
in this volume is whether the public authorities of
transition and poor countries should hedge their risks
from floods and other extreme events with insurance
or insurance-related, risk-transfer instruments.
These questions and issues are not unique to
Europe. By addressing the underlying causes and pol-
icy responses to escalating flood damages in Europe,
this collection of articles will be of interest to a broad
audience of policymakers, practitioners, consultants,
and academics who are concerned about the rising
global economic toll from flood disasters.
2. THE ROLE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON EUROPEAN FLOOD RISKS
The UN’s International Panel on Climate Change
recently concluded that, while there are uncertainties,
some extreme events, such as droughts, floods, heat
waves, avalanches, and windstorms, are projected to
increase in frequency and/or severity due to changes
in the mean and/or variability of climate.(10) A ques-
tion addressed in this volume is what this means for
Europe today? To what extent, if any, can the re-
cent flood losses in Europe be attributed to climate
change?
Two authors in this volume, Axel Bronstert and
Zdzislaw Kazmarek, investigate this question. In his
article on “Floods and Climate Change: Interactions
and Impacts,” Bronstert discusses the difficulties and
uncertainties in separating the effects of global warm-
ing from the many other human-induced factors in-
fluencing the frequency and intensity of flood events
and the resulting losses. He refers to the interdepen-
dency of the flood risk components as the “cascade
of flood risk,” which includes changes in land use and
land cover, modifications to the river morphology and
the channel system, the increase in human settlements
and capital in flood risk areas, in addition to the pos-
sible effects of a changed climate. These components
affect the risk of catastrophic flood losses in many
different ways, for example, by altering the retention
capacity of river basins and by increasing the vulnera-
bility of people and property in flood-endangered ar-
eas. Climate change can also affect the frequency and
intensity of floods in different and sometimes sub-
tle ways. A warmer climate will likely increase pre-
cipitation,(11,12) where the distribution of rainfall in
addition to the average plays an important role with
regard to flood risks. It is not only precipitation that
translates into flood losses. As Bronstert points out,
climate warming can alter vegetation and affect water
absorption and flooding.
Bronstert’s review of research on climate change
and European flood risks shows evidence of a corre-
lation between climate warming and more intensive
and frequent flooding in some European regions and
no correlation in other regions. He is not surprised
by the conflicting evidence and cautions about the
uncertainties and unknowns inherent in the scientific
investigations. The knowledge of climate change and
its effects on systems and cycles of the earth is still
very limited. Much of the research relies on the results
of large global climate models, but the spatial scale of
these models is too large for simulating anthropogenic
climate change on a regional level. Moreover, most of
the investigations of changing flood risks do not ade-
quately take into account the full range of human in-
fluences. Bronstert concludes that an integrated anal-
ysis of the human-induced affects on the whole chain
of causes and effects, including precipitation, runoff
generation and concentration, flood wave propaga-
tion, and inundation and flood damage, is needed to
determine the effects of climate change on flood risks.
The conclusion Bronstert draws for Europe has
been reaffirmed by recent research investigating the
relationship between global warming and riverine
flooding.(13−15) These authors present results indicat-
ing that global warming may have increased the risk
of flooding in selected, very large river basins; how-
ever, they also point to the limitations of available
climate models, which do not have a fine enough res-
olution for an accurate application at the river-basin
level, and to the large and inherent uncertainties.
Whereas the causal link between global warming
and flooding is still speculative, an important part of
this link in Europe may be the relationship between
the temperature cycles of the North Atlantic Ocean,
the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), and Euro-
pean weather. To explain the variations observed in
snowmelt-induced floods in Polish rivers, Zdzislaw
Kaczmarek investigated the correlation of European
precipitation and snow cover with the NAO index of
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temperature variations. Applying a simple model of
snow cover and its changes in selected Polish river
basins, he concludes that as the NAO has increased,
snow cover has decreased significantly. This means
that the spring floods resulting from the combination
of melting snow and precipitation2 may be linked to
the stochastic properties of the NAO index.3 This re-
sult is of substantial interest for assessing the risks of
European flood events associated with precipitation
and snow melt.
Kaczmarek does not address the question of
whether there is a link between the NAO index and
climate change and thus does not suggest that spring-
time flooding is resulting from a warmer climate. De-
spite the IPCC’s warning that climate warming will
likely increase the extremes in weather events on
a global scale, there is still scant evidence that cli-
mate warming is contributing to flood losses in Eu-
rope today. Alternatively, the escalation in European
flood losses are convincingly linked to other anthro-
pogenic causes. In his article on “European River
Floods in a Changing World,” Ken Mitchell argues
that the main driving forces of flood losses are the
movements of population and capital into harm’s way
and human-driven transformations of hydrological
systems. Population and capital are concentrating in
flood-prone areas; land-use practices are increasing
the runoff from precipitation; and private construc-
tion and public infrastructure continue to be vulnera-
ble to flood damage. This conclusion applies beyond
Europe and beyond flooding. Normalizing the trend
in losses from major natural disasters across the globe
over the last decade to account for population and
wealth increases, Mileti(18) concludes that increased
disaster losses can almost be fully explained by in-
creasing population and capital.
3. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF FLOOD
RISK MANAGEMENT
The conclusion that climate change is playing a
role in Europe’s increasing flood damages is prema-
2 By downscaling GCM models for Alpine catchment areas,
Nachtnebel(16) also argues that an increase of flooding proba-
bility may depend on simultaneous precipitation events and snow
melting due to warmer spring temperatures.
3 A further correlation between sea temperature and precipitation
has been found by Maracchi,(17) who shows that the triggering of
convective storms in Tuscany, Italy has been enhanced by warm
moist air from the Mediterranean due to increased sea surface
temperature.
ture; however, the IPCC suggests that such a role is
likely in the future. In countries like the Netherlands,
which have a large geographic exposure to the risks
of flooding, a small increase in flood probability and
intensity can translate into large losses. In their arti-
cle on “Adapting to Climate Change: A Case Study
on Riverine Flood Risks in the Netherlands,” Richard
Tol, Nicolien van der Grijp, Alexander Olsthoor, and
Peter van der Werff ask whether institutions like the
water-management authorities and their likely suc-
cessors will learn and adapt to the increasing flood
risks posed by climate change and also by interven-
tions in the system by the authorities themselves.
This question cannot be addressed without taking
into account the full institutional setting surrounding
river-basin management. In the Netherlands, more
so than in most other European countries, the pub-
lic and NGOs have become influential, especially in
protesting the extent of flood protection by dikes
and other structural measures in favor of more nat-
uralistic policies like “letting the river be the river.”
Public interventions have constrained the water au-
thorities in providing engineered flood protection.
The authors argue that the increasing demands of
the public to participate and influence flood risk man-
agement poses an added difficulty with regard to the
institutional response to climate change. Based on a
study of the Rhine and the Meuse Rivers over the past
50 years and a scenario study looking into the future,
they show that new and major infrastructure is needed
to maintain flood risks at their current level. They give
particular attention to a Dutch proposal to construct
bypass channels as an alternative to building stronger
dikes. The authors are pessimistic, however, that there
will be sufficient political will or needed institutional
reform to meet this challenge.
Hungary ranks only behind the Netherlands
with respect to flood exposure. In contrast to the
Netherlands, participatory institutions and processes
with regard to flood risk management in Hungary are
at an early stage; yet, in all areas of environmental
policy the public is becoming increasingly involved.
In their article on “Stakeholder Views on Flood Risk
Management in Hungary’s Upper Tisza Basin,” Anna
Vari, Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer, and Zoltan Ferencz
report on the results of a public survey to elicit views
on the appropriate means of reducing the high flood
losses in the Upper Tisza area and for transferring the
residual losses from the direct victims, who are mainly
very poor farmers, to taxpayers or an insurance pool.
These issues are especially topical for the Hungarian
government, which has spent large sums on protective
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levees and has a traditional obligation to provide
substantial relief to private victims (following recent
devastating floods the government fully repaired or
rebuilt all damaged homes and buildings). Although
many view government support as fair for this des-
titute region, there are mounting concerns that it is
unsustainable. Levees inevitably increase flood risks
further downstream, and compensating flood victims
is not only discouraging local efforts to reduce flood
losses but is also causing serious problems for the
Hungarian government, which intends to meet the
Maastrich conditions as a new EU member. The gov-
ernment would welcome more private responsibility
and insurance, a policy path that few in this region
could afford and thus a path that would force many
villagers to leave the area. Moving the villagers out
and renaturalizing the river are measures many con-
sider more sustainable and, at the same time, unfair.
Hungary, like many countries, is thus asking how it
can manage its flood risks in a more responsible, sus-
tainable, and equitable way.
In contrast to the Netherlands, the Hungarian sur-
vey showed a great deal of public support for struc-
tural flood-protection measures. Another surprising
result was that a large number of the survey respon-
dents including those facing no risks thought the tax-
payers should continue to aid Tisza victims on the
grounds that the government—by not pursuing more
sustainable policies in the region—is largely respon-
sible for the flood damage. Yet, there was strong
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by insurance and state aid in recent
European and U.S. floods.
minority support for more ecological flood policies
and more private insurance, which led the authors
to conclude that a flood-risk management strategy in
Hungary will likely not gain widespread support un-
less it combines elements of the business-as-usual
path, that is, the path characterized by central govern-
ment protection and relief, with more market-based
and ecological policy paths.
The hierarchical policy response to flooding in
Hungary is typical of central and eastern European
governments but contrasts sharply with, for example,
the United Kingdom, which has traditionally placed
far greater responsibility on individuals and house-
holds. Fig. 2 shows the relative proportions of state
aid and insurance in the cases of four recent floods in
Europe and the United States (the 1998 Easter floods
in the United Kingdom, the 1993 German Rhine
floods, the 1997 Polish flood, and the 1993 midwest
floods in the United States). Although the United
Kingdom and Germany stand out as having practi-
cally no or very little government aid to victims, re-
spectively, the Polish government (like Hungary) is
very generous in compensating victims after a disas-
ter. Interestingly, the United States, with its exten-
sive National Flood Insurance Program, is closer to
the Polish case. Many observers point out the draw-
backs of relying heavily on government post-disaster
relief, which encourages more development in flood
plains,(19) but as the Hungarian case demonstrates,
many citizens value social solidarity.
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4. THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
OF DISASTER RISKS BY PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES
Social solidarity, however, is creating a dilemma
for the Hungarian and many transition governments
in Europe. With escalating flood losses, transition
countries may have great difficulty in financing dis-
aster relief and recovery. This is especially true in
the developing world, where very poor and very
disaster-prone countries, for example, Honduras, the
Philippines, and China, face such enormous risks that
they can be set back years in their development. The
question addressed by three articles in this volume is
whether these governments could potentially benefit
from insurance or insurance-related financial instru-
ments, like catastrophe bonds, that are put into place
before the disaster occurs.
Keeping in mind that the purchase of insurance or
related financial instruments raises the average costs
of disasters to governments in the long run, the ques-
tion is whether the benefits justify the costs. This is
the question posed by Paul Freeman and Georg Pflug
in their article on “Infrastructure in Developing and
Transition Countries: Risk and Protection.” The the-
ory of insurance suggests that private individuals will
purchase insurance only if they are averse to large
losses. If these losses are spread across taxpayers, is
there a reason for governments to purchase protec-
tion? Freeman and Pflug point out that insurance has
added value in assuring a country’s solvency and sta-
bility, especially if the government authorities have a
difficult time borrowing, diverting funds from other
budget items, or otherwise raising funds after a ma-
jor disaster. Therefore, the cost-benefit tradeoff is one
between economic growth through infrastructure in-
vestment and added solvency and stability for the
economy, and the authors develop a model to show
this tradeoff. The model provides a basis for evaluat-
ing alternative financing options based on a country’s
objectives in terms of growth, solvency, and stability.
In their article on “Sovereign CAT Bonds and
Infrastructure Project Financing,” David Croson and
Andreas Richter examine this tradeoff more specifi-
cally by exploring the opportunities for using insur-
ance and other catastrophe-linked securities to re-
duce the total costs of funding public infrastructure
projects in emerging economies. This question is of
particular interest to countries that fund infrastruc-
ture projects with loans from international financial
institutions, such as the World Bank. The reason is
that funding for infrastructure projects in vulnerable
countries is often rerouted as relief for natural disas-
ters, for example, almost 40% of World Bank funds to
Mexico are diverted for this purpose.(21) The authors
address three key questions: Can catastrophe-linked
securities be useful to a sovereign nation? Why are
such financial instruments ideally suited for protect-
ing public infrastructure projects sponsored by third
parties (for example, the World Bank)? How can the
benefits of a government or external project spon-
sor, who values timely completion of the projects, be
estimated? To address these questions, the authors
develop a model to calculate the overall cost reduc-
tions possible with the use of insurance-linked finan-
cial instruments based on the costs of capital, the risks
of disasters, the feasibility of strategies for mid-stage
project abandonment, and the timing of capital com-
mitments to the infrastructure investment. With this
model, they can identify the set of circumstances un-
der which governments or lenders might be advised
to pay the costs of these instruments.
This research shows that governments can poten-
tially benefit from insurance or insurance-related fi-
nancial instruments that are put into place before a
flood or other disaster occurs. This is not the case for
governments of wealthy countries, since they usually
have ample opportunities to raise needed capital after
a disaster occurs, usually by issuing highly rated gov-
ernment bonds. This raises a dilemma: those countries
or governments that can benefit most from insurance-
linked instruments can least afford them. Are there
ways that private “charitable” investors or interna-
tional financial institutions could play a role in en-
abling poor countries to purchase pre-disaster financ-
ing instruments?
Howard Kunreuther and Joanne Linnerooth-
Bayer in their paper on “The Financial Management
of Catastrophic Flood Risks in Emerging-Economy
Countries” address this question and suggest that
international lending institutions, like the World
Bank, consider innovations for subsidizing insurance-
related instruments for poor countries. These authors
also examine another important consideration with
regard to sovereign insurance. Since governments,
like individuals, may invest less in mitigation mea-
sures if they have insurance, the so-called moral haz-
ard, these authors suggest alternatives for linking
insurance-linked instruments with incentives for mit-
igation. As a concrete case, they discuss the finan-
cial arrangements for disaster recovery after the 1997
flood disaster in Poland, which caused losses of ap-
proximately 3% of Poland’s GDP. They examine the
full range of pre-disaster financing or hedging in-
struments and compare them with those available
after the disaster. They also show how pre-disaster
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instruments can be designed to create incentives for
the Polish authorities to invest in flood-proofing a
water-treatment plant.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Research investigating the relationship of climate
change to the intensity and frequency of flooding
at a regional level will be indispensable if countries
over the globe are to adapt to a warming climate. In-
deed, weather-related extreme events may be one of
the costliest consequences of climate change. Even
without climate change, Europe and the world will
likely face a dramatic rise in weather-related dam-
ages. Our knowledge about climate change and other
factors contributing to extreme events and their con-
sequences is improving, but this knowledge will prove
insufficient if institutions and democratic procedures
are not in place to respond to the risks.
Stakeholder involvement in policies for the mit-
igation of flood losses and the design of a public-
private insurance system in Hungary is a step in
this direction. Yet, the pessimistic outlook for insti-
tutional adaptation to increasing flood risks in the
Netherlands, which has a strong democratic tradition
of stakeholder involvement, is sobering and suggests
that we need new, innovative ideas for adapting to
the challenges of floods and other extreme events. A
recent innovation for the financial management of ex-
treme events stems from the financial markets and in-
cludes a range of insurance-related, risk-transfer in-
struments, such as catastrophe bonds, to hedge the
risks of disasters. These instruments have proven use-
ful to insurance companies with high exposure to
catastrophes, and they could potentially support poor
governments facing the potential of very large disaster
losses. However, those governments most in need of
pre-disaster financial arrangements are usually those
that can least afford them. This may call for rethinking
the way governments provide aid to poor countries,
in effect switching from post-disaster relief to aid in
the form of pre-disaster insurance instruments.
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Floods and Climate Change: Interactions and Impacts
Axel Bronstert∗
Whether the floods experienced during the last decade in Germany and in other European
countries are triggered or worsened by human activities has been the subject of a great deal of
debate. Possible anthropogenic activities leading to increased flood risk include river regulation
measures, intensified land use and forestry, and emissions of greenhouse gases causing a change
in the global climate. This article discusses the latter by reviewing the existing knowledge on the
subject. First, the relevance, capabilities, and limitations of climate models for the simulation
and analysis of flood risk under aspects of the anthropogenic climate change are described.
Special consideration is given here to differences between the “typical” spatial scale of climate
models and hydrological flood models. Second, observations of trends in climate variables
relevant for river flooding issues are summarized. Special emphasis is put on the Rhine and
other German catchment areas. Third, the possibilities of modeling the different parts of the
“cascade of flood risk” are summarized, introducing the special features of meteorological,
hydrological, and river hydraulic models.
KEY WORDS: River flooding; flood risk; climate change; hydrological modeling; climate downscaling
1. INTRODUCTION
Whether the floods experienced in recent years
in Germany and in other European countries are trig-
gered or worsened by human activities has been the
subject of a great deal of debate.(1–5) Possible anthro-
pogenic activities leading to increased flood risk in-
clude river regulation measures, intensified land use
and forestry, and emissions of greenhouse gases caus-
ing a change in the global climate. This article dis-
cusses the latter by reviewing the existing knowledge
on the subject.
In recent years, rising water levels, floods, and
landslides following heavy precipitation have oc-
curred with increasing frequency in many European
countries. Table I gives a still not complete overview
of severe river floods in the European Union and
neighboring countries and their direct effects on the
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Potsdam, Institute for Geo-Ecology, Chair for Hydrology and Cli-
matology, PO Box 60 15 53, 14415 Potsdam, Germany; tel: +49
331 977 2548; fax: +49 331 977 2092; axelbron@rz.uni-potsdam.de.
population of the affected areas between 1991 and
2000.
In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) confirmed the increase of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere and the resulting global
warming of the earth.(6) The second technical report(7)
concluded, inter alia, that the mean summer temper-
atures in the northern hemisphere in the last decade
have been the highest experienced since the begin-
ning of the 15th century. On the basis of a wide array
of proxy sources, such as ice cores, tree rings, corals,
and lake sediments, it has been concluded that the
20th century is at least as warm or even warmer than
any century of the last millennium. Accordingly, for
some places of the earth, especially for high moun-
tain regions, the 20th century seems to be the warmest
century in several thousand years. These findings are
supported on a even wider basis by a variety of tem-
perature measurements over the globe as reported in
the IPCC third assessment report.(8)
In the 20th century warming took place basically
during two periods: from about 1910 to 1940 and from
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Table I. Heavy Floods in the EU and
Neighboring Countries, 1991–2000, and
Their Effects on the Population
Region Year Fatalities Evacuations
Wallis (Switzerland); Northern Italy 2000 36 ?
England and Wales 2000 ? ?
Eastern Spain 2000 ? ?
Hungary and Romania 2000 11 ?
Bavaria (Germany); Austria; Switzerland 1999 12 ?
Southwest France 1999 ? ?
Portugal; Western Spain; Italy 1998 31 ?
Belgium; Netherlands 1998 2 ?
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland 1998 ca. 100 ?
Eastern Germany; Czech Republic; Western Poland 1997 114 195,000
Southern Spain 1996 25 200
Southern, western, and northern Germany; Belgium; 1995 27 300,000
Luxembourg; Netherlands; eastern
and northern France
Piemonte and Liguria (Italy) 1994 73 3,400
Greater Athens (Greece) 1994 12 2,500
Southwest Germany; Belgium; Luxembourg; southern 1993–1994 17 18,000
Netherlands; eastern and northern France
Piemonte and Liguria (Italy); southeast France 1993 13 2,000
Essex and Devon (UK); Ireland 1993 4 1,500
Vaucluse (France) 1992 42 8,000
Sicily (Italy) 1991 16 2,000
the middle of the 1970s to the present.(8) The seven
warmest years occurred during the last 10 years of the
20th century (see Fig. 1). A similar trend of temper-
ature increase, as well as an accumulation of warmer
years during the last 10 years, was not only observed
worldwide, but also in Germany.
The decisive questions for evaluating the effects
of climate warming on the risk of flooding in Europe
are the following:
Fig. 1. Mean annual values of air temperature over the land ar-
eas of the earth (◦C) 1861–2000 in relation to the average of
1961–1990.(8)
 Is the observed temperature increase accom-
panied by an increase in precipitation as well
as by an increasing number and/or severity of
floods?
 Is there any change in the characteristics
(quantity, intensity, extension) and frequency
of extreme precipitation events causing
floods?
 What are the effects of climate change on
flooding in comparison to other anthropogenic
impacts and in comparison to the “normal”
natural variability?
At present, large scientific uncertainties are as-
sociated with these questions. However, some con-
clusions with regard to the possible effects of global
warming on the risk of flooding may be drawn on the
basis of the knowledge available today. For this pur-
pose it is advisable to differentiate between two cat-
egories of floods according to the size of the affected
area and the duration of precipitation (spatial and
temporal scale of the flood events). Extensive, long-
lasting floods ( plain floods) describe the flooding of
larger areas that is almost invariably caused by rain-
falls lasting several days or weeks in connection with
high antecedent soil saturation. Flooding caused by
extensive and long-lasting rainfalls, partly connected
with the melting of snow and ice, occurs mostly in
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Fig. 2. Overview of observed trends in global hydrology.(7)
plain areas when the dikes along the big rivers can
no longer contain the flood discharges. This can lead
to flooding of wide areas, as, for example, during the
flooding of the Rhine/Maas rivers in December 1993
and in January/February 1995. Local, sudden floods
( flash floods) describe flooding in small catchments
that is mainly caused by short and highly intensive
precipitation (e.g., thunderstorms). Flash floods oc-
cur primarily in hilly or mountainous areas due to
prevailing convective rainfall mechanisms, thin soils,
and high runoff velocities. The warning time for these
events is short. In general, the duration of the flood
event is also short, but this flood type is also frequently
connected with severe damages.
2. CLIMATE MODELING AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO THE FLOODING ISSUE
The mean global temperature has risen by 0.3–
0.6◦C since the end of the 19th century, and 0.2–
0.3◦C of this increase occurred in the last 40 years.
According to statistical analyses carried out by the
German Center for Climatic Computations (DKRZ),
the warming of the last 20 years can be attributed
with 95% certainty to anthropogenic causes as op-
posed to natural climatic variability.(9) With regard to
the question of flooding, the decisive factor is not the
temperature, but rather the characteristics of precip-
itation. In this respect, long-term observations on a
global to continental scale have, for instance, shown
an increase in precipitation in higher latitudes of the
northern hemisphere in winter and a certain decrease
in precipitation over the subtropical areas from Africa
to Indonesia. Fig. 2 illustrates the observed trends in
global hydrology over the last 20–30 years.
Energy and water cycles are closely interrelated
systems with mutual impacts. On the basis of ther-
modynamic principles, it can be stated that on the
global scale a temperature increase will lead to a gen-
eral intensification of the hydrological cycle. Assum-
ing a global temperature increase between 2.8–5.2◦C,
Mitchell(10) estimates increased global evaporation
and precipitation rates to be between 7–15%. This in-
crease is similar to the calculations by Roth,(11) which
showed an intensification of the global hydrological
cycle by approximately 10%. Due to the shifting of
climatic zones and an increasing intensity of convec-
tive processes, Berz(12) anticipates a future increase in
the frequency and severity of windstorms, floods, and
storm surges in many parts of the world.
An assessment of the change in the evolution
(severity and intensity) of floods calls for analyses that
are carried out on much smaller scales than that of
the global or continental. For such an assessment it is
necessary to analyze the change of hydrological con-
ditions, and especially the characteristics of heavy pre-
cipitation, at the regional to local hydrological scale.
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This requires the adaptation of existing regional, dy-
namic climate models and/or statistical downscaling
of methods toward the requirements of regional hy-
drological models.
Dynamic climate models attempt to mathemati-
cally simulate, at various degrees of detail, the physics
of the atmosphere, of the oceans, and the exchange
processes between the earth’s surface and/or the bio-
sphere and the atmosphere. The most powerful cli-
mate models today are coupled global atmosphere-
ocean circulation models (GCM), which carry out
three-dimensional calculations of the equations for
mass and energy transport, momentum, humidity of
the atmosphere, and salt content of the ocean for the
entire globe. For this purpose the atmosphere and
the oceans are separately subdivided into a gridded
system of vertical layers and horizontal sections so
that an overall three-dimensional disaggregation is
achieved. As the GCMs were originally conceived for
the analysis of large-scale circulation systems, they are
much too coarse in their spatial resolution to yield us-
able data for the analysis of floods.(13) Precipitation
values for an area of 500 × 500 km, that is, one mean
value for 250,000 km2, cannot supply reliable infor-
mation on the risk of heavy rainfall in a river basin
covering an area of the order of 10,000 km2.
Therefore, a variety of techniques have been de-
veloped to derive the climate forcing required for as-
sessing the hydrological, basinwide impacts of climate
change. The most important ones are the statistical
downscaling and the regional climate models. Statis-
tical downscaling bridges the two different scales by
establishing empirical (statistical) relationships be-
tween large-scale features simulated reliably by the
GCMs, such as geopotential height fields, and regional
or local climate variables, such a temperature and pre-
cipitation at a certain location. Statistical downscal-
ing techniques have been applied in a series of stud-
ies,(14) but few of these studies have been carried out
in the context of climate change and flooding. A re-
view of prospects and limitations of this approach for
use in climate change impact studies focusing on ex-
treme hydrological events is beyond the scope of this
article.
The so-called regional climate models have been
applied for some time. In contrast to the general cir-
culation models, they cover only a section of the globe
that can be modeled at a finer spatial resolution. At
present, the grid widths used for regional climate
models are approximately 50 km or less. The climatic
conditions at the boundaries of the regional sections
are predetermined by the results of the GCMs. Such
a spatial resolution is considerably more adequate for
the analysis of flood risks. However, these models can-
not assess or project precipitation with the high degree
of certainty necessary for the quantification of flood-
ing risk for the following reasons.(15)
 The boundary conditions of the regional model
are obtained from the GCM, and thus an
error of atmospheric dynamics contained in
the large-scale model is transferred to the re-
spective region. Errors or shortcomings in the
GCM thus directly limit the capacity of the re-
gional climate model.
 The resolution of the regional climate models
is sufficiently detailed to represent large-scale
precipitation patterns. However, these models
are not yet sufficient to cover small-scale, con-
vective precipitation (e.g., thunderstorms) in
the necessary detail. Though processes taking
place at a smaller scale than represented by
the grid box (subgrid-scale processes) can be
parameterized by the subdivision of the grid
boxes into a clouded and a cloud-free section,
several convective systems cannot be localized
within a grid square. With an increasing res-
olution, an increasing number of parameters
would have to be isolated from the explicit
modeling process, a problem that has not yet
been resolved.
 Flooding is triggered by extreme precipita-
tion. However, the climate models have not
yet been sufficiently tested for their realistic
representation of such extremes.
 The parameterization of important processes,
such as the formation of clouds, soil moisture
dynamics, or land surface interactions, has not
yet been resolved in a way that allows for a
definition of the natural variability under any
weather condition or for the recognition of a
possible signal of climate change.
An example of the effect of soil moisture dy-
namics on the generation of precipitation, that is,
soil water being available for evapotranspiration,
thus increasing atmospheric humidity and contribut-
ing to cloud formation, is given by Beljaars.(16) In
an application of the weather forecast model of the
European Center for Medium-Range Weather Fore-
cast (ECMWF), the sensitivity to land surface param-
eterization in particular to the soil moisture module
was analyzed. Two approaches (the at that time oper-
ational version “C47” and an extended and improved
version “C48”) were compared on the basis of their
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forecasts for the extreme precipitation in July 1993
in the midwestern states of the United States. One
of the major differences between C47 and C48 is the
representation of the soil water dynamics: the C47
version contained two prognostic soil layers (7- and
42-cm deep) and an additional 42-cm climatological
layer as boundary condition, whereas the C48 ver-
sion is built up by four soil layers (7-, 21-, 72-, and
189-cm deep) and free drainage as lower boundary
condition. The results (Fig. 3a/b) show a rather dif-
ferent forecasted precipitation pattern, particularly
Fig. 3a/b. Mean precipitation forecast with an operational weather forecast model of the ECMWF for all 48–72-hour predictions between
July 7–22, 1993 for the midwestern states of the United States. Fig. 3a (upper chart) and 3b (lower chart) present the results based on the
former and the new land-surface parameterization (by personal communication of A. Betts, based on results from Beljaars(16)).
over the central United States. It can be clearly seen
that the amount of rain over the regions of Kansas,
Nebraska, and Iowa, which was calculated using the
former approach (CY 47) is almost zero (Figure 3a). In
contrast, the precipitation calculated by means of the
improved approach (CY 48) is considerably higher
and of longer duration. The authors conclude that
the extreme precipitation over the Mississippi area
in summer 1993, which was mainly responsible for
the extreme flooding at that time, could be estimated
much more realistically by the new approach. This
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example illustrates the sensitivity of climate projec-
tions to the soil moisture module. However, this might
not be an artifact of the climate model, because na-
ture, itself, is probably not less sensitive. The water
stored and evaporated from the soil has a decisive in-
fluence on the hydrological cycle, both on cloud and
rainfall formation (recycling of precipitation) and on
the generation of runoff.
Regional climate models can supply information
necessary for the estimation of flood-relevant precip-
itation, particularly with regard to weather conditions
connected with large-scale precipitation fields. How-
ever, for obtaining accurate information on the loca-
tion, quantity, and intensity of precipitation (necessary
for the analysis of the flooding process) as well as on
a change of the precipitation characteristics resulting
from global climate change, the models are not suffi-
ciently accurate or spatially detailed.
Apart from the difficulties in climate modeling
there are further unresolved problems with regard to
flood modeling.
 The transformation of precipitation (and/or
snow melting) into floods in a catchment area,
that is, the basic hydrological modeling effort,
frequently cannot be carried out with sufficient
accuracy due to the high natural variability
of the infiltration characteristics, insufficient
knowledge of the processes involved during
extreme precipitation periods, and insufficient
data on the catchment areas.
 Measurements of extreme precipitation and
runoff are frequently incorrect and not very
numerous. However, such measurements are
indispensable in order to standardize and im-
prove climate as well as hydrological models.
 Any climate-induced trends in the runoff be-
havior of a river are often superimposed by
the effects of changes in land use, river reg-
ulation measures, settlement expansion, and
changes in the river morphology. Frequently, it
is not possible to separate the effects of these
changes.
3. EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON FLOOD CHARACTERISTICS
Flood generation and runoff is a highly nonlin-
ear system, which is exposed to the natural and spa-
tial/temporal variability of meteorology, topography,
soil, vegetation, climate, groundwater conditions, and
the channel drainage system. Therefore, quantitative
statements, especially with regard to the effects of cli-
mate change on flooding and runoff processes, are
highly uncertain.(17) A qualitative assessment of the
situation can be based only on our present state of
knowledge, summarized below, taking into account
the underlying physical laws and the interpretation of
a series of measurements.
In investigating the risks of flood losses, meteo-
rological and hydrological conditions, river hydraulic
characteristics, and land-use conditions must be con-
sidered and separately assessed. Each of these factors
can contribute to an increased risk of flood damage, in
particular if there are negative interrelationships and
synergies. Of these flood-risk factors, the meteorolog-
ical conditions are considered to be of primary impor-
tance with regard to climate change. Also, vegetation
and soil conditions in the catchment area, which de-
termine water retention and evaporation processes,
can be affected by climate change and thus have a
feedback effect on flood development.
3.1. Observations in Germany and Europe
3.1.1. Trends in Precipitation and River
Discharge in the Rhine Area
An increase in mean precipitation, estimated on
the global scale on the basis of theoretical consid-
erations (see Section 2), has been confirmed on the
regional scale in parts of Germany and neighboring
areas by corresponding trends measured over approx-
imately the last 100 years. According to Engel,(18) the
annual precipitation over the Rhine area extending
to Cologne has, since 1890, shown a rising overall ten-
dency with distinctive periodical fluctuations. Apart
from the increased amounts of annual precipitation,
there is also a tendency of a seasonal shift from sum-
mer to winter. Combining both trends over the last
100 years, on average this results in a fairly constant
summer precipitation (June–October) and a signif-
icantly increased winter precipitation (November–
May). The statistical analysis of precipitation trends
in Europe between 1891 and 1900 by Rapp(19) shows
a significant increase in winter precipitation of cen-
tral and northern Europe and a decrease in southern
and southeastern Europe. These results are consistent
with the rainfall trends observed in the Rhine basin.
Apart from the above-mentioned precipitation
trends, corresponding tendencies were also noted for
the mean discharge in the Rhine basin extending to
Cologne. Engel(18) reports a rising tendency of the
maximum annual discharge of the Rhine at Cologne
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over the last 100 years. However, the observed trend
only applies to the maximum annual discharge de-
rived from daily data and cannot be related to extreme
discharges, that is, floods occurring less frequently,
but involving heavier discharge. Gru¨newald(20) re-
ports that the cause of the spectacular floods of the
Rhine in the years 1993/1994 as well as in 1995 cannot
be attributed to runoff from the Alps, but rather to the
low retention capacity of the soils in the flood-relevant
middle mountain range in Germany and France. The
low infiltration rates can mainly be attributed to the
spatially extensive periods of rainfall prior to the ac-
tual period of flooding, for example, December 7–18,
1993, and/or to the melting of the snow cover and
the frozen soil in January 1995. These flood events
showed how important the melting conditions of the
snow cover can be for the development of floods. Thus,
climate-induced changes in the quantity, frequency,
and timing of melting of the snow cover may have an
effect on the hydrological regime of a river and on
flooding.
3.1.2. Changes in Frequency of Weather Conditions
in Europe
Under zonal atmospheric circulation conditions,
in particular, a high correlation has been found be-
tween the large-scale weather type over Europe and
the North Atlantic and the occurrence probability of
regional or local precipitation in central Europe. For
example, Ba´rdossy(21) reports a probability of 85.6%
for daily precipitation occurrence at the climate sta-
tion at Essen with regard to cyclonal westerly weather
type and of 82.9% for cyclonal southwesterly weather
type. Investigations at many other weather stations
in western Europe have also confirmed the relation-
ship between westerly/south-westerly zonal circula-
tion conditions and heavy precipitation over parts of
western Europe.
Ba´rdossy(22) and Gerstengarbe(23) have examined
the frequency of weather conditions in Europe since
1891 by means of time series of daily weather maps
(Grosswetterlagen). They found a significant increase
in the frequency of west weather conditions, the sta-
tistical breaking point of the time series occurring
in the middle of the 1970s. The time series of west-
ern weather conditions and complementary types of
weather conditions for the months of December and
January is shown in Fig. 4. The increase of western
zonal conditions is evident. Since these weather con-
ditions can be considered typical of long-term, large-
scale precipitation patterns in central Europe (see
Fig. 4. Moving average frequencies (10-year window) of large-
scale westerly zonal weather conditions and large-scale weather
conditions north, east, northeast, and southeast (N+E+NE+SE)
over Europe for the months of December and January from 1881
to 1989.(22)
above), for some catchment areas a correlation can
be established between the increase of these weather
conditions and an increased frequency of floods. In
this connection, Caspary(24) draws the conclusion that
for some catchment areas in the Black Forest the
probability of flooding has dramatically increased.
Due to the lack of earlier weather maps and records,
however, it is not possible to state to what extent the
observed trend of the 115-year time series is explained
by longer-term, natural fluctuations.
3.1.3. Effects of Regional Warming
in the Past Two Centuries
Burkhart(25) reports a decrease of the extreme
floods of the Elbe river during the past 200 years.
This decrease is probably due to a reduction of floods
caused by ice jams and ice jam breaks. The reduction
of ice jams resulted mainly from the regional warming
that occurred after the end of the last little ice age (af-
ter 1800) and, to a smaller extent, from the increase
of salt content and from the inflow of relatively warm
waste and cooling water. The construction of numer-
ous upland reservoirs is also a factor to be consid-
ered in assessing water levels in the Elbe over recent
decades.
Table II compares the statistics of water-level time
series for the 19th and 20th centuries at the Elbe
gauges Dresden and Magdeburg. From this data, it
552 Bronstert
Table II. Discharge Rates (in m3/s) for Elbe River Floods of Equal Recurrence Intervals
Based on Time Series for the 19th and the 20th Centuries(25)
Statistical Return Period (in Years)
Period 2 5 10 20 25 50 100 200
Gauge Dresden
1806/1900 1,808 2,690 3,212 3,669 3,806 4,206 4,577 4,924
1900/1990 1,386 1,974 2,318 2,617 2,706 2,967 3,207 3,432
Difference 522 715 894 1,052 1,100 1,239 1,370 1,492
Gauge Magdeburg
1727/1890 2,280 3,200 3,730 4,310 4,180 4,700 5,050 5,370
1890/1975 1,720 2,430 2,830 3,220 3,330 3,650 3,950 4,240
Difference 560 770 880 960 980 1,050 1,100 1,130
is evident that the flood discharge rates for equal sta-
tistical recurrence intervals have decreased, that is,
that the flooding risk of the Elbe is lower in the 20th
century than it was in the previous century.
3.1.4. Changes of Characteristics of Debris Flow
Events in Alpine Environment
If the permafrost borderline rises in the high
mountain range due to a long-term mean tempera-
ture increase, this can lead to thawing and to a desta-
bilization of the currently frozen glacial deposits. In
this case, landslides and moraines with severe local
damage are likely to increase over the next several
decades. Whether the increased frequency of land-
slides and debris flows in Switzerland observed in the
past years is related to the warming in the Alpine re-
gion observed since 1850 has not yet been clarified.(26)
3.1.5. Indirect Effects of Reduced Vegetation
Densities and Degraded Soils
In the long term, climatic change also leads to a
change in the natural vegetation cover. Soil degra-
dation resulting from reduced vegetation, a reduced
macro porosity, and increased crusting and siltation
will decrease the infiltration capacity and enhance di-
rect runoff in the case of heavy precipitation.
The effect of reduced vegetation density on flood
development stems from a diminished interception
storage capacity and, above all, in the reduced pro-
tection of the soil surface against the kinetic energy
of precipitation. The latter may lead to the accumu-
lation of silt and thus to a considerable decrease in
infiltration potential, which may, in the case of highly
intensive rainfall, trigger flooding. Problems of this
kind are especially important in semi-arid areas (e.g.,
in the Mediterranean), but also in agricultural areas
with temperate climate conditions. Changes in the
natural composition of the vegetation cover and of
the soil structure due to changed climatic conditions,
however, only occur over longer periods. Therefore,
they will only have a long-term impact on changes in
flood patterns.
3.2. Modeling Possibilities
One important objective of modern flood risk
management and modeling is to understand and pre-
dict the extent, location, duration, and timing of
floods. Such forecasts must be based on complex and
detailed mathematical modeling systems. To simulate
a flood, basically three different modeling compo-
nents are required.
3.2.1. The Meteorological Model
The quality of weather forecasting models has sig-
nificantly improved during the last years. Today, such
models can supply information on temperature, wind,
and precipitation up to approximately one week in ad-
vance. However, forecasting cannot yet assess accu-
rately the location and the extent of precipitation. In
particular, information on the location and intensity
of local convective heavy rainfall (thunderstorms) is
still insufficient for the direct forecast of flash floods.
Weather forecasts must not be confused with cli-
mate projections. Dynamic climate models, which,
from a physical point of view, are very similar to
weather forecasting models, can supply information
only on climatic trends and mean, longer-term chan-
ges. A concrete time- and location-specific forecast
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of the various weather data is impossible within the
usual, necessarily long-term, time frame of climate
models.
3.2.2. The Hydrological Model
Hydrological models, which simulate the trans-
formation of precipitation into runoff, have pro-
gressed considerably as directed to different types of
flood generation.(27–29) However, the transformation
of precipitation into runoff is not always a routinely
applied part of a real-time flood prediction modeling
system. Especially under conditions of extreme rain-
fall, the hydrological models show deficiencies in the
assessment of infiltration overland flow, that is, the
share of the precipitation running off at the surface,
and of the groundwater reaction to excessive rainfall.
Furthermore, questions of scaling in the assessment
of hydrological processes are still partly unclear. A
third problem lies in the frequently insufficient requi-
site databases. Improvements in these models, how-
ever, can be expected, and this will reduce the gap be-
tween the forecast of precipitation and runoff within
the catchment area, thus presenting a basis for flood
projection.
3.2.3. The Hydraulic Model
Hydraulic models calculate the routing of the
flood wave within the river channel. They are not con-
cerned with the question of how much water is flow-
ing into the river, but how the water moves within the
river system. They require inflow data at the starting
points of the system (usually measurements from a
water gauge in the upper part of the river tributary, or
supplied by a hydrological rainfall-runoff model, as
explained above) to calculate water level, discharge
rates, as well as extension of the flooded area for the
channel system analyzed. These models are highly de-
veloped for many large river systems, and they have
supplied flood-level projections for many years.(30–34)
Since they require the input of inflow data into the
respective water system, however, they only work for
short early warning times (i.e., the time in which the
inflow moves from the point of measurement to the
point of calculation). For the Rhine in Cologne, for ex-
ample, this early warning time is only slightly longer
than two days. For smaller rivers, the early warning
times are so short that hydraulic models are of little
use for real-time projections of floods.
The challenge for the future lies in the improve-
ment and coupling of the above model systems to
allow for early warning times according to reliable
weather forecasts. Such coupled systems would also
permit the investigation of the longer-term effects
of climate change in the form of scenario analy-
ses. By means of such scenarios it will be possi-
ble to analyze the behavior of a catchment area
in the event of flooding under selected, typical fu-
ture climatic conditions in order to derive typical
flood characteristics. These events can then be com-
pared with present or past conditions in order to
make qualitative estimates for the river system under
consideration.
3.3. Changes of Extreme Weather Conditions
in Relation to Changes of Sea Surface
Temperature and Ocean Currents
In Section 3.1.2, the relationship between large-
scale atmospheric circulation patterns and the inten-
sity and frequency of rainfall events over parts of
Europe was discussed. It was shown that the increase
of westerly weather conditions over Europe has led
to an increase of precipitation in certain European re-
gions. In addition to the changes of atmospheric cir-
culation conditions, the relationship between global
warming, warming of the sea surface, changes of large-
scale ocean currents, and an increasing frequency of
weather anomalies are gaining increasing interest by
hydrometeorological researchers. A similar impor-
tant research topic concerns changes in the course,
frequency, and intensity of cyclones and the relation
to the formation and water content of clouds. It is
beyond the scope of this article to review the recent
research on sea surface temperature anomalies and
heavy precipitation events leading to floods. How-
ever, a few examples from different climatic regions
are given below.
Maracchi(35) examines the relationship between
extreme convective events in Tuscany (Italy) and
sea surface temperature anomalies in the Mediter-
ranean Sea. Based on an analysis of a series of thun-
derstorm events, Maracchi concludes that the trig-
gering of convective storms will be enhanced by an
increased sea surface temperature due to the in-
creased advection of warm moist air from the sea.
Ali(36) investigates the trends in cyclone intensity
and frequency due to a rise of sea surface temper-
ature of 2 and 4◦C by using a model for simula-
tion of storm surges in the Bay of Bengal. Mason(37)
discusses the possible changes of precipitation over
Southern Africa by using a GCM, including the ef-
fects of an increasing sea surface temperature. Ma-
son concludes that increases both in frequency and
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intensity of extreme rainfall events are simulated
throughout the subcontinent. Kaczmarek(38) exam-
ines the relationship between the North Atlantic Os-
cillation (NAO) index and snowmelt-induced floods
in Poland. He concludes that an increasing NAO in-
dex increases the risk of winter/early spring floods
for selected rivers in Poland due to an earlier and
more frequent appearance of snow-melt weather
conditions.
3.4. Knowledge Gaps
It is apparent that there are numerous unre-
solved questions with regard to the relationship be-
tween climate change and flooding. The following
overview of knowledge gaps is based on Bronstert(39)
and Dooge.(40) Further information on the subject is
given in the guidelines for future-oriented flood pro-
tection by the German Working Group on Water(41)
and by Kundzewicz.(3)
3.4.1. Change in the Frequency of Heavy Local
(Convective) Rainfall
For operational purposes, regional and local fore-
casts are particularly important. However, a quan-
titative prediction of the frequency, location, ex-
tent, and intensity of highly intensive local rainfall
has so far only been possible to a very limited de-
gree, even in short-term weather forecasting. Meth-
ods of analyzing spatial/temporal precipitation fre-
quency on a small scale must be further developed,
which applies to the linkage of weather-radar mea-
surements and precipitation data as well as to the link-
age of typical weather conditions and precipitation.
Progress is urgently needed, especially with regard to
local, highly erosive flash floods.
3.4.2. Significance of Changes in Weather Conditions
for Long Time Series
The significance of the changes in the frequency
of weather conditions in parts of Europe (see Section
3.1.2) over longer time periods is not yet known. In
this respect it would be desirable to trace large-scale
weather conditions well into the past and to corre-
late them with proxy sources, for example, biological
indicators. This may provide information on how sig-
nificant changes in the frequency of weather condi-
tions coincide with long-term and spatially extensive
statistical nonstationary behavior.
3.4.3. Risk Analysis: Natural Conditions Versus
Anthropogenic Interference with Nature
Apart from individual cases, hydrologists have
not yet been able to distinguish the influence of cli-
mate change on flooding in relation to other anthro-
pogenic interferences or in relation to the natural
variability of the meteorological and area-specific hy-
drological conditions. For such an analysis the further
development of process-oriented hydrological mod-
els coupled with meteorological and hydraulic simu-
lation tools is necessary. Such a model development
could result in an operational tool for the quantifica-
tion of the anthropogenic influences in relation to the
natural fluctuations of the meteorological and hydro-
logical conditions.
3.4.4. The Effect of Changes in Land Coverage
Changes in land surface and vegetation during
the past decades are mainly due to human interfer-
ence with the natural systems, such as agriculture,
forestry, settlements, and road construction. Climatic
change influences on land coverage play a secondary
role compared to more severe, direct changes of
land use, such as forest clearing or urbanization.
Nevertheless, in the long term, climatic change influ-
ence on land coverage may become a more impor-
tant factor influencing the frequency and severity of
floods.
Direct anthropogenic interferences, such as wood
clearing, extension or transformation of agricultural
areas, and urbanization, or indirect anthropogenic in-
fluences, such as the consequences of forest damage
or changes in water availability due to the enhanced
greenhouse effect, may result in significant large-scale
and long-term changes of the biosphere. In partic-
ular, the long-term effects on the vegetation cover
and soil surface condition and consequently on the
probability of flooding have not yet been adequately
assessed.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This article has discussed various aspects and
relations of flood risk. Stock(42) termed the inter-
dependency of different flood risk components the
“cascade of flood risk” (see Fig. 5). This cas-
cade includes the flood-relevant aspects of global
change: climate change, change in land use and land
cover, modifications to the river morphology and the
channel system, as well as the increase in human
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Fig. 5. Causes, effects, and consequences of floods: “Cascade of
Flood Risk.”(42)
settlements. These changes of environmental con-
ditions affect the flood risk at different levels, for
example, by altering the retention capacity of river
basins, by changing both the retention capacity and
the potential damage in floodplains adjacent the river,
and by increasing the vulnerability due to settle-
ment in flood endangered areas. Subsequently, flood
risks are influenced by natural (climate; river basin
morphology) and man-made (river channelization;
urbanization) factors influencing the frequency of
floods and social/economic factors influencing their
consequences.
Our knowledge of climate change, its future de-
velopment, and its effects on systems and cycles of the
earth is still very limited. This discussion has shown
that in some areas there is evidence of an increased risk
of flooding from climate change. In other areas there
is no such evidence. Most of the past investigations
of flood development have been carried out from a
mono-causal point of view, that is, from the view of
the respective observer. An integrated analysis, cov-
ering the cause-effect chain of precipitation—runoff
generation—runoff concentration—flood wave prop-
agation (routing)—inundation—flood damage, would
allow for a comparative assessment of the various
flood-triggering and damage-causing factors. For this
purpose the further development of complex hydro-
logical catchment models and of statistical tools for in-
corporating the stochastic components of such models
would be required.
Therefore, a state-of-the-art evaluation on flood
risk should include all relevant levels of flood risk
composition, both the aspects of naturally induced
hazard and vulnerability due to the activity of hu-
mans.(43) One must keep in mind that only in excep-
tional cases will it be possible to quantify each of the
factors involved in the composition of flood risk, and
in many cases it will be difficult to separate climate
from anthropogenic effects. However, an integrated
management of flood risk will enhance our ability
to mitigate the total damage caused by river floods
and can result in an optimization and adaptation of
flood protection measures, both structural and non-
structural. As a “byproduct” of integrated flood risk
management, one may also improve the quantifica-
tion of climatic and other global change impacts on
flood risk.
Since knowledge of climate change and its ef-
fects is still limited, population, industry, and govern-
ments should take cost-effective climate protection
measures, for example, by reducing climate-relevant
trace gases and protecting the vegetation cover of the
earth. Climatic protection is also desirable from the
point of view of flood protection. A concrete mitiga-
tion of floods at specific locations and times cannot be
expected from climate protection measures; however,
a long-term, generally positive reduction in flood risks
can be anticipated.
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The Impact of Climate Variability on Flood Risk in Poland
Zdzislaw Kaczmarek∗
This article examines the role of climatic and hydrological variability in assessing the cumula-
tive risk of flood events in Poland over a T-year period. In a broad sense flood-risk estimation
combines a frequency analysis of extreme hydrological phenomena with an evaluation of
flood-induced damages. The damage from floods depends on the critical values of the river
discharges. The probabilistic flood analysis usually includes an estimation of the expected an-
nual probability of the critical discharge Qcr being exceeded and the equivalent long-term risk
of it being exceeded over the next T years. If, however, the process is nonstationary, the T-year
risk of flood damage may depend importantly on the variation of hydrological processes. As a
possible explanation for the variations observed in snowmelt-induced floods in Polish rivers,
this article investigates the possible impact of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) on surface
air temperature T and precipitation P. The spatial distribution of the correlation coefficients
between NAO and T, as well as NAO and P, show very significant differences in the NAO
impact on meteorological variables in various parts of Europe. To assess the implications of
NAO variations on spring flood discharges, a simple model of Snow Cover Water Equivalent
(SCWE) was applied to selected Polish river catchments. The conclusion of this analysis is that
the yearly maximum of SCWE values significantly decreases with increasing NAO. This leads
to a temporal redistribution of winter and spring runoff. The question of spring flood charac-
teristics being stationary or nonstationary may therefore be linked with stochastic properties
of the NAO index time series.
KEY WORDS: Flood risks; snow cover; NAO index; climate variability
1. INTRODUCTION
Risk and uncertainty in water resources arise
from the inherent variability of geophysical processes
and changes in complex socioeconomic factors. As a
decision tool, risk analysis is based on the quantifica-
tion of the probabilities of floods occurring and their
possible consequences. Uncertainty arises from the
lack of exact knowledge regarding the probability dis-
tribution of floods, errors in estimated parameters of
these distributions, and a number of factors having an
impact on damages related to a given flood pattern.
In the recent decade, water managers have been
alarmed by extreme floods in China, the Czech Re-
∗ Address correspondence to Zdzislaw Kaczmarek, Institute of
Geophysics, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland;
Kaczmar@igf.edu.pl.
public, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and many other
countries. Most of these catastrophic events were
caused by unusually intense precipitation in moun-
tainous areas or by the complex interaction of rainfall
and snowmelt.(1) At the same time, since the 1980s a
decrease of peak discharges during spring floods has
been observed in most of the central European rivers.
It is therefore difficult to generalize about flood haz-
ards across Europe.
The aim of this article is to discuss the role of cli-
matic and hydrological variability in assessing the cu-
mulative risk of snowmelt-induced flood events over
a T-year period. In a broad sense, flood-risk assess-
ment combines a frequency analysis of extreme hy-
drological phenomena and an evaluation of the flood
damages. In this article, I consider the physical (hy-
drological) aspects of flood risks and their relation
559 0272-4332/03/1200-0559$22.00/1 C© 2003 Society for Risk Analysis
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to large-scale atmospheric processes. The potential
linkages between changes in the statistical properties
of snowmelt-induced floods and large-scale meteoro-
logical phenomena, like atmospheric circulation pro-
cesses, are the main subjects of this analysis. In par-
ticular, the possible connection between snowmelt-
induced floods and the North Atlantic Oscillation
(NAO) is investigated.
Many authors link changes in the atmosphere’s
hemispheric meridional heat and moisture trans-
port to the high variability of the North Atlantic
Oscillation.(2,3) The NAO is a large-scale alterna-
tion of atmospheric mass with centers of action near
the Icelandic Low and the Azores High.(4) There
are several methods to describe the NAO phenom-
ena by means of numerical indicators. In this arti-
cle, I will apply the Hurrell NAO index,(5) defined as
the normalized pressure difference between Lisbon
in Portugal and Stykkisholmur/Reykjavik in Iceland.
The time series of the winter (December to March)
NAO index in the period 1901–2000 is shown in Fig. 1.
Shorthouse and Arnell(6) note that the winter
river flows in northern Europe are positively corre-
lated with the North Atlantic Oscillation, whereas
rivers in southern Europe are negatively correlated
with the NAO index. They explain this correlation
by “enhanced rainfall over Northern Europe and
Scandinavia whilst a significant reduction of the to-
tal atmospheric moisture occurs over parts of Central
and Southern Europe, and the Mediterranean” in
years exhibiting high NAO index. This interpretation
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Fig. 1. Time series of winter NAO index (Source: Hurrell(5)).
Fig. 2. Mean monthly discharges of the Vistula River in years with
high and low NAO index.
of the recent changes in the winter/spring river dis-
charges in central Europe is nonetheless disputable
because of the very weak correlation between the
NAO index and winter precipitation for most of
the central European catchments (e.g., Rhine, Elbe,
Odra, Vistula, and Nemunas) and the simultaneously
significant changes in the temporal pattern of river
flows.
As an example, the Vistula River hydrographs
in years with high and low NAO index are shown in
Fig. 2. An interesting picture of the correlation of the
mean monthly river discharges (from January to June)
on the winter NAO index is presented in Fig. 3. It
can be seen that for high values of the NAO index,
the river discharges slightly increase from January to
March. This is probably due to a reduction of snow
accumulation and the consequent decrease in river
Fig. 3. Correlation of mean monthly discharges of selected Euro-
pean rivers with the winter NAO index.
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discharges in April and May, which is a typical flood
period in central Europe. This temporal pattern of
correlation between the NAO index(5) and the water
balance during the winter and spring seasons is par-
ticularly apparent in the eastern part of Poland, for
example, for catchments of the Nemunas and Vistula
Rivers. High values of the NAO index contribute to
warm winters over much of Europe, which may highly
influence snow accumulation and snow-melting pro-
cesses, and can consequently have a significant impact
on spring floods in central and eastern Europe. This
hypothesis will be discussed below.
2. CUMULATIVE RISK OF FLOOD
OCCURRENCE
Riverine flood losses depend on many factors: the
critical values of river discharges, floodplain manage-
ment, and the efficiency of warning and protection
measures. In addition to the consequences, the as-
sessment of flood risk requires an estimation of the
frequency that the peak flood rate will be exceeded.
Often, this assessment requires a subjective judgment
on the mathematical form of the probability density
function, making use of all the available information,
including in situ stream-flow data, historic and paleo-
flood data, and information concerning atmospheric
and catchments processes accompanying flood forma-
tion. Estimating probabilities of extreme floods will
always require extrapolation beyond the data set, and
procedures for doing this are controversial.
The performance of an engineered flood protec-
tion system must be evaluated over the system’s life-
time. Consequently, the hydrologic conditions can be
described as a function of time, particularly if the river
environment changes over time due to the impact of
land-use change or because of climate perturbations.
The probabilistic risk analysis of floods should there-
fore include the statistical estimation of the expected
annual probability of exceeding the critical discharge
Qc, as well as the long-term probability of exceed-
ing the critical discharge over the next T years (e.g.,
T = 10, 20, 50, etc.). This T-year probability can be
expressed as:
RT(Qmax ≥ Qcr ) = 1 −
T∏
t=1
∫ Qcr
0
f (Qmax, t ) dQmax
(1)
where t is a vector of time-dependent parameters of
the probability density function. In the case of a sta-
tionary hydrologic process t =  = const. If, how-
ever, the conditions of runoff formation change over
time, the T-year probability of a critical flood occur-
rence will depend on variations of meteorological and
hydrologic variables. For example, as has been shown
by Kaczmarek,(7) in the case of stationary conditions,
the 50-year probability of exceeding the flow rate of
8,000 m3/s on the Vistula River in Warsaw is approx-
imately equal to R50 = 0.1. But if one assumes a
linear increasing trend of mean maximum discharges
by only 0.5% per year, the 50-year probability of ex-
ceeding the critical value at the Warsaw gauge station
will increase to R50 = 0.334, that is, triple in rela-
tion to the stationary case. Alternatively, assuming a
decreasing linear trend of the same magnitude, the
R50 probability would be reduced to 0.035. In some
cases the hydrological process may be stationary, but
over decades it exhibits considerable variability with
respect to concentrations of spectral power. Calcu-
lation of the T-year probability of flooding will thus
depend on the time window in which it is assessed.
Several questions arise with regard to the possi-
ble nonstationarity of hydrologic processes. Does a
change display a steady downward or upward trend,
or is the process approximately periodic? Can the
trends be estimated with reasonable accuracy? Would
the change concern only the mean (central) value of
the probability distribution, or would the variance or
distribution asymmetry also change over time? An-
swering these questions based on a relatively short
history of hydrologic data is difficult, if not impossi-
ble. An analysis of the interrelation between large-
scale meteorological processes and the river hydrol-
ogy may, however, add some clarity.
3. TRENDS IN SPRING FLOOD DISCHARGES
IN SELECTED RIVERS IN POLAND
Changes in land-use patterns and in greenhouse
gas concentrations may result in the nonstationar-
ity of the hydrological regimes in many river catch-
ments areas. Statistical tests applied to dozens of rel-
atively long time series of river discharges in vari-
ous parts of the world resulted in the rejection of
the stationarity hypotheses for about 20% of the
cases at a 5% significance level.(8,9) Some scientists
claim that land-use and climate changes will result
in an increase in the frequency of both high and low
river flows. Others have expressed the opinion that
if the climate changes and snowfall decreases, there
could be a widespread shift from spring to winter
runoff.(10,11) Such a shift may already be observed for
some European rivers.(12)
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A negative trend in the spring maximum dis-
charges has been observed for the major Polish
rivers—the Vistula, Odra, Warta, and Bug. The
Vistula River system has a catchment area of about
194,000 km2 and covers most of central and eastern
Poland; the Warta River (54,000 km2) is a tributary
of the Odra River (109,730 km2) and is located in
the western part of the country; while the Bug River
(20,140 km2) is a tributary of the Vistula River on the
border between Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine. The
last two catchments have different climatic conditions.
In particular, the average winter temperature in the
Warta River basin is 1.9◦C higher than in the Bug
River basin. On average, the snow cover in the Bug
catchment area lasts three to four weeks longer than in
the Warta catchment area. Recently, a negative trend
in the spring maximum discharges for most of Poland’s
rivers has been verified by time series of maximum
discharges accompanying snowmelt-induced floods, a
trend that has been notably visible for the Warta River
since the middle of the last century (see Fig. 4).
A number of statistical tests can be applied to
detect a trend in time series data on geophysical phe-
nomena.(8) In what follows, an uncommon procedure
is described that can be useful for testing changes in
the frequency of hydrological and meteorological phe-
nomena. Let us assume that a random sample of size
N, which is drawn from an unknown continuous dis-
tribution of a stationary random process X, is divided
into two independent samples of sizes n1 and n2. Let’s
further assume that in the first sample an event A (X≥
XA) has been observed K (K = 0, . . . n1) times. The
probability that in the second sample A will appear u
Fig. 4. Time series of the Warta River peak discharges during
snowmelt-induced floods.
times (u = 0, . . . n2) can be calculated by means of the
hyper-geometric distribution:
PA(u) =
K
(
n1
K
)(
n2
u
)
(n1 + n2)
(
n1 + n2 − 1
K + u − 1
) , (2)
where (
a
b
)
= a!
b!(a − b)! (3)
denotes the total of possible combinations of b-
element sets that can be obtained based on an a-
element set (b ≤ a). If the probability in Equation
(2) is small, the stationarity hypothesis of the investi-
gated meteorological/hydrological process is not well
founded. According to Gumbel and von Schelling:(13)
These methods may be of interest for forecasting floods
if, instead of the size of the flood, we are interested
only in the frequency. The same procedure may also be
applied to other meteorological phenomena, such as
droughts, the extreme temperatures (the killing frost),
the largest precipitation, etc. (p. 249)
To illustrate an application of the hypergeometric
distribution, I analyze 176 years (1825–2000) of win-
ter/spring floods of the Warta River as shown in Fig. 4.
Let the random event be defined as A(Qmax ≥ 416),
where m(Qmax) = 416 m3/s is the average value of
the maximum discharge series. In the years 1825–1980
(n1 = 156), the event A was observed K = 60 times,
while in the years 1981–2000 (n2 =20), the event A was
observed only once (u = 1). The probability PA(u),
which is calculated from Equation (2), is therefore
equal to 0.0016. This probability is small enough to
doubt the stationarity assumption of spring flood dis-
charges in the Warta River. Similar results were ob-
tained for other river basins in Poland and in some
neighboring countries. Below I suggest that winter
weather conditions and snow cover may help explain
the nonstationarity of spring discharges, which, from
Equation (1), has a significant impact on flood risk
assessment.
4. MODELING SNOW COVER
WATER EQUIVALENT
To investigate the implications of winter weather
conditions on spring flood discharges, a conceptual
model of snow cover water equivalent (SCWE) as
a function of air temperature T and precipitation P
observed during winter months is described below.
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Let the change of SCWE over time be described by
means of the differential equation:
d(SCWE)
dt
= Pr(T−)(1 − KS) · P − Pr(T+)
· KM · µ(T+)(1 − e−SCWE). (4)
The probability in a given month of the daily air tem-
perature being below or above zero may be calculated
as:
Pr(T−) = 1
σ (T) · √2π
∫ 0
−∞
exp
[
− [T − µ(T)]
2
2σ 2(T)
]
dT
(5)
and
Pr(T+) = 1 − Pr(T−), (6)
where µ(T) and σ (T) denote the mean value and stan-
dard deviation of air temperatures, respectively. The
mean daily value µ(T+) of air temperature calculated
for a given month for days with T > 0 is:
T+ = 1
σ (T) · √2π
∫ ∞
0
T · exp
[
− [T − µ(T)]
2
2σ 2(T)
]
dT.
(7)
Let us further denote:
d(SCWE)
dt
= a + b · e−SCWE, (8)
where:
a = Pr(T−)(1 − KS) − Pr(T+) · KM · µ(T+);
b = Pr(T+) · KM · µ(T+).
Integration of Equation (5) yields:
SCWE(i+1) − SCWEi
+ LN a + b · exp(−SCWEi+1)
a + b · exp(−SCWEi ) − a · τ = 0. (9)
Solving Equation (9), the snow cover water equiv-
alent at the beginning of month (i + 1) can be es-
timated knowing the SCWE,the parameters a and
b, and the monthly time interval τ (in days). The
model depends on two parameters, KS and KM, which
can be estimated (calibrated) based on results of
snow measurements and on meteorological data. For
river basins in central Europe, an approximation for
the degree-day factor KM can be taken as 4, while
for KS the following empirical relationships can be
applied:
Ks = 0.05, if [µ(T) − µ(T+)] < −3.0
Ks = 1.0, if [µ(T) − µ(T+)] ≥ +1.0
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Fig. 5. Time series of maximum snow cover water equivalent
(SCWE) in Poland’s lowland.
Ks = 0.762 + 0.238∗[µ(T) − µ(T+)],
if −3.0 ≤ [µ(T) − µ(T+)] < +1.0.
Based on Equations (5)–(9), a time series (November
to April) of the SCWE was calculated for a number of
catchment areas in Poland’s lowland. The time series
of maximum winter/spring SCWE values, averaged
for this region, are shown in Fig. 5. This figure shows
a decreasing trend of about 0.9% per year, marked
by the very high variability of accumulated snow. No
statistically significant autocorrelation in the SCWE
time series was detected.
5. SNOWMELT-INDUCED FLOODS IN
POLAND AND THE NAO INDEX
Figs. 6 and 7 present the results of regressions
of spring flood discharges of two Polish rivers with
the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) winter index
(December to March). Similar results were found for
a number of other river catchment areas in central
Europe. In an attempt to explain these correlations,
an analysis was made of the possible impact of the
NAO index on the winter air temperature T, winter
precipitation P, and the SCWE. In the European re-
gion, Figs. 8 and 9 show the spatial distributions of the
correlation coefficients between the NAO index and
T, as well as between the NAO index and P, based on
data taken from Table I.
564 Kaczmarek
-2.2 -1.2 -0.2 0.8 1.8 2.8 3.8
NAO index (DJFM)
0
300
600
900
1200
1500
Qm
ax
 [m
^3
/s]
Regression of spring Qmax on winter NAO
Warta River
Fig. 6. Correlation of spring peak discharges of the Warta River
with the winter NAO index.
It can be observed that the European regional
differences in the NAO have an impact on the meteo-
rological variables that is very significant. In northern
Europe, temperature and precipitation increase with
the increase of the NAO index, whereas the opposite
is the case in southern Europe. From an application
Fig. 8. Correlation of winter air
temperature with the winter NAO index.
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Fig. 7. Correlation of spring peak discharges of the Bug River with
the winter NAO index.
of the earlier described conceptual model (Equations
(5)–(9)) of snow processes to selected Polish river
catchments, we conclude (Fig. 10) that the yearly max-
imum of SCWE decreases with the increasing NAO
index. This, in turn, could lead to a decrease in flood
risk caused by snowmelt-induced floods in the years
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Fig. 9. Correlation of winter
precipitation with the winter NAO index.
Table I. Correlation of Winter (DJFM) Precipitation and
Temperature with the NAO Index
Station Name Coordinates r (NAO, P)a r(NAO, T)b
Haparanda 65.8◦N, 24.2◦E 0.37 0.53
Angmagssalik 65.6◦N, 37.6◦W −0.02 −0.18
Thorshavn 62.0◦N, 6.8◦W 0.53 0.32
Bergen 60.0◦N, 5.3◦E 0.77 0.67
Helsinki 60.3◦N, 25.0◦E 0.18 0.60
Oslo 59.9◦N, 10.7◦E 0.21 0.60
Stockholm 59.4◦N, 18.1◦E 0.14 0.62
Copenhagen 55.7◦N, 12.6◦E 0.14 0.64
Belfast 54.6◦N, 6.2◦W 0.01 0.78
Warsaw 52.1◦N, 21.0◦E −0.05 0.66
De Bilt 52.1◦N, 5.2◦E 0.08 0.73
Valentia 51.9◦N, 10.2◦W 0.09 0.66
Wroclaw 51.1◦N, 16.9◦E −0.09 0.65
Frankfurt 50.1◦N, 8.7◦E −0.19 0.66
Krakow 50.1◦N, 20.0◦E −0.17 0.56
Paris 49.0◦N, 2.5◦E −0.19 0.60
Lyon 45.7◦N, 4.9◦E −0.37 0.42
Milan 45.4◦N, 9.3◦E −0.35 0.52
Rome 41.8◦N, 12.2◦E −0.37 −0.08
Istanbul 41.0◦N, 29.1◦E −0.36 −0.21
Madrid 40.4◦N, 3.7◦W −0.69 0.02
Lisbon 38.7◦N, 9.1◦W −0.64 0.10
Athens 38.0◦N, 23.7◦E −0.11 −0.31
Ponta Delgado 37.7◦N, 25.7◦W −0.49 0.12
aHurrell and Van Loon (1997).
bAuthor’s calculations based on data from the Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Centre Data Package (Oak Ridge, TN).
characterized by high NAO. The question of station-
arity or nonstationarity of snowmelt-induced floods is
therefore partially linked with the statistical proper-
ties of atmospheric circulation.
The mechanisms responsible for long-term vari-
ations of the NAO are poorly understood. From both
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Fig. 10. Correlation of snow cover water equivalent with the winter
NAO index.
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proxy and observational data one can conclude that
the multidecadal signal in the NAO index has been
amplifying with time, with an accompanying tendency
of the NAO spectrum to become redder.(4) However,
it is difficult to judge whether the high values and
positive trend of NAO index that has been observed
over the last two decades will continue as a result of
global warming. Investigations implemented within
the World Climate Research Programme may be cen-
tral to clarifying this unresolved question. Until this
question is resolved, flood protection systems should
not be designed with the assumption of reduced long-
term risk of flood damages. Flood risk should also not
be assessed on the basis of a relatively short series of
peak discharges of snowmelt-induced floods, which
are observed in a period characterized by the recent
high values of the North Atlantic Oscillation.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are many approaches and models for as-
sessing flood hazard and providing decisionmakers
with the tools necessary for designing flood protec-
tion systems.(14,15) To assess flood risks, there is a need
to combine the available meteorological information
with an analysis of the hydrological processes. In the
case of snowmelt-induced floods, the winter precipita-
tion and air temperature conditions determine the in-
tensity of runoff formation in the spring. Because the
North Atlantic Oscillation is to a large extent respon-
sible for the winter weather conditions over much of
the Europe, it seems reasonable to investigate its im-
pact on hydrology, in particular on snow processes
and on related flood phenomena.
There is evidence that the amount of snow accu-
mulated in central European lowlands decreases as
the NAO index increases. This leads to a decrease
of maximum spring river discharges in years charac-
terized by high winter NAO. For this reason, hydrol-
ogists are interested in studying decadal variations
of the NAO index, as well as its possible long-term
change due to increased concentration of greenhouse
gases. Much remains to be done, however, before the
necessary level of understanding and predictability
of large-scale atmospheric circulation is achieved for
practical use for flood risk assessment. Unless more
reliable information on the future stochastic proper-
ties of atmospheric processes becomes available, the
long-term risk of flood damages should be assessed
using relatively long series of hydrological observa-
tions, which should include years with high and low
NAO characteristics. Another possibility is to apply
a scenario approach, which is usually done in the cli-
mate impact assessment studies.(16)
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European River Floods in a Changing World
James K. Mitchell∗
Whereas the verdict is undecided about the effects of global warming on Europe’s flood risks,
it is clear that Europeans are becoming more exposed and vulnerable to floods. Losses are
increasing dramatically, mainly because of population and capital moving into harm’s way and
also because of human-driven transformations of hydrological systems, including river basins
and floodplains.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Loss of life and injuries due to flooding have
generally been declining in Europe1 during the past
two centuries but there is now renewed worry about
this hazard. Unusually severe floods during the 1990s
and early 2000s affected much of the continent and
have been the most obvious spur to attention (e.g.,
western Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic,
Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, among others). But
the shift in opinion has also been propelled by many
other factors. Prominent among these are concerns
about possible atmospheric warming and marked
changes in European land cover and land use.(1,2)
Taken together, these semi-global processes may ex-
acerbate future flooding by altering river regimes in
the direction of larger runoff volumes and shorter low
water to flood peak intervals.(3–5) In addition, there
exist flood-forcing factors of more specific European
provenance. Many of these are connected with pow-
∗ Address correspondence to James K. Mitchell, Department of
Geography, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ 08854-8045; tel.:
732-445-4103; fax: 732-445-0006; jmitchel@rci.rutgers.edu.
1 Here Europe is interpreted broadly to include territory between
the Ural Mountains in the east and the Atlantic Ocean in the
west, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the Black Sea
and the Mediterranean Sea in the south. Turkey (part of which
falls within these boundaries) is also a potential member of the
European Union.
erful shifts in Europe’s political-economic and socio-
cultural systems as well as the specifics of society-
environment relations in different parts of the con-
tinent. Sorting out the relative contributions of these
varied factors is an important scientific and public pol-
icy challenge for the new millennium.
2. HISTORIC TRENDS OF EUROPEAN
FLOODING
Historic data on flood losses are neither compre-
hensive nor standardized throughout Europe and it is
only in recent years that anything like a complete cat-
alog of floods has begun to be maintained. But, for all
its limitations, the available evidence permits drawing
some conclusions about flood trends. Although an-
nual numbers of flood disasters have shown no con-
sistent trend during the most recent period (1987–
1998),(6) throughout the 20th century as a whole flood-
related deaths have been either stable or decreasing
while economic burdens of flooding and related soci-
etal disruptions have become decidedly worse.
Large-scale loss of life from individual floods pre-
date the 19th century (Table I). These have nearly
always been associated with coastal storm surges,
mostly around the North Sea littoral. Twentieth-
century flood disaster death tolls have been much
lower—typically averaging fewer than 250 per year
during the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Although
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Table I. Flood Disaster Deaths in Europe 1099–1829 (730 years)∗
Year Location Flood Type Deaths
1099 East Anglia, UK storm surge 100,000
1219 Jutland, Denmark storm surge “thousands”
1228 Netherlands storm surge 100,000
1287 Waddenzee, Netherlands storm surge 50,000
1362 Schleswig, Germany storm surge 30,000
1421 Dort, Netherlands storm surge 10,000
1530 Netherlands rivers/storm surge 400,000
1570 Netherlands river/storm surge 50,000
1634 Cuxhaven, Germany storm surge 6,000
1717 The Hague, Netherlands storm surge 11,000
1824 St. Petersburg, Russia ice jam 10,000
1829 Gdansk, Poland ice jam 1,200
∗Deaths are reported for significant large floods only. Due to dis-
putes among sources, the accuracy of these totals cannot be estab-
lished. Especially before 1600 they are best regarded as approxi-
mate indicators of loss.
Sources: References 7–11.
there has been an upsurge of concern about flood
deaths in Europe during the 1990s, available data sug-
gest that the annual aggregate numbers have been
significantly smaller than earlier in the century.
Economic losses associated with flooding are up
sharply in recent years. By the end of the 1990s, many
flood events were imposing multi-million U.S. dol-
lar losses to structures and other property. The 1997
floods in Poland and the Czech Republic are believed
to have inflicted losses on each country in excess of
$1 billion.(11,12) Not all losses represent material im-
pacts. Costs of disruption to farms, industries, and
transportation systems are substantial and precau-
tionary evacuations are also growing. Although the
losses fall well short of those in the United States,
they are unprecedented for European river floods.
In a related trend, the geographical spread of disas-
trous flooding also appears to be increasing, though
whether this is a function of fuller and more transpar-
ent reporting, including improved data from behind
the former Iron Curtain, is difficult to gauge.
National-level flood data are informative, but
they do not necessarily reflect trends in individual
communities. This is especially true of large cities that
have historically been disproportionately well pro-
tected against hazard as a function of their power
to affect the political priorities of national govern-
ments. Typically, urban flood disasters had declined
to low levels by the beginning of the Industrial Rev-
olution. For example, all but two of the 56 major
floods that affected Florence since 1177 occurred be-
fore 1844.(13) However, as urban areas have grown
and become more complex during the 20th century,
a gap has begun to appear between the capabilities
of existing flood defenses and the potential for larger
urban flood disasters.
3. CONCERNS ABOUT FLOODING
IN EUROPE
In Europe, concern about flooding has grown
rapidly in recent years and has resulted in significant
public policy responses by transnational organizations
as well as national ones. (See, e.g., the 20-year “Ac-
tion Plan on Flood Defence” adopted in Rotterdam
on January 22, 1998 by the 12th Conference of Rhine
Ministers at a projected cost of 12 billion ECU.)
These actions have been partly propelled by a general
heightening of flood awareness that was facilitated by
improved environmental surveillance and monitoring
technologies, as well as by enhanced telecommunica-
tions systems. The European Space Agency(14) now
supplies user groups with remotely sensed images of
flooding in real time, and comprehensive data sets that
record the location, extent, and duration of floods are
beginning to become available on a global basis.(11)
The result is quicker, more reliable, and more com-
plete provision of data to flood scientists. At the same
time, there has been an acceleration in natural sci-
ence and social science research on European flood-
ing, which has led to more informed public debates
about flood issues.(15−19)
More effective and widespread reporting of
events by the mass media have also contributed to
growing awareness of floods. Newspapers, television,
and radio have undergone their own transformations,
both technologically and organizationally. The news
horizons of Europeans have expanded in step with
the increasing mobility of European populations and
the evolving Euro-consciousness of institutions that
were formerly focused on more parochial issues. As a
result, Ukrainian and Iberian floods that might once
have been obscure events for British and German
audiences are now likely to feature on nightly news
reports beamed throughout the continent to people
whose jobs and vacations are increasingly part of a
common European social space.
Moreover, the types of flood disasters that are
featured in media reports often touch on deep-seated
contemporary anxieties about human security: vic-
tims caught in unfamiliar surroundings; children and
young people without experience of hazard; sites that
were assumed to be protected but proved otherwise!
Scenes of Mediterranean tourist towns and vacation
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campgrounds inundated by flash floods pose worrying
questions about safety for northern European vaca-
tioners. Reports of young canyon-runners drowned
in sudden Swiss thunderstorms tap the fears of par-
ents and older family members. The occurrence of
record-setting floods in cities like Lisbon and Cologne
is unsettling for populations that have come to regard
such places as well buffered against natural extremes.
Water lapping at the tops of Rhine dikes that had
been assumed to possess comfortable safety margins
reinforces the notion that the floods themselves are
becoming more extreme—although a more careful
analysis suggests that the human component of the
hazard is changing more dramatically.
Recent news reports tend to suggest that Eu-
ropean flood problems are increasingly ubiquitous
and that existing flood-management systems are op-
erating close to their limits of effectiveness. These
media judgments are reinforced by assessments of
European-based reinsurance companies like Swiss Re
(Geneva) and Munich Re, which have pointed out the
growing toll of economic losses and issued cautions
about overreliance on insurance as a tool for man-
aging flood hazards.(20) Together with academic ana-
lysts, media and insurance sources have raised ques-
tions about the adequacy of European flood-warning
systems, especially for flash flooding.(21,22) Unlike the
United States, where forecasting and warning systems
are highly important components of flood-mitigation
strategies, they are less well developed in most parts of
Europe, and public confidence in them is correspond-
ingly weaker.2 A series of well-publicized prediction
failures has also highlighted both the technical diffi-
culties of forecasting floods in Europe and the under-
developed role of warnings in Europe’s national haz-
ard management systems.(23,24) Taken together, these
factors convey the impression that floods are increas-
ing objects of concern in Europe and that at least some
of their effects are growing worse. A casual observer
might be tempted to look to climate change for an ex-
planation of these trends, and part of the answer may
lie in that direction. Since there has not been a thor-
ough investigation of climate change effects on Euro-
pean flooding (see Bromstedt, this issue), the question
must remain open. But there is ample reason for con-
2 The Netherlands—which has had a long history of severe flooding
up through the mid-20th century—is something of an exception.
Large-scale evacuations continue to follow in the wake of flood
warnings that forecast water heights above dike levels. For exam-
ple, during one period of high water in 1995, a quarter of a million
people were evacuated from the lower Rhine region (The Times,
December 28, 1999).
cluding that other factors are of equal or greater im-
portance than climate change. The next section takes
up this theme.
4. DRIVING FORCES OF FLOOD HAZARD
IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE
Like other natural hazards, floods are not simply
extreme physical events that inflict losses on unsus-
pecting human populations and their property. They
are interactive processes that involve inputs from both
nature and society. Some analysts have expressed the
general relationship in terms of a simple formula:
Hazard = Risk × Vulnerability, where Risk is roughly
equal to the natural contributions and Vulnerability
to the human ones.(25) That expression captures the
interactive and uncertain character of hazard, but it
also grossly oversimplifies the natural and human in-
puts, especially by conflating several distinctly differ-
ent human dimensions, namely, exposure, resistance,
and resilience. All these dimensions are also strongly
contextual.(20,26) In particular, they are affected by the
combined effects of powerful, pervasive, and often
destabilizing forces, such as the burgeoning electronic
information revolution; new technologies of environ-
mental surveillance and transformation; widespread
human modifications of river-basin landforms, land
cover and land use; the globalization of economic
relations; marked shifts in the composition and dis-
tribution of populations; rampant urbanization; and
the restructuring of political ideologies or govern-
mental systems as well as public reactions to those
changes.
Findings from a recent study that focused on a
wide range of natural hazards in 10 international mega
cities3 are also useful for understanding the chang-
ing human ecology of European floods.(27) Briefly
stated, they suggest that changes in exposure and
vulnerability are disproportionately important causes
of increasing hazard losses in major cities. Though
not unimportant, increasing natural physical risks
are less significant contributors to the rising toll
of losses. Existing responses to hazards are being
pushed to their limits with consequent pressures not
only to develop new alternatives but also to rede-
fine acceptable thresholds of loss. Although only
one European city (London) was included in the
study, there is evidence that the findings also apply
3 London, Lima, Mexico City, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Sydney, Tokyo, Seoul, and Dhaka.
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to places like Florence, the interconnected Utrecht-
Rotterdam-Hague-Amsterdam complex known as
Randstad, and many other European cities.(28)
At the outset it is worth pointing out that abso-
lute population growth is not usually a major con-
tributor to the increasing flood disaster potential of
Europe. Whereas invasion of floodplains by humans
in search of new land for farming or homes is one of
the most important drivers of flood losses in places
like Bangladesh and throughout much of Africa or
Latin America, Europe’s total population is increas-
ing only very slowly and in some states may actually
be declining. More important is the concentration and
redistribution of population that accompanies urban-
ization, although rates of urban expansion in Europe
are again lower than in many developing countries.
The spread of low-density suburbs and ex-urbs is a
particularly significant factor in the conversion of ru-
ral lands near European cities, including floodplains.
But far more important than any of these are shifts
in the location of industries and homes impelled by
economic factors and lifestyle choices.
The invasion of downstream floodplains by
export-oriented businesses and industries, especially
along navigable waterways that connect with deepwa-
ter international ports, is one example of increasing
exposure to flood risks that reflects economic stim-
uli. This process is marked in London where there
has been a decided shift of the locus of flood haz-
ard during recent decades, as new investments crowd
into the Thames estuary and the lower Thames valley
seeking superior access to European and world mar-
kets. Similar processes can be observed in the lower
Rhine valley (e.g., the massive Europort facility near
Rotterdam and the Hague) and to a lesser extent
along the lower Elbe and the lower Seine (e.g.,
Le Havre port complex). Even the outer fringes of
Europe are not exempt from floodplain invasions
by export-oriented businesses. Norwegian furniture
manufacturers locate factories on flat sites beside
fjords where they can import desirable cherry and
maple woods from North America and reship the fin-
ished products to transatlantic consumers.
It has become conventional to apply the term
“economic globalization” to the process driving these
changes, but that simple label should not disguise
the fact that many different interlocking—and some-
times countervailing—subsets of human activity are
involved. For example, the burgeoning emphasis on
port locations for industries is facilitated by changes
in a complex web of factors that includes, among
other things, marine transportation, navigation, and
dredging technologies; shipboard labor practices; ves-
sel registration and regulation rules; the acquisition
of new electronic skills by mariners; the profitability
of the shipping industry; and the state of competition
between different transportation modes. In turn these
components are embedded in a dominant consumer-
oriented economy that is made possible by fluid sup-
plies of investment capital and preferences for en-
trepreneurial risk-taking, coupled with precisely seg-
mented and targeted marketing strategies that rely on
vast quantities of timely and comprehensive informa-
tion about consumer tastes and surplus income. The
foregoing itemization only begins to scratch the sur-
face of an economic process that is amplifying flood
hazards in Europe and elsewhere, but it is sufficient
to illustrate that hazards analysts and managers must
look beyond the obvious elements of high water and
unwise location decisions for effective responses to
the flood-hazard conundrum.
The movement of exporting industries to water-
side locations is one kind of regional shift that is af-
fecting the distribution of flood-hazard potential in
Europe. Another is the phenomenon of north to south
industrial migration, which is occurring in countries
like Britain, France, and Germany. Probably best seen
in Germany, where it is described as a “descent to
the south,” this process is characterized by the relo-
cation of high-technology, service-oriented industries
from older decaying manufacturing cities in north-
ern parts of the continent (that had been hearths of
the Industrial Revolution), to small cities and villages
with the kinds of climatic, recreational, and cultural
amenities that are preferred by affluent business man-
agers and highly mobile workforces. A byproduct of
this movement is a net transfer of land-development
pressures away from the big river systems of northern
Europe to smaller upland watersheds on the fringes
of the Alps, Apennines, and Massif Central or to mar-
itime locations in France, northern Italy, and southern
Portugal.(29) When the boom in vacationers, who fre-
quent the mountains and coasts of southern Europe,
is added to the influx of new industries, the aggregate
southward shift in patterns of flood-hazard potential
is clearly marked.
Meanwhile, the old river cities of northern
Europe are experiencing their own changes in flood-
hazard potential as a result of urban clearance and
redevelopment projects that are designed to improve
the attractiveness of waterfront areas to existing
residents and new investors. Along the Thames in
London, the Manchester Ship Canal, the Seine in
Paris, the Rhine in Rotterdam, the Spree in Berlin,
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and the Elbe in Hamburg, old docks, crumbling ware-
houses, derelict train terminals, and outdated power
stations are being replaced by new upscale apart-
ments, cultural facilities, government offices, parks,
shopping and entertainment complexes. Low-value
investments at risk to flooding are disappearing and
higher value ones are taking their place. This trend is
not confined to old industrial Europe as growing Eu-
ropean affluence is multiplying the value of buildings,
infrastructures, services, and amenities all across the
continent. In other words, the basis for even larger
future flood disasters is being laid down.
In many places, transportation infrastructure, wa-
tershed protection and water supply, nature conser-
vation, and recreation are becoming more important
floodplain land uses than traditionally dominant agri-
culture. Historically, much riverside land in Europe
has been used for agriculture, and demands for ad-
ditional agricultural acreage frequently gave rise to
large-scale wetland drainage and river-straightening
schemes.(30,31) But now the need for locally pro-
duced farm goods is declining as cheaper substitutes
become available from other continents, including
North America. An early retreat from floodplain agri-
culture was sounded in the Netherlands during the
1960s and 1970s when Dutch officials cancelled plans
for agricultural reclamation of new polders near the
IJsselmeer and turned them over to water supply, for-
est park, and urban uses instead. Road, rail, and wa-
terborne transportation routes now thread the flood-
plains of western European rivers to a remarkable
degree. The redesign and extension of transportation
infrastructures has already played a large part in the
project for a single European market (e.g., tunnels
under the English Channel and through the Alps;
road bridges across the Kattegat/Ore Sund and the
Bosporus; improved links between the Rhine and
Danube waterways; high-speed intercity passenger
trains; ongoing efforts to connect and pivot the con-
tinent’s freight rail network around newly reunited
Berlin). Even more so than inundation of fields and
homes, the disruption of commuting and freight ser-
vices for vast regions is often the economic impact
that is most at stake during floods. It is too early to
tell whether similar changes in flood exposure and vul-
nerability will occur in eastern Europe, but there the
picture is complicated by possible regional shifts in
agricultural production that may accompany expan-
sion of membership in the European Union. We may
see more investment in floodplain agriculture along
the rivers of Poland, Romania, and the Ukraine rather
than less. In any event, it is likely that Europe’s flood-
hazard patterns will be shaped by global as well as
local forces.
One of those forces is the growing power of hu-
mans to shape natural landscapes and biogeophysical
processes. By the beginning of the 20th century, the
landscapes and ecosystems of Europe may have been
more extensively modified by humans than those of
any other continent, and the past 100 years have seen
a further acceleration in these activities.(32) Although
the clearance of forests and the conversion of wet-
lands for agricultural purposes are no longer major
forces in much of Europe, they have been replaced
and surpassed by other equally effective agents of
environmental transformation. These include, among
others, demands for tourism, recreation, and amenity
services (ski slopes, marinas, resort developments);
the degradation of natural ecosystems by air pollu-
tants and other complex products of affluent societies
(e.g., toxic contamination of wetlands by mine spoil
and other wastes; so-called forest death, or Waldster-
ben); increased demands for water (e.g., supply reser-
voirs); and low-density residential sprawl. Many of
these changes have direct implications for flooding.
For example, throughout the Alpine regions environ-
mentalists have argued in support of a connection be-
tween deforestation of mountain slopes, on the one
hand, and increased runoff with shorter times to peak
flows at downstream flood gauges, on the other.(33)
But here a word of caution is in order. Although a
general relationship between watershed conversion
and increased flooding has been established in many
parts of the world, the mix of contributory factors and
the operating parameters seems to vary considerably
from place to place. Thus the combined interaction of
human and natural factors may have different flood-
related consequences in, say, China, Great Britain,
and the United States.(34−36) In summary, without a
great deal of additional field data and analysis, it is
premature to conclude that human-driven changes in
river-basin landforms, land cover, and land uses are
universally contributing to increased flood vulnera-
bility in Europe but the possibilities are suggestive of
such a connection.
Flood vulnerabilities are also changing in
Europe. The continent’s population is aging; almost
15% of Europe’s citizens are now over 65 years old—
up from 12% in 1980.(37) Since the aged tend to want—
and need—more assistance during or after extreme
events, this places a heavier burden on public ser-
vices and raises anxiety levels among potential flood
victims. Much of Europe’s population is also becom-
ing more affluent—though there are major contrasts
572 Mitchell
between the richer states of the European Union and
the poorer ones of the former USSR, which suffered
grave economic crises during the collapse of Com-
munist economies. Greater wealth confers some ad-
ditional security on groups that might once have lived
close to the margins of economic survival, but wealth
also tends to drive up the economic costs of natu-
ral disasters because more people occupy larger and
more costly houses and are often willing to sustain
bigger disaster losses. Vulnerability is also increas-
ing among Europe’s recent immigrants. Newly arrived
poor populations and local itinerant or homeless pop-
ulations increasingly have begun to occupy marginal
sites in and around major cities, including some river
floodplains. Though the trend is detectable in places
like Frankfurt am Main and some inner neighbor-
hoods of London, it is nowhere as pronounced as in
the third-world shantytowns of Latin American and
Asia, nor even in the riverside embankments of Tokyo
or certain districts of Los Angeles.(38,39) Given the fact
that: (1) many of the most flood-prone parts of Euro-
pean cities lie close to their historic cores; (2) these
places are valued for a mixture of tourism, amenity,
and heritage reasons; and (3) the demand for inner-
city residential properties is usually strong, it is un-
likely that urban flood vulnerability differentials in
Europe will be as wide as those of North America or
elsewhere but the trend bears watching nonetheless.
Levels of urbanization vary widely among the
states of Europe, but tend to be highest in north-
ern countries and lowest in periphery states of
the Balkans, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, and
Portugal.(29) Urban growth is disproportionately oc-
curring in the hinterlands of existing large cities
and in the medium-sized and smaller cities of the
European “Sunbelt.” These are the places where one
would tend to expect additional flood problems in
the future. But the relationship between urbaniza-
tion and flood potential is by no means simple and
is strongly affected by trends toward increasing func-
tional specialization of cities. A recent study iden-
tified 11 different types of European urban units,
ranging from global cities like London and Paris
through specialized high-technology service centers,
such as Bristol and Munich, to declining port cities
(e.g., Genoa, Marseilles), planned new towns (e.g.,
Evry), monofunctional satellites (e.g., Roissy), and
tourism centers (e.g., Salzburg, Venice).(29) The com-
bination of economic and noneconomic forces that is
driving flood potential affects these places differen-
tially and in ways that call for careful assessment on a
case-by-case basis.
It is important to note that flood-loss potential
in Europe is affected by certain situational character-
istics that influence vulnerability and complicate the
task of choosing appropriate public policies. Among
others, these include high population densities in most
river basins and large numbers of historic buildings
and culturally valued sites. For example, it can be ar-
gued that Europe’s generally high population den-
sities hamper the enactment of floodplain land-use
controls, but this overlooks the fact that it is in (high
density) urban areas where the demand for controls is
greatest and where they have historically been most
effective. Europe’s generally long history of human
occupancy also confers some distinctive emphases on
flood policy. Simply because there are so many of
them, the protection of historic communities and his-
toric buildings looms disproportionately large as a
European policy issue. Inasmuch as “zero damage”
is an acceptable flood-protection criterion for historic
buildings that are irreplaceable, thresholds of accept-
able loss are often set quite low and are therefore
highly sensitive to small-scale fluctuations of flood
regimes.
Issues of flood protection for historic buildings
are but one facet of a larger and more complex subject:
European practices for assessing flood risks and for
setting thresholds of acceptable risk as well as accept-
able flood hazard management practices. Although
the human dimensions of flood-risk assessment are
attracting hazards researchers in Europe,(40−43) this
subject has not yet received sufficient scrutiny. In
the United States and Japan it has been observed
that risks that were once tolerated under one set of
socioeconomic conditions can become unacceptable
when circumstances change. One of the best exam-
ples of this phenomenon is the shift in thresholds
of acceptable natural risks that followed a substan-
tial growth of national wealth in Japan during the
decades after World War II. High death rates from
floods, typhoons, and earthquakes that were tolerated
during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s became unaccept-
able in a country that was rapidly moving into the
upper echelons of developed states by the 1960s. A
national commitment to reduce disaster deaths was
accepted by the Japanese government after the Ise
Bay (Nagoya) typhoon of 1959 and successfully imple-
mented during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. European
parallels have not been so dramatic, but it is nonethe-
less clear that many people in Europe have become
increasingly adverse to imposed risks. Though there
have been few prominent European advocates of a
“zero-risk society,” public opinion seems to be shifting
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toward greater risk sensitivity. Hence, there may be
less willingness to tolerate floods than previously.
In much the same manner, willingness to accept
conventional engineering flood-management prac-
tices or technologies appears to be changing in
Europe. Dikes, reservoirs, and concrete walls are in-
creasingly viewed as ugly or environmentally dam-
aging and sometimes—as in the case of large dam
failures—a source of catastrophic hazard in their own
right. Whereas the range of choice among adjustments
to floods is relatively large in the United States, in
Europe the dominant preference seems to be for
fewer alternatives but more conservatively designed
ones.
Various pieces of evidence support a judgment
that Europeans and Americans may hold different
perspectives on environmental risk. Differing design
risk thresholds are one example. Flood-protection
works in Europe are often designed to provide what
American engineers would regard as very high thresh-
olds of safety. Along the Rhine, many river works
are designed to accommodate 1 in 1,250-year floods,
whereas the typical standard on U.S. rivers is 100–
200 years (http://www.sare.org/san/htdocs/hypermail/
html-home/15-html/0424.html). Other engineering
examples might be cited, such as the exacting con-
struction standards for the Thames Flood Barrage
or for European buildings in areas exposed to high
winds. Sensitivity to catastrophic environmental risks
was elevated in Europe by the experience of the Cher-
nobyl nuclear disaster and by fears about the fail-
ure of similar power stations in eastern Europe. Per-
haps because of this, Europeans have been quick to
embrace social theories that privilege (environmen-
tal) risk as a fundamental new organizing concern
of post-modern societies. (i.e., the so-called risk soci-
ety paradigm).(44−46) Though not unreceptive to argu-
ments that would elevate the social importance of risk,
American hazards scholars have been more reluc-
tant to endorse a similarly expansive view. Of course,
countervailing notions have been voiced by some
Europeans to the effect that Americans demand unre-
alistically high standards of safety against a vast range
of risks. One of these is Alexander Solzhenitsyn—
a shrewd judge of human foibles—who in a com-
mencement address at Harvard University argued
that Americans have an exaggerated sensitivity to
what Russians would regard as minor environmental
threats!
These observations are meant to remind read-
ers about the complexities that attend environmen-
tal policy making at the beginning of the third mil-
lennium. To the age-old realities of a world where
the assemblage of physical and biological factors that
make up specific environments is immensely variable
from place to place and subject to sharp temporal
discontinuities, we must add the realization that hu-
manity possesses both vastly expanded capabilities to
modify environmental risks and rewards as well as a
burgeoning propensity for fundamentally restructur-
ing the institutions and practices of daily living. This
is the thoroughly dynamic, uncertain, and ambigu-
ous context within which the selection of appropriate
European flood policies and programs will take place.
5. CONCLUSIONS
There is ample reason to be concerned about the
growth of flood-disaster potential along the rivers of
Europe even without taking climate change into ac-
count. Clearly, Europeans are facing a serious hazard
challenge that is continentwide in scope. As inheritors
of a long and complex history of flood experience—
the lessons of which have too often been ignored—
Europeans have the advantage of already knowing
a good deal about environmentally sustainable flood
management. As pioneers of new institutions of gov-
ernment and new systems of decision making that
were shaped by the political fallout from wars both hot
(1939–1945) and cold (1945–1989), they have faced—
and will continue to face—a unique suite of flood-
policy challenges. As citizens of governments that
continue to pursue more interventionist public poli-
cies than their recent transatlantic counterparts, they
may be able to “reinvent” government along some-
what different lines from the United States. And as
members of societies whose perspectives on environ-
mental risk may not be the same as those of the United
States, Japan, and other places that have heretofore
dominated much of the international discourse on
hazards, they have the opportunity to fashion creative
alternatives that will enrich the storehouse of tech-
niques by which humans come to terms with uncertain
and hazardous environments in ways that commend
themselves to people in other parts of the world.
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Adapting to Climate: A Case Study on Riverine
Flood Risks in the Netherlands
Richard S. J. Tol,1,2,3,∗ Nicolien van der Grijp,2 Alexander A. Olsthoorn,2
and Peter E. van der Werff2
Climate change may well lead to an increased risk of river floods in the Netherlands. However,
the impacts of changes in water management on river floods are larger, either enhancing or
reducing flood risks. Therefore, the abilities of water-management authorities to learn that
climate and river flows are changing, and to recognize and act upon the implications, are of
crucial importance. At the same time, water-management authorities respond to other trends,
such as the democratization of decision making, which alter their ability to react to climate
change. These complex interactions are illustrated with changes in river flood risk management
for the Rhine and the Meuse in the Netherlands over the last 50 years. A scenario study is
used to seek insight into the question of whether current water-management institutions and
their likely successors are capable of dealing with plausible future flood risks. The scenarios
show that new and major infrastructure is needed to keep flood risks at their current level.
Such a structural solution to future flood risks is feasible, but requires considerable political
will and institutional reform, both for planning and implementation. It is unlikely that reform
will be fast enough or the will strong enough.
KEY WORDS: Adaptation; climate change; flood risks; institutions; Lower Rhine
1. INTRODUCTION
Studies of the impact of climate change often ig-
nore adaptation,4 and studies that include adapta-
tion often follow first-order approaches under a ce-
teris paribus assumption.(2) This may well be inappro-
priate, because people’s and systems’ relations to cli-
mate tend to change due to many factors (technology,
1 Centre for Marine and Climate Research, Hamburg University,
Hamburg, Germany.
2 Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
3 Center for Integrated Study of the Human Dimensions of Global
Change, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA.
∗ Address correspondence to Richard S. J. Tol, ZMK, Troplowitzs-
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4 Adaptation is the knowing and unknowing response of actors and
systems to climate change, either in anticipation of or reaction
to, so as to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change and
maximize its positive impacts, whether successful or not.(1)
wealth, land use), the majority of which are not re-
lated to climate. So, to better understand reactions
to climate change, we must study the institutions that
channel people’s perceptions and intentions into ac-
tual responses to expectations of climate change.
This raises questions such as: Do water managers
realize that the climate is changing? Do they recog-
nize the implications for their tasks and objectives?
If so, are they able to react timely and adequately?
What constitute institutional barriers to implement
certain proposed flood risk mitigation schemes? And
what, given current societal trends, are the prospects
for adapting institutions to find better and feasible
responses to climate change?
In this article, we focus on water management in
the Netherlands, in particular management of flood
risks posed by the large rivers (Meuse and Rhine).
In this context, the questions of awareness of cli-
mate change and its implications are not particularly
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interesting, as everyone who has something to do
with Dutch water management knows about climate
change. We therefore largely restrict ourselves to the
conflict between what should be done about increas-
ing flood risks and what can be done in the current
and expected future institutional context. The cen-
tral question in this article is whether Dutch water-
management authorities will be able to cope with
a substantial increase in riverine flood risk. As our
answer is no, this automatically leads us to propose
institutional reform. Current decision making is too
vulnerable to being hijacked by special and local in-
terests, both in the planning and in the implementa-
tion phase. At the same time, local knowledge and
interests are disregarded. The current separation of
water management and land-use planning policies
also creates unnecessary problems for adequate flood
management.
The article has three building blocks. One is an
analysis of trends in water-management institutions
in the Netherlands.(3) The second building block is an
engineering study of future flood risks.(4) The third
building block consists of two case studies. The first is
on the implementation of a current flood management
project: the Maaswerken.(5) The second case study is
on the public acceptability of a future flood manage-
ment project: the Rijn op Termijn.(6) In this article,
we bring the three elements together to study po-
tential adaptation to flood risks in the Netherlands.
Miller et al.(7) and Cohen et al.(8) also emphasize the
importance of institutional arrangements for water-
management issues in the United States and for flood
management of the Columbia River, respectively.
Kelly and Adger(9) similarly stress the social context
of adaptation. Strzepek et al.(10) go a step further and
build scenarios of future institutions and context as
well, a more or less similar approach as the one taken
here.
The article follows this route. We sketch the cur-
rent developments in water management against the
background of societal trends, and extrapolate these
to the future (Section 2). Section 3 lays out solu-
tions to current (Maaswerken) and anticipated (Rijn
op Termijn) flood risks. The institutional responses to
these initiatives are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2. FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND
TRENDS IN WATER MANAGEMENT
The Netherlands is densely populated with pros-
perous and well-educated people. Decisions are typi-
cally made through consensus. The country is formed
by the deltas of the rivers Scheldt (a rain-fed river
originating in southern Belgium), Meuse (a rain-fed
river originating in northern France), and Rhine (a
glacier- and rain-fed river originating in Switzerland).
The Scheldt River connects Antwerp Harbor to the
North Sea. The Rhine is the largest of the three rivers.
Just after passing the Dutch-German border, it splits
into three major branches (the IJssel, the Lek, and the
Waal) and a number of smaller branches. The Waal
branch connects Rotterdam Harbor to the German
industrial heartland. The country is flat. Centuries of
subsidence have left most of the country below mean
sea and river level. Dikes and dunes are supposed to
protect the country from floods from both sea and
river. Centuries of floods have left the people rather
nervous and inventive about flood risk management.
Water flows are regulated through an elaborate sys-
tem of canals, sluices, pumps, and so on. Dutch civil
engineers are amongst the best in the world when it
comes to engineering water works.
Flood risk management is only one part of water
management, although it has top priority. Under cur-
rent national law, flood risk, inland navigation, fish-
eries, leisure, rivers as a fresh water resource, and na-
ture conservation must be managed in an integrated
way. Recently, under the expectation of increasing
flood risks, the water-management community advo-
cated a more important position for water manage-
ment in national spatial planning in the Netherlands.
The possibilities for dealing with very high river dis-
charges should become one of the guiding principles
for national spatial planning.
Reflecting these multiple interests of rivers, wa-
ter management is carried out by a complex array
of authorities. An overview of the main players and
their main responsibilities can be found in References
3, 11–14. Van der Grijp and Olsthoorn(3) identify
four major trends in water management over the last
50 years. These trends may well continue to change in-
stitutions in the same direction for the next 50 years.
The first trend is internationalization, or the geo-
graphical extension of policy from the local scale to
the watershed. Water-management policy, tradition-
ally a matter of local and regional authorities, was
first nationalized by Louis Napoleon, viceroy for his
brother Bonaparte (see References 15 and 16 for a
more extensive review of the history of flood man-
agement in the Netherlands). The responsibility of
the central government for water issues was recon-
firmed in the Constitution of 1848, and strengthened
in the Constitution of 1983. Operational responsibility
Riverine Flood Risks in the Netherlands 577
for flood safety rests with the water boards. The flood
of 1953 led to a reorganization of the water boards.
There were over 2,500 semi-professional water boards
in 1950. There are less than 50 fully professional ones
now.(11) Geographical upscaling of institutions con-
tinues at an international level. The 1986 Sandoz in-
cident5 gave teeth to the International Rhine Com-
mittee, though initially only to chew on water-quality
and pollution issues. Since the floods of 1995, mostly
in Germany, its mandate has included flood control.(3)
The Helsinki Convention provided a framework for
treaties on the Meuse.(17) The new EU Water Direc-
tive is likely to reinforce the trend of internationaliza-
tion of river water management.
The second trend is integration. Water has many
roles, and water management serves many purposes.
These include drinking water, irrigation water, navi-
gation, recreation, nature preservation, fisheries, and
cooling water. Problems may arise because of floods,
droughts, and contamination. All these roles and the
associated management goals come together in one
system, and pretending that interactions do not ex-
ist may be seriously misleading or counterproductive.
Yet, different aspects of water are often still managed
by different entities with different, occasionally con-
flicting, interests. Over the years, and particularly in
the last decade, integration of water issues has been
pushed by the central government.(18) However, op-
erational reality lags behind.(19) It should be noted
that, currently, integration more or less stops where
the water ends. Land-use planning and water man-
agement remain largely separated, although there is
considerable mutual consultation.(20)
The third trend is democratization. Engineers, bu-
reaucrats, and politicians have less to say about wa-
ter management than they used to. More stakehold-
ers get increasingly involved. This is marked by the
gradual extension of voting rights in water boards
from large landowners to all inhabitants (completed
in 1994).(19,21) More importantly, elaborate impact as-
sessments of proposed projects are now required by
law, media attention to planned infrastructure can be
enormous, and public hearings are extensive.(3) Al-
though this increases the democratic nature of deci-
sion making and thereby the quality of planning and
implementation, it may also increase its costs and slow
down the process considerably.
Note that in reaction to the (near) floods of 1995,
the Deltaplan Grote Rivieren (Delta Plan for Large
5 A factory spilled large quantities of poisonous chemicals during
a fire.
Rivers) was introduced. The accompanying law accel-
erates and streamlines decision-making procedures,
partially reversing the democratization trend. This
law applies also to infrastructure other than flood-
safety-related investments.(22)
The fourth trend is ecologicalization. Water man-
agement used to be decided on a narrow economic
and engineering calculus, and used to be biased by
typical civil engineering thinking. The upsurge of the
environmental movement in the 1970s, reinforcing the
older movement for protecting landscape and cultural
heritage, changed this. Notably, during that time, plans
to impolder the IJssel Lake and the Waddensea were
abandoned, and plans to close the Eastern Scheldt
Estuary were changed, all in favour of nature preser-
vation.(23) The thoughts behind these isolated deci-
sions are now pervasive. Civil engineering has given
way to ecological engineering. Rivers are no longer
just transport channels and a resource of fresh water,
but important recreation areas and part of the “eco-
logical main structure.” The current round of dike
reinforcements is supposed to be the last one. After
2000, flood risk management should make use of nat-
ural dynamics, rather than concrete and steel.(12)
These trends both constrain and enable future
management options. Together, they determine what
options are feasible, and which one is likely to be
adopted. Reactions to climate change should be
placed against this background.
3. A RADICAL PLAN TO COPE
WITH CLIMATE CHANGE
The implications of climate change may be quite
severe for river deltas such as the Netherlands.
The majority of general circulation models (GCMs)
project winter precipitation to increase in the Rhine
River basin.6 This would increase the risk of river
floods.(26–28)7 Earlier snowmelt in the Alps could fur-
ther enhance river floods. Sea level rise would slow
down the outflow of water. In the Netherlands, the
impact of climate change on water resources and
flood risks is clearly recognized. The works of the
6 That is, GCMs that look at the effect of greenhouse gas emissions
generally project the northern half of Europe to get wetter. GCMs
that also include sulphate aerosols occasionally project a drying
of northern Europe.(24) However, acidification policies in Europe
rapidly decrease sulphur emissions.(25)
7 Note that sizeable rivers such as the Rhine react to above-average
rainfall for an extended period (at least a month) over the whole
watershed.(29,30) GCMs are more reliable for this type of floods
than for flash floods and floods of small rivers, and the Rhine
catchment is sizeable to be resolved in a GCM.
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Table I. Annual Average Damage (in Million Guilder per Year)
Due to River Floods in the Limburg Meuse Valleya
Policy Intervention 1995 2050b
Do nothing 9.9 21.8
Embankments 0.7 1.5
Nature development 0.6–3.3 1.4–7.3
Deepen summer bedc 3.5 7.4
aAverage damage is estimated using a hydrological model of
the Meuse, coupled to a GIS database of the stock at risk from
flooding. Modeled flood damage is calibrated to the actual flood
damage of 1995 (without policy intervention). Input comes from a
stochastic weather generator, calibrated to current climate and a
scenario of future climate.
bWinter temperatures 2◦C higher than today, winter precipitation
up 10%.
cThe summer bed is that part of the riverbed that is permanently
flooded. The winter bed is only flooded in winter and early spring.
Source: Schuurman.(32)
Committee Boertien is one example, but there are
more.(3)
This committee studied flood risk management
along the river Meuse. The Meuse is a medium-
sized rain-fed river originating in the north of France,
traversing Belgium and the Netherlands to mouth in
the North Sea. The Limburg Meuse Valley is unique
for the Netherlands8 because it is hilly and there are
no dikes because the soil is such that water would
seep underneath the dike (if there were one). Severe
floods in 1993 led the government to install Commit-
tee Boertien (officially: Commissie Watersnood Maas)
with the assignment to assess what could be done to
avoid flood damages in the future.(31) The findings of
this committee with respect to the benefits of possible
options to reduce flood risks with and without climate
change (Table I) are interesting.
Table I shows the estimated annual average
flood damage for various management scenarios. The
Committee Boertien included robustness to climate
change in their study, using a temperature and precip-
itation scenario for the year 2050 that is arbitrary but
still well within the set of possibilities. Scenarios like
this should be viewed as a sensitivity analysis rather
than a forecast. A relatively modest change in climate
(a 2◦C temperature increase and a 10% precipitation
increase in winter in 2050) would more than double
the average annual damage. Medium-sized European
rivers typically respond in this way.(33,34) But, under
8 Although more common in the rest of the world. Limburg is the
southern-most province of the Netherlands, squeezed in between
Belgium and Germany. The Meuse is on the Dutch-Belgian bor-
der, the Limburg Meuse Valley is shared by the two countries.
the studied management interventions (see Table I),
average damage would be kept below the 1995 dam-
age. However, the studied management interventions
would reduce average damage by a factor of 3–16.
Thus, in the Limburg Meuse Valley, the effect of man-
agement is much stronger than the effect of climate.
That is, the impact of climate change is “noise” com-
pared to the “signal” that management potentially
effectuates. This is true for many impacts of climate
change.(35)
The situation is completely different, however,
for flood risks along the river Rhine. The flood risks
posed by the Rhine and its branches are much larger
than the flood risks of the Scheldt and the Meuse. This
has to do with the large discharge of the Rhine, and
the fact that the areas adjacent to the river are pold-
ers. Most polders are below mean river level, so if
water gets in, it needs to be pumped out, which takes
a long time. If a dike breaks, fast-flowing water would
cause a lot of damage. The traditional first response
to expectations of increased risk would be to raise
dikes. However, this approach is widely rejected as
not sustainable.
Unfortunately, no one has found a neat solution
so far to the climate-change-induced increase of flood
risks. A default solution would be to continue current
and past practice of solving problems as they emerge
(that is, after some harm is done), and picking a solu-
tion that does not upset the delicate balance of inter-
ests. This has proven to be quasi-successful, although
problems were often shifted in place or time rather
than solved.(15,16) It is doubtful whether this strategy
will be of great help in dealing with climate change
due to the scale of the problem and the state of the
current water-management system. Works to improve
the weakest dikes were accelerated in 1995. No def-
inite plans have been decided upon for after 2000.
Proposals, which focus on increasing the retention and
recreational value of the flood plains, tweak the water-
discharge system, but do not substantially alter it.
The alternative would be a radical redesign of
the delta of the water-management system. In 1998,
the research institute Delft Hydraulics(4) produced a
blueprint Rijn op Termijn. This plan is not painless, but
it could take away a number of current problems and
prevent a number of future ones. The core element
of the blueprint is to redistribute the water flow over
the three branches of the Rhine, that is, the Waal, the
Lek, and the IJssel (see Fig. 1). The Waal, which dis-
charges most of the water, is the major shipping route
from Rotterdam to Germany and back. The Lek and
the IJssel are less important.
Riverine Flood Risks in the Netherlands 579
Fig. 1. Current (left panel) and proposed future (right panel) distribution of the Rhine’s peak flow over its branches. The 5,000 m3/s branch
is additional and only used in times of high water. It involves digging a new canal but largely relies on an earlier branch of the river.(4)
Climate change is likely to increase the peak flow.
In the study by Delft Hydraulics, the design peak dis-
charge is assumed to increase from 15,000 m3/s to
20,000 m3/s. This is an arbitrary but not implausible
scenario. The design peak discharge is the maximum
river flow—as measured at Lobith where the Rhine
enters the Netherlands—that occurs without causing
severe floods downstream. The design peak discharge
constitutes the first element of the guidelines for flood
protection. The second element of flood protection is
the acceptable risk of dike overtopping. This risk is
set by Parliament, upon advice of a committee of wise
men.(37) The current risk is 1/1,250 year, that is, river
dikes and other water works should be built such that
they fail less than once every 1,250 years. The toler-
ated risk is so low because the would-be damage is so
high. Should a dike break or be overtopped, a large
polder would fill with fast-streaming water. It would
take months to get the water out. The acceptable risk
does not comprise a valuation of personal risks.
Confronted with a higher peak flow, one could
do several things. First, water-management authori-
ties could hope that the Germans would solve the
problem, and store excess water somewhere in a reser-
voir. The current discussion in Germany suggests that
this is an unlikely scenario, for several reasons. One
such is that water management is the terrain of the
Bundeslaender rather than the federal government,
which hampers any structural solution to the flood
problems along the Rhine.(38) Another reason is that
building (temporary) reservoirs is not the preferred
option from a German perspective.(4)
Second, one could accept more frequent floods.
This is not an option in the Netherlands. The 1995
evacuation of 1 in 60 of the population is still fresh in
people’s minds, and not to be repeated. Recent at-
tempts to introduce flood risk insurance failed for
lack of interest by insurers and reinsures.(2,35,39,40)
The Netherlands is becoming a “zero-risk” society,
that is, the tolerance of involuntary risks is low and
decreasing.
Third, one could build higher dikes. This runs
against the trend of ecologicalization, and is counter
to the recently adopted government policy of no more
dike reinforcement. Dikes are considered ugly and
spoil the landscape. Dikes are also expensive, partic-
ularly if done properly. A lot of river dikes were built
and rebuilt over the centuries. It is seldom known
what they were made of, and thus they are diffi-
cult to reengineer.(4) Furthermore, there is always a
residual risk of dike failure, particularly in the light
of the uncertainty about climate change projections.
Floods in the densely populated areas of Brabant and
South Holland or the petrochemical industry near
Rotterdam would be extremely expensive. Therefore,
it would be better to relocate flood risks, which is hard
to achieve with additional dike building.
Fourth, one could increase the discharge capac-
ity of all three branches by deepening and widening
the riverbed. However, getting the water as quickly
as possible to the North Sea would cause other prob-
lems. Increasing discharge capacity would reduce
water flows in summer, which, particularly if com-
bined with higher temperatures, would enhance the
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probability of droughts, hurting nature, recreation,
agriculture, drinking water resources, and navigation.
The current, already elaborate system of sluices would
need to be substantially and expensively extended to
prevent this. Reliable and speedy navigation is im-
portant for Rotterdam Harbor, competing as it does
with Antwerp and Hamburg. Standards for navigabil-
ity of the Rhine are laid down in a treaty between the
Netherlands and Germany.(3)
Fifth, one could dig a fourth branch. This would be
expensive and risky, since such a branch would need to
run against natural geography and would require land
already used for other purposes.(4) This branch would
inevitably flow through ‘t Gooi, which is hilly and pop-
ulated by well-to-do and well-connected people.
Sixth, one could introduce a bypass. A bypass is
a river branch that only occasionally discharges wa-
ter. A report by Delft Hydraulics(4) opts for this idea.
Fig. 1 shows the consequences. If the discharge of the
Rhine at Lobith is less than 15,000 m3/s, everything
remains as it is now. All water in excess of 15,000 m3/s
is discharged northward, through the countryside of
the province of Gelderland and Overijssel, and later
joined with the IJssel to mouth in the IJssel Lake,
from where the water would need to be discharged
or pumped into the Waddensea. The bypass plan con-
tains two more features. The Waal is turned into a
canal, so that navigation is improved. The Lek is
turned into a nature reserve.
The bypass as advocated by Delft Hydraulics is
obviously not the only option, and probably not the
best one.9 It is the most detailed proposal, however,
and clearly demonstrates the scale of intervention that
is required to durably manage river flood risks in the
Netherlands. In the next section, we review the insti-
tutional implications of intervention at this scale.
4. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
The implications of the bypass plan for the
provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel are quite dras-
tic. Fig. 2 compares the current and the proposed sit-
uation. Large stretches of land would need to be set
aside for the newly created bypass. Isolated houses
and hamlets would need to go, and some villages and
towns would need to be protected by circular dikes.
The occasional flooding would be detrimental for agri-
9 See Reference 36 for tools to evaluate adaptation to climate
change in the water-resources sector. Yohe and Tol(38) develop
their own method and, applying it to the case of the Rhine, con-
clude that dike reinforcement is the most likely adaptation option.
Fig. 2. The proposed bypass and restructured IJssel River. The
light areas are currently flood-safe, but will occasionally flood in
the proposed situation.(4)
culture, so that nature development would be the al-
ternative, perhaps combined with estates. The bypass
is designed so as to minimize such impacts, but they
are still large.
Placed in the context of democratization, it is un-
clear whether the bypass or a similar plan will succeed.
Locals would be asked to leave house and hearth for
a questionable cause. In a series of interviews we con-
ducted in the area,(6) one of interviewees remarked
“Climate change? Ha! One professor says it gets wet-
ter, the other says it gets drier.” The fact is that the
current decision-making process gives considerable
weight to “not in my polder” feelings. The results
of the series of interviews suggest that farmers may
be willing to move, provided that financial compen-
sation is adequate. However, they would regret the
breakup of social life. Recent migrants to the region
particularly appreciate the current, open landscape,
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and thus oppose new dikes and other infrastructure.
Both groups, however, would be willing to accept indi-
vidual losses for the greater good, provided that social
benefits are clear to them. On the other hand, these
people could and would resist government plans if
the necessity is unclear, compensation inadequate, or
if something goes wrong in the communication pro-
cess. This group of people is well organized, and ef-
fectively influenced the planning of the Betuwelijn (a
major new railroad) and dike reinforcements in the
same area.(3)
Another issue is that the people of Gelderland
and Overijssel would be asked to bear most of the
costs (that is, increased flood risks), whereas the ben-
efits (reduced floods risks) would largely befall the
people of Brabant and Holland. Over the years, Dutch
flood management has consistently upheld the prin-
ciple of spatially equalized flood risks.(37) Similar re-
gional sentiments, particularly tensions between cen-
ter (i.e., Holland and Utrecht) and periphery (the rest
of the country), have played a role in the management
of the Limburg Meuse. People in Limburg subsidize
flood management in the west of the Netherlands,
while flood risks are substantially higher in Limburg.
This is one of the reasons why the central government
currently seeks to reduce flood risks in Limburg. Sim-
ilar arguments may lead to political problems for the
bypass plan for the Rhine River.
The Delft Hydraulics plan is not inconsistent with
the trend of ecologicalization, particularly because
the Waal does not need higher dikes and the Lek is
turned into a nature reserve. The actual bypass re-
quires engineering, though, and new dikes are needed
to protect the towns and villages of Gelderland and
Overijssel. As mentioned above, the plan disregards
upstream solutions in Germany, ignoring the trend of
internationalization.
The plan requires integration to be taken two
steps further. Most importantly, water management
and land-use planning need to be interwoven. At the
moment, the relevant authorities merely talk to one
another, and only occasionally listen. A recent exam-
ple is the Betuwelijn, the planned location of which
gets in the way of flood safety reinforcements.
The difficulties in getting different authorities and
other stakeholders to agree on policies and actions
that address problems overarching specific interests
are recognized. New ideas for water management(41)
focus on the process of finding feasible approaches
to deal with an uncertain future rather than on at-
tempting to find support for a preengineered solution
to a predefined problem. The initiative of Delft Hy-
draulics may be seen as an attempt to start such a
process.
Just how hard this is is shown by the Maaswerken
project. This project aims to improve flood safety
along the Meuse. At the same time, it seeks to further
commercial mining of sand and gravel and to develop
nature. Integration and ecologicalization are thus at
work, and so is internationalization since the Meuse
cannot be controlled without extensive cooperation
with Belgium. In fact, the project includes a slight revi-
sion of the international border. The project planning
is accompanied by extensive consultation with local
and regional stakeholders. The Maaswerken project
thus combines all elements of possible Rhine projects,
although the Maaswerken project is smaller, less com-
plex, and less controversial than a restructuring of
the Rhine. Nonetheless, the Maaswerken project is
plagued by troubles.
Ever since its inception in 1990, the project has
been overtaken by events, including floods along the
Meuse (in 1993 and twice in 1995) and the Rhine
(1995), new regulations from The Hague (on flood
management, spatial planning, and nature conserva-
tion), and new initiatives from Brussels (on interna-
tional flood management, on water management, and
on nature conservation). Initially envisaged as three
separate projects, the Maaswerken project grew more
complex over time. Priorities were revisited time and
again—on average, once every year; the emphases
shifted from gravel exploitation, to nature conserva-
tion, to flood safety, and back—in every possible se-
quence. The budget was often revised too, and funding
continues to be uncertain. Stakeholders grew impa-
tient and tired of the frequent changes. Initially coop-
erative locals withdrew support, while gravel compa-
nies and property speculators press forward. Van der
Grijp and Warner(5) extensively discuss the project.
As discussed above, this project is smaller, sim-
pler, and less controversial than the Rhine bypass
project. If implementing the Maaswerken is so diffi-
cult, how feasible are large-scale interventions in the
Rhine?
5. CONCLUSION
Climate change could seriously increase flood
risks in the Netherlands. This is recognized by the
water-management authorities, which have the tech-
nical capacity to keep flood risks at or below current
levels. The Netherlands is also rich enough to pay for
technical solutions. However, a structural solution—
such as the bypass plan sketched above—would
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require strategic thinking, political courage, individ-
ual sacrifice for the greater good, and integration of
land-use planning and water management. The cur-
rent institutional setting is such that a structural so-
lution is likely to give way to incidental solutions.
Dutch water management has a long history of partial
and short-term solutions. Continuing along this path
will entail increasing flood risks as well as suboptimal
adaptation.
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Stakeholder Views on Flood Risk Management in Hungary’s
Upper Tisza Basin
Anna Vari,1∗ Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer,2 and Zoltan Ferencz1
With escalating costs of flood mitigation and relief, a challenge for the Hungarian government
is to develop a flood mitigation and insurance/relief system that is viewed as efficient and fair by
the many stakeholders involved. To aid policymakers in this task, this article reports on a recent
study to elicit stakeholder views on flood risk management in the Upper Tisza Basin, including
views on appropriate means of reducing losses and for transferring the residual losses from the
direct victims to taxpayers or an insurance pool. This study is part of a project to develop an
integrated approach to flood risk management coordinated by the International Institute of
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in collaboration with Swedish and Hungarian researchers.
The discussion begins by describing the background of flood risk management problems in the
Upper Tisza Basin. The results of interviews carried out with selected key stakeholders and
the results of a public survey eliciting views on flood risk management are reported. The final
section draws conclusions on incorporating stakeholder views into a flood risk management
model, which will be used to illustrate policy paths at an upcoming stakeholder workshop. The
conclusions are also of direct interest to Hungarian policymakers.
KEY WORDS: Floods; flood risk management; integrated risk management; catastrophe models;
stakeholder views; insurance
1. INTRODUCTION
In Europe, Hungary ranks only behind the
Netherlands with respect to flood exposure. Over half
of the country’s territory, two-thirds of its arable land,
and one-third of its railways are exposed to riverine,
groundwater, and flash floods. Estimates show that
losses from flooding could reach almost one-quarter
of the GDP of river flood basins, or 7–9% of the total
GDP of the country.(1)
One of the highest flood risk areas in Hungary,
and one of the poorest regions in Europe, is the Upper
Tisza river basin in the northeastern part of the coun-
1 Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Sociology, Budapest.
2 International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),
Laxenburg, Austria.
∗ Address correspondence to Anna Vari, Hungarian Academy
of Sciences, Institute of Sociology, 1014 Budapest, Uri u. 49;
anna.vari@ella.hu.
try. The intensity and frequency of flood disasters in
this region, and throughout Hungary, appear to be
increasing because of development and farming prac-
tices in the exposed areas, deforestation and other
land-use practices, the regulation of the rivers, and ne-
glect of the drainage systems.(2) Worsening weather
extremes due to climate change may also be a con-
tributing factor.(3) Because most of Hungary’s rivers,
including the Tisza, originate outside of the coun-
try, flood risk management in Hungary can be effec-
tive only with the cooperation of its seven bordering
countries.
With increasing losses, the Hungarian govern-
ment is concerned about continuing its tradition of
taking almost full responsibility for flood risk man-
agement, including flood prevention, response, relief,
and public infrastructure repair. The central govern-
ment has invested huge sums in a vast network of
protective levees, including about 3,000 kilometers
585 0272-4332/03/1200-0585$22.00/1 C© 2003 Society for Risk Analysis
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of levees along the Tisza River. Without these lev-
ees there would be extensive flooding in the country,
for example, a flood occurring on the Tisza River
could inundate up to 16,000 km2 or around 17% of
Hungary’s territory.(4) This levee system is proving
insufficient with worsening flood conditions, and it is
expensive to maintain. Moreover, there are value con-
flicts, for example, whether to continue protecting the
residents of high-risk areas with levees or to renatu-
ralize the river to enhance the ecosystem.
The Hungarian government takes full responsi-
bility for private damages in the event of a levee
breach, and victims from all types of floods usually
receive a great deal of public relief. This social sol-
idarity with flood victims, which is typical of all the
formerly socialist countries of central Europe, has be-
come a major concern to the Hungarian government
since it has embarked on a fiscal austerity program
so as to qualify for European Union membership.
Government officials would welcome more private
responsibility in reducing and insuring flood losses;
however, many Hungarians regard the transfer of li-
ability for flood losses to citizens in very poor areas,
such as the Upper Tisza region, as unfair. One of the
more controversial issues in Hungary, and throughout
central Europe, is thus the respective roles of the gov-
ernment and the private market in providing relief to
flood victims.
The challenge for the Hungarian government is
to develop a flood mitigation and insurance/relief
system that is viewed as efficient and fair by the
many stakeholders involved. To aid policymakers in
this task, this article reports on a recent study to
elicit stakeholder views on flood risk management
in the Upper Tisza Basin, including views on appro-
priate means of reducing losses and for transferring
the residual losses from the direct victims to tax-
payers or an insurance pool. This study is part of a
project coordinated by the International Institute of
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in collaboration
with Swedish and Hungarian researchers.3 The pur-
pose of the project is to develop an integrated ap-
proach to flood risk management in the Upper Tisza
region, in which stakeholder views are incorporated
into a flood-catastrophe model.(5,6) This model will
provide important information on policy alternatives
for managing flood risks in the Upper Tisza region
3 This project, “Flood Risk Management Policy in the Upper Tisza
Basin: An Integrated Approach,” is being carried out by IIASA
in collaboration with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and
Stockholm University. It is funded by the Swedish FORMAS.
in an upcoming workshop involving stakeholders and
Hungarian policymakers.
In the next section, we describe the background
of flood risk management problems on the Upper
Tisza River. In the third section, we report on inter-
views carried out with selected key stakeholders, and
in Section 4 we present results of a survey adminis-
tered to the Hungarian public. The final section draws
conclusions for Hungarian policymakers.
2. FLOOD POLICY IN THE UPPER
TISZA BASIN
The Tisza River originates in the northeastern
Carpathians in the Ukraine and flows from Roma-
nia and Slovakia to Hungary, and eventually into the
Danube in Serbia (see Fig. 1). Pecher et al.(7) point
out that from 1877 to 1933 the average period be-
tween high-water discharges resulting in disastrous
floods on the Tisza River was 18 years; from 1933
to 1964 it was only three to four years. Since 1998,
record-breaking water levels of the river have oc-
curred annually, but the extensive network of levees
surrounding the river has prevented major losses. The
flood of 2001, however, burst through the protective
levees and caused extensive damage. Approximately
17,000 people were evacuated, 1,000 houses com-
pletely destroyed, and another 2,000 houses damaged.
Estimated direct losses amounted to approximately
U.S.$180 million, or 0.4% of Hungary’s GDP.(8) Since
flood waves originating in upstream Ukraine arrive in
Hungary at very high speed, there is a little time for
warning and preparation.
Communities in the Upper Tisza region, and es-
pecially the high-risk areas near the Tisza River and
its tributaries, are among the poorest in Hungary. The
area is predominately rural with 200,000 inhabitants
of 114 villages and four towns. Most settlements are
located far from the cities with bad road connections,
and only 22% of the settlements have access to the
railway network, compared to the country average
of 38%. Especially among the less qualified Roma
population, the rate of unemployment in the region
is very high—24% in 1999 compared to the country
average of 9%. For the employed, 35% work in agri-
culture, 25% in industry, while approximately 40% of
the active population works in the service sector. In-
comes from agricultural activities are typically small,
and agriculture by itself cannot support the local pop-
ulation. Riverine floods and inland waters have aggra-
vated this situation considerably. There are communi-
ties, for instance, where free seed was distributed, but
residents were not willing to sow mainly on account
of the flood risk.(9)
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Fig. 1. Hungary and the Tisza River.
On the other hand, the area has a large and unde-
veloped potential for recreation, tourism, and nature
conservation. There are pristine, almost untouched,
areas surrounding the meandering Tisza River, and
its floodplain is sprinkled with old villages, traditional
farms, and historic buildings. Tourism was on the rise
until 2000, when the area was stigmatized by a cyanide
spill into the Szamos and Tisza Rivers caused by the
breakage of a tailings impoundment maintained by
the AURUL Australian-Romanian joint venture min-
ing company in northwestern Romania. Until this
episode, water sports had developed intensively in the
area; however, infrastructure supporting these sports
remains underdeveloped, and there is large uncer-
tainty about the future of the region with regard to
tourism.
The central government accelerated its levee-
construction program for the Upper Tisza River and
its tributaries in 1998, after which a World Bank study
queried whether the benefits to this poor region justi-
fied the costs.(1) Following the levee breach of March
2001, the insufficiency of this program was widely rec-
ognized, and the government has begun discussing
other flood mitigation measures, including the con-
struction of emergency reservoirs in Hungary and up-
stream Ukraine, increasing the capacity of the main
riverbed, and changing land-use practices in the flood
plains.(10)
These discussions have become controversial and
sometimes contentious. The water authorities, among
others, view structural measures as essential for
protecting the lives and livelihoods of villagers in
the high-risk areas. Alternatively, environmentalists,
among others, increasingly view structural measures
as detrimental to the ecosystem of the region and as
contributing to flood risks downstream. The environ-
mentalists’ discourse includes taking down the levees
in some areas and renaturalizing the river. This would
require relocating residents and possibly even some
villages out of the high-risk areas.
The taxpayers’ role in compensating the victims
of floods has also become controversial. As a case in
point, the rebuilding or repair of the damaged homes
and buildings from the 2001 flood was criticized as ex-
tensive, especially since many of the homeowners also
received insurance payments. With escalating losses
throughout Hungary, this policy is not only becom-
ing prohibitively expensive, but is increasingly viewed
as encouraging undesired development in flood-risk
areas.
In comparison even with western Europe and the
United States, a large percentage of Hungarian house-
holds, almost 60%, carry flood insurance offered by
one Hungarian and 16 foreign-owned insurers. The
reason for this high insurance uptake is that flood
policies are “bundled” with residential property in-
surance, which is required for a homeowner mort-
gage. In the poor Upper Tisza region, however, only
about 40% of the households hold property insur-
ance. The premium for homeowner flood insurance is
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independent of the risk; in fact, insurers charge all
households in Hungary an equal percentage of their
property insurance premium to cover flooding. This
has resulted in significant cross-subsidization from
persons living in low-risk areas, for example, in large
cities including Budapest and Szeged, to persons liv-
ing in high-risk areas, for example, in villages in the
Upper Tisza region. Thus, not unlike the United King-
dom and France and many other countries in western
Europe, a cornerstone of the present Hungarian in-
surance system is cross-subsidization of premiums.
Flood insurance does not cover victims for com-
monly incurred damages, including water seeping
under the levees, drainage problems, and, most im-
portantly, standing water due to raised groundwater
levels. Flood insurance is not offered at all in areas
unprotected by levees, and no commercial insurance
is available for crops or businesses. For these reasons,
many consider flood insurance in its current form to be
insufficient and recommend government intervention
to establish well-defined and more comprehensive in-
surance practices.(1)
Policymakers in Hungary, like in many other
countries in Europe, are considering legislating a na-
tional flood-insurance system. There are many op-
tions for combining the public and private sectors. For
example, the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) offers public insurance that is mandatory
for those holding a bank mortgage. The U.S. system
is moving toward risk-based premiums to eliminate
cross-subsidization. Alternatively, France’s system is
private but backed by taxpayer funds. It is based on
a concept of social solidarity, with deliberate cross-
subsidies across regions and hazards.
The World Bank study makes a specific recom-
mendation for Hungary. For the first tier, the gov-
ernment would provide compensation of a limited
amount to all households that suffer losses from flood-
ing. As a second tier, flood insurance would be avail-
able from commercial insurers (up to a specified level)
to everyone living in a flood risk basin on an indem-
nity basis (meaning cross-subsidies from low-risk to
high-risk insureds). As a third tier, private insurance
may be available on an actuarial risk basis.(1)
3. STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS
Nearly all Hungarians have a stake in the flood
risk management system for the Upper Tisza re-
gion, either directly by their exposure to flood risks
or indirectly by their tax payments for flood mit-
igation relief and their foregone public amenities
because of flood relief expenditures. As a case in
point, after a Tisza flood in 1998 the central govern-
ment delayed construction of part of the Budapest
subway in order to divert funds for flood relief to
Tisza victims. For the purpose of eliciting stakeholder
views on flood risk management strategies for the
Upper Tisza region, face-to-face, open-ended inter-
views were carried out with the actively involved
stakeholders. These included 24 persons represent-
ing central, regional, and local government agencies,
farmers and entrepreneurs, NGO activists, and in-
surance companies. The interviews formed the basis
for a public survey, or survey to those stakeholders
more indirectly involved, which will be reported in
Section 4. The purpose of the interviews was to elicit
opinions on the factors responsible for the apparent
increase in flood risks in the Upper Tisza Basin and
the consequences of the flooding. In addition, the in-
terviewees were asked to express opinions on their
preferred policy strategies to reduce these risks, their
preferred measures for providing relief to flood vic-
tims, and their preferences for the design of a private
and/or public flood insurance program for Hungary.
3.1. Factors Increasing Flood Risks
Without exception, all the interviewees con-
sidered flood risks to be increasing in the Upper
Tisza region and in Hungary. The following reasons
were given: technical/structural deficiencies, land-use
changes, institutional changes, and lack of private mit-
igation measures.
Most stakeholders regarded technical/structural
deficiencies, namely, the poor quality of the flood
protection systems, as the major flood risk factor.
Many expressed the view that the post-1990 demo-
cratic governments did not allocate sufficient funds
for the maintenance and improvement of the levees.
In addition, some interviewees claimed that the exist-
ing monitoring systems are inadequate. This concern
is transnational since flood waves arrive from the up-
stream countries of Romania and the Ukraine, and
some interviewees pointed to the undeveloped state
of the Ukrainian monitoring system.
A group of respondents attributed more blame
for the increase in the severity of flood risks in the
Upper Tisza region to deforestation and other land-
use factors. In particular, the environmentalists con-
sidered the problem to stem from worsened soil ero-
sion due to extensive clear felling and forest cutting in
the Ukraine. The wooded area of the Ukraine’s Tran-
scarpathian region has recently been reduced by a half
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or even two-thirds of its former area.(7) Soil erosion
leads to a decrease in the water-retaining capacity of
both the vegetation and the soil and can partly explain
why the flood waves now arrive much faster to the
Hungarian Tisza River. Environmentalists also em-
phasized the continuing canalization of rivers as con-
tributing to flooding in Hungary. This situation has
been exacerbated by the construction of the levees,
which adds to the narrowing of the riverbed, resulting
in a further acceleration of its flow. The construction
of levees upstream increases flood risks downstream.
Interviewees also pointed to institutional chan-
ges, particularly the impaired financial basis of the
highly centralized water-management authorities af-
ter the political transition. Before 1990, the national
water authority had a staff of 25,000 persons spread
between Budapest and 12 regional branches. Today,
the staff numbers about 4,000 persons. Nevertheless,
some interviewees considered the organization of wa-
ter management in Hungary as still fairly good. Others
raised the issue of poor cooperation between the wa-
ter authorities and the municipalities. This is particu-
larly problematic with regard to standing-water issues,
which require the cooperation of private landown-
ers, municipalities, local water associations, and the
national water authorities.
Although the lack of private, individual actions
for flood prevention and response was considered a
minor issue with regard to riverine floods, in the case
of standing water it was often mentioned as a ma-
jor factor of risk. Blocked water drains and clogged
culverts were attributed to inappropriate mainte-
nance resulting from the ignorance and negligence of
landowners. As a result of land privatization, a new
group of landowners has emerged who have little ex-
perience in preventing standing water.
Interestingly, few interviewees mentioned
changed patterns in rainfall or changing climatic
conditions as an important long-term contributing
source to flood losses in the Tisza region. Although
it was acknowledged that recent weather extremes
have increased, this was viewed as within the normal
variability. None of the respondents mentioned
global climate change as leading to the increased
incidence or severity of floods in this region.
3.2. The Consequences of Floods
in the Upper Tisza Basin
According to most respondents, the most serious
consequence of floods in the Upper Tisza Basin dur-
ing the past years has been damage to agriculture,
especially to the crops of arable lands. In three con-
secutive years since 1998, the subsistence farmers in
this area suffered severe losses that depleted their re-
serves and resulted in considerable economic and so-
cial problems. In the longer run, floods and standing
water lead to hardening of the soil, which makes it
difficult to cultivate, further reducing the already low
productivity of the affected areas. In the words of a
local mayor (all interviews are anonymous):
Due to the series of floods and draughts, the soil here
becomes hard. Since this is a local problem, the author-
ities do not care and we do not get any compensation
for this. What we receive is the average compensation
given all through the country, although lands here are
of lower quality, and we are at a greater risk. (Interview
excerpt, June 14, 2000)
According to some interviewees, the most serious
consequence of the floods is the difficulty in planning
farming activities. Commercial insurance for crop risk
is not available, even if the farmers could afford it.
As a consequence of the repeated flood disasters,
many residents try to survive by diversifying their ac-
tivities and starting businesses that are less sensitive
to floods. They grow plums and walnut on the flood-
plains, process the crops (jam making), pursue home
craft activities (traditional carpet weaving, embroi-
dery), or use the floodplains as grazing land. However,
most of the interviewees believe that due to the social,
economic, and ecological factors—among others, the
flood risks—the region is not suitable for supporting
its current population.
Besides farming, another activity of increasing
importance in this area is tourism. Since tourism is
mainly a summer activity when water levels are low,
floods and standing water have a less significant im-
pact on tourism than they do on farming. On the other
hand, water-quality problems have considerable con-
sequences. The 2000 cyanide-contamination incident
continues to stigmatize the area, resulting in signifi-
cantly fewer summer tourists. Again, according to a
local mayor:
We take care of the health of the tourists, just like of
our own health. However, this year they are not coming
here. Many tourists cancel their reservations, and we see
that most rooms will be empty. This is very sad because
a number of people invested in improving their houses
to host tourists. (Interview excerpt, June, 14, 2000)
3.3. Mitigation Strategies
The majority of the interviewees considered the
strengthening and heightening of the existing levees
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as inevitable, even if only along certain sections of
the river. They pointed out that if the construction
program had taken place in the past few years, it
would have cost largely the same as has been spent
on flood-fighting efforts. Opinions differed, however,
on whether to heighten the whole levee system, which
was supported by most of the water-authority experts,
or to pursue alternative solutions such as partially re-
naturalizing the floodplains and removing levees to
create natural reservoirs, solutions supported by most
of the mayors.
There was almost unanimous agreement on the
value of reforestation in the catchment area, espe-
cially in the Ukraine, although there was a great deal
of pessimism on how effective the government could
be in this endeavor. A few stakeholders went so far
as to propose that Hungary help finance reforesta-
tion in upstream Ukraine, which was also targeted for
measures to improve the monitoring systems. There
was widespread consensus on the value of construct-
ing new reservoirs and, again, many considered the
Ukraine as the more efficient location. Respondents
cautioned, however, about the difficulty of control-
ling Ukrainian reservoirs, and several persons actu-
ally identified suitable areas in Hungary. There were
also opponents, who considered the construction of
reservoirs more expensive and less efficient than re-
naturalization of the floodplains.
The active stakeholders saw a large, but varied,
role for the central government in preventing flood
damage in the Upper Tisza area; however, this role
did not extend to flood response measures. With
a greatly reduced budget, the Water Management
Authority now calls on local resources, including pri-
vately owned vehicles and equipment, to respond to
threatening flood emergencies. The majority of the re-
spondents approved of this switch to more private in-
volvement and indicated that the recently increasing
financial support (since 1998) of the water authorities
has irritated the public in the region. According to an
interview with a local mayor:
Water management [in Hungary] does not work well,
because the authorities do not really care. If they do
not receive the funding they wish, they do not prepare
properly, and if there is a problem, they say it hap-
pened because they had not received sufficient funding.
Even if they receive money, they do not use it properly.
They are not forced to do things efficiently, and they
are not interested in doing so. (Interview excerpt, June
14, 2000)
This reliance on private citizens and property also
extended to another prevention measure, the main-
tenance and reconstruction of the drainage systems.
Because of the private, municipal, and state owner-
ship of the systems, it was agreed that the situation
calls for a coordinated program, possibly with a large
role for the local water associations established by pri-
vate landowners. In the words of a water-management
official:
The present problem with inland waters is due to the
new owners’ failure to loosen the lower soil. The soil
has become plugged, and so it can’t absorb the water
from the downpours. In addition, the drains became
plugged, and the canals full of mud. We have had certain
things repaired where the problem was the greatest, but
we didn’t correct everything. The most neglected is the
canal system of the land owners; somewhat better is that
maintained by the local water associations, and the one
belonging to the water management authority is quite
good. But each works only if the others are in order
. . . The land owners have duties, they are supposed to
contribute to the maintenance of the drainage system,
or they have to join the associations. (Interview excerpt,
May 19, 1999)
This was reinforced in an interview with a represen-
tative of a local water association:
We have inherited a system of inland water manage-
ment that works well, but we didn’t inherit the legal
regulations to accompany it. Citizens who receive a land
ownership right should also receive the duties that come
with it, the duty of maintaining the drainage system.
(Interview excerpt, May 19, 1999)
Although no blame was attributed to residents,
businesses, and farmers in high-risk areas, everyone
agreed on the importance of building restrictions
within the endangered areas. Economic incentives
were considered appropriate, and many suggested
that government compensation of flood losses be
withheld from those building without a permit. How-
ever, opinions were varied with regard to providing
financial incentives for transferring people out of the
inundated areas. Some expected that many people
would move away anyway because of the manifold
problems in the region. Others claimed that the local
people are happy where they live and would not wel-
come the idea of leaving, even with financial support.
Economic incentives to promote individual mea-
sures were also considered appropriate for en-
couraging more flood-resilient livelihood strategies.
However, due to the extended inundation in the areas
affected by standing water, only the plantation of reed
was proposed. Many emphasized the scarce resources
of most local farmers, suggesting that the government
help finance the costs of land-use changes with loans
and subsidization. With the exception of the drainage
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systems and livelihood strategies, most interviewees
attributed little responsibility for reducing flood losses
to the local population and thus did not consider pub-
lic information as being an essential tool in risk mitiga-
tion. A minority disagreed and proposed longer-term
programs to raise public awareness of the risks and
their mitigation, for example, the maintenance of the
drainage systems, suitable zones for construction, and
appropriate building methods.
Finally, a number of stakeholders took a more
ecological view of the flood risk issue in the Up-
per Tisza region by proposing renaturalization of the
floodplains and remediation of wetlands. Some even
argued that “the land belonging to the river should
be given back to the river.” These interviewees pro-
posed areas that might be reasonable to inundate in
the case of high-water episodes. They also proposed
areas where a drainage system, similar to the medieval
canal system, could be established to ensure inunda-
tion of the wetlands and storage of water.
3.4. Compensation and Insurance
Throughout Hungary, there is extensive public re-
lief to private victims of floods. The recent policy of the
government has been to compensate victims for 100%
of their losses if the cause of the flood is insufficiency
of the levees, but for only 50% of their losses if the
cause is not directly connected to the government’s
negligence in providing protection. Transfers also ex-
ist within the insurance system since premiums are not
based on flood risks. Recently, these transfers have
become controversial, as evidenced, for example, by
the large press coverage of the curtailment of con-
struction of the Budapest subway line in 1998. More-
over, with limited government resources, many view
flood relief as reducing other types of government
transfers. This has created conflicts between farm-
ers and authorities, between municipalities and cen-
tral government, the flood victims and the insurance
companies, the affected and unaffected regions, and
Budapest and the countryside. This resource compe-
tition is apparent from the following statement made
by a local mayor.
Many attack the county [Szabolcs-Szatma´r-Bereg
county in the Upper Tisza Basin] because it has re-
ceived a lot of compensation. At the moment, the fi-
nancial resources are so scarce that the government can
only support a region at the disadvantage of others. . . .
Now, everyone gets so little that no one is inclined to
self-sacrifice. (Interview excerpt, May 21, 1999)
As would be expected from competition for
scarce resources, the stakeholder views on the ne-
cessity, extent, and financing of victim relief after a
major flood were divergent. Yet, none of the intervie-
wees questioned victim relief and compensation from
the central government following the 1998 and 1999
floods. This changed somewhat after the flooding of
2001, when the government compensated 100% of
structural damages.(11)
The interviewees were also questioned with re-
gard to the existing and potential role of flood insur-
ance for municipal structures and private property. As
mentioned earlier, about 40% of the property own-
ers in the Upper Tisza region have private property
insurance, but with limited coverage. In addition, all
the mayors interviewed claimed to have flood insur-
ance policies for local government buildings, although
it is not possible to cover other infrastructure, such as
roads, bridges, and pipelines. The reported experience
with private insurers, however, was rather negative.
Many commented on the reluctance and delays of the
insurers to pay legitimate claims, and they viewed the
limited coverage as a major problem. According to a
mayor from the region:
The insurance companies did not help, although had
there been a levee breach, they would have paid a for-
tune. It would have been very nice of them to give even
a small amount to the victims. (Interview excerpt, June
13, 2000)
A representative of an insurance company held a dif-
ferent opinion:
We were very fair with our clients. While flood insur-
ance does not cover seepage, we thoroughly investi-
gated each case and compensated many victims on an
individual basis. Our contracts issued before 1996 cov-
ered cases where water levels exceeded the level of the
100-year flood, but those issued after 1996 covered only
cases of levee overtopping, where the concept of a levee
includes the temporary sandbags as well. This is why
many clients with pre-1996 contracts were compensated
in spite of the lack of levee overtopping, while others
with post-1996 contracts were not. (Interview excerpt,
June 28, 2000)
In Hungary, there has been some discussion on
requiring private and public flood insurance in high-
risk areas. The mayors rejected a policy of mandatory
flood insurance for all local government property, but
other local stakeholders were more receptive with re-
gard to private property insurance. Some argued that
homeowners should take financial responsibility for
their losses; however, many respondents rejected pri-
vate responsibility and considered flood relief to be a
citizen’s right of protection.
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With the government’s interest in reducing its
liabilities, it is not surprising that experts from the
national authorities were more open to innovative
ideas regarding the role of private insurance, as well
as in favor of incentives for promoting more indi-
vidual initiative to reduce flood losses. One inter-
viewee at the county level proposed that private in-
surance be encouraged with economic incentives, for
example, only those who buy insurance for insurable
risks (e.g., overtopping of the levees) should be eli-
gible for government compensation for uninsurable
risks (e.g., standing water). National policymakers
proposed other types of incentives, for example, that
property insurance premiums be tax deductible or
that subsidized catastrophe loans be offered to home-
owners and companies for building safer buildings,
for improving existing ones, or for moving to safer
locations.
To share the risks of agricultural losses, some in-
terviewees proposed the introduction of voluntary,
mutual, nonprofit organizations. The proponents ar-
gued that the operation of mutuals would increase
individual responsibility and reduce the involvement
of the central government without the disadvantage
of paying the administrative costs and profit of the
private insurance companies. Such organizations al-
ready exist in Hungary, for example, self-insurance
associations for agricultural risks, although flood- and
standing-water losses are not covered. The problem is
that these voluntary associations are financially very
vulnerable and may become insolvent in the case of
cumulative catastrophes. According to the intervie-
wees, the system should involve the government as a
reinsurer for such associations.
3.5. Strategies for Mitigation and Disaster Relief
This short discussion based on stakeholder inter-
views points to at least three different types of strate-
gies the Hungarian policy community can take for re-
ducing flood losses in the Upper Tisza region and for
offering relief to the victims of floods. At one extreme,
the Hungarian government can continue to absorb a
large share of the costs of mitigation and public relief
by continuing its investments in the levee program and
its generous compensation of flood victims. This will
likely lead to a worsening of the central government’s
budget deficit and encourage undesired development
in the flood-prone areas. Even with these drawbacks,
there was substantial support among the stakehold-
ers for continuing investments in structural measures
and significant scepticism about the ability of the lo-
cal population to cope without central government
protection.
Alternatively, the government can withdraw re-
sources from this area and rely more strongly on mar-
ket forces to encourage individual responsibility for
reducing losses and for insuring against them. This
would likely lead to increased diligence on the part of
farmers and landowners, but also to an increased bur-
den on an already vulnerable population and possibly
to out-migration and the abandonment of some his-
toric villages in the area. There was little support for
a radical switch to individualized measures; yet many
stakeholders recognized that private insurance could
play a more important role.
Another policy strategy is oriented to the eco-
logical preservation of the area and would include
subsidized programs to help farmers change land-
use practices, the renaturalization of the river by
removing levees in some areas, and the provision of
infrastructure for soft tourism. Insurance may be an
option, but only by circumventing the commercial in-
surers with nonprofit mutual insurance arrangements.
This should not preclude social solidarity in provid-
ing flood relief and compensation. Sceptics of this ap-
proach point out that these measures will not reduce
the risks to already existing villages, may require re-
location of villagers and farms, and will not solve the
government’s budgetary problem.
The interviews revealed that most of the respon-
dents would prefer a mixed strategy, combining ele-
ments of each of these three strategies. Particularly
among the local stakeholders, many were in favor
of an ecological policy path, but only with continued
involvement of the central government in providing
protection and relief. The environmentalists also pre-
ferred the ecological approach, but with a surprising
degree of support for market-based strategies, includ-
ing the involvement of insurance companies. Only
one mayor expressed explicit preference for a radi-
cal switch to a more market-based strategy.
4. THE PUBLIC SURVEY
Based on the stakeholder interviews, a question-
naire with face-to-face interviews was administered
to 400 persons. The purpose of the questionnaire was
to elicit views of the public on Hungary’s options for
reducing flood risks and providing relief to the vic-
tims. Four separate locations in Hungary were cho-
sen in order to include stakeholders at risk to flood
as well as stakeholders who subsidize those living
in high-risk areas through their tax and insurance
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payments. Two of these areas are located along the
Tisza River: the upstream, rural flood basin in the
Upper Tisza catchment area and the downstream city
of Szolnok (see Fig. 1). The other two areas are lo-
cated in the west of Hungary and are exposed to little
risk of flooding: a hilly region in Zala county and the
city of Sze´kesfehe´rva´r in the Transdanubian region.
The study thus included two high-risk and two low-
risk, two rural and two urban areas. The sample size
in each area was 100. Settlements in rural areas were
chosen randomly, and the number of participants was
determined according to population size. The sample
was selected to be representative in terms of gender
and age for each region.
The questionnaire contained 24 questions, of
which nine could be answered with “yes,” “no,”
“maybe,” or “don’t know.” With the exception of one
open question, the remaining 14 questions gave the re-
spondent a list of possible options, which they ranked
partially or fully in order of importance or relevance.
They could also add options and comments. In the
following, we report on selected results of the survey.
4.1. Causes and Consequences of Floods
Respondents were asked to choose the four most
important causes of increasing flood losses in Hungary
from a list of 11 options. Table I shows the most fre-
Table I. What Are the Main Causes of Increasing Flood Losses in
Hungary?
Chosen by (%)∗
The water-management organizations 21
have fewer resources
Due to global climate change, more intensive 42
rainfalls and snowmelts are experienced
more frequently
Levees are not sufficiently high and strong 57
Large forest areas have been cleared 63
in the river basin
Authorities have issued building permits for 34
areas where the risk of inundation is high 34
Levees have not been properly maintained 73
Regulation and damming of rivers have 20
changed the water runoff
Persons living in the area are not taking 8
sufficient measures to prevent losses
Warning systems are not early enough 12
Neighboring countries do not take sufficient 46
measures to reduce flooding downstream
Too many people have chosen to build 10
and live in flood risk areas
∗Respondents were asked to choose four.
quent answers, which included the improper mainte-
nance of the levees, the clearing of large forest areas
in the catchment area, and the insufficient height and
strength of the levees. Almost half the interviewees
implicated the neighboring countries and (contrary
to the interviews) global climate change as among the
main reasons for increasing flood losses. Significantly,
the least important cause was attributed to the lo-
cal people taking insufficient preventive measures or
building in flood-risk areas. At the same time, one-
third of the respondents blamed the authorities for
having issued building permits in areas with high in-
undation risk. These results confirm the views of the
key stakeholders that Hungarians tend to blame their
government or neighboring countries for the coun-
try’s escalating flood losses, and few appear to hold
those living and working in the high-risk areas as con-
tributing substantially to this escalation.
There were regional differences in these re-
sponses. Those living in the high-risk areas, and es-
pecially residents of the rural Upper Tisza region, at-
tribute less blame to the Hungarian authorities for the
insufficiency of the levees and for their failure to re-
strict building; they attribute more blame to ecological
factors such as climate change and to deforestation in
the upstream countries. The recent series of record-
breaking water levels in this region may explain this
response.
The second question asked respondents to rank
the three most serious consequences of floods from
a list of nine (to which they could add options). As
shown in Table II, more than half the respondents
considered the damages to homes, summer houses,
Table II. What Are the Most Serious Negative Consequences of
Floods in Hungary?
Chosen by (%)∗
Homes, summer houses, and property 58
are damaged
Farming activities become impossible 45
People are distressed and often become ill 45
Roads, utilities, and public buildings 40
are damaged
Pollution is spread by flood waters 37
The ecosystem becomes unbalanced 31
The income from farming activities 25
becomes highly uncertain
Property values decrease in the 12
endangered areas
Tourism is decreased 4
∗Respondents were asked to choose four.
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and other property as the most serious consequences.
Somewhat fewer respondents emphasized the dis-
ablement of farming activities and the distress of the
flood victims, and the least frequent responses in-
cluded the decrease in tourism and the decrease in
property values.
Residents of the Upper Tisza region gave sig-
nificantly more emphasis to damages to houses and
summer homes (78%), impacts on the health of vic-
tims (58%), and disablement of farming activities
(56%) than did respondents in the other three re-
gions. Those living in the two rural areas attributed
more significance to the contamination of the in-
undated areas (37% and 46% in the Upper Tisza
and the Zala region, respectively), while those liv-
ing in the urban centers gave more emphasis to dam-
ages to public buildings and roads (53% and 50% in
Szolnok and Sze´kesfehe´rva´r, respectively) and the re-
sulting imbalance of the ecosystem (44% and 38%,
respectively).
4.2. Mitigation Strategies
When asked whether anything can be done to
reduce flood losses, only 9% of the respondents re-
sponded negatively. Table III shows the most frequent
answers to the question of what measures would be
most effective in reducing flood losses (a maximum
of three measures could be selected from a list of 11).
Consistent with the first question, the most frequently
selected measures included heightening and strength-
Table III. What Measures Do You Think Would Be Most
Effective for Reducing Flood Losses in Hungary?
Chosen by (%)∗
Heightening and strengthening 74
the existing levees
Reforestation 61
Maintenance of the drainage systems 45
Preventing construction in high-risk areas 27
Removing levees to increase catchment areas 21
Development of forecasting 21
and warning systems
Provision of more resources to 16
water-management authorities
Financial support for transferring people 14
out of high-risk areas
Informing the public about flood risks 10
and their mitigation
Introducing appropriate agricultural activities 9
Renaturalization of parts of the river 6
∗Respondents were asked to choose four.
ening the existing levees and reforestation in the
catchment area. Maintenance and reconstruction of
the drainage systems, as well as preventing construc-
tion in high-risk areas, were selected at a lower fre-
quency. Twenty-one percent of the respondents con-
sidered the removal of selected levees as an important
mitigation measure, which is significant considering
that this measure is a radical departure from the tradi-
tional policy of protecting the settlements with levees.
Lower rankings were given to other alternative mea-
sures, such as informing the public, financial incentives
to encourage inhabitants to migrate out of high-risk
areas, introducing alternative agricultural practices,
renaturalization of parts of the river, and support of
the water-management authorities.
The regional distribution of the first ranked miti-
gation measures is shown in Fig. 2. The rankings show
little regional deviation with regard to the most pop-
ular mitigation measure of improving the levees, but
there is more deviation regarding other measures.
Reforestation is particularly emphasized in the set-
tlements along the Tisza River, both in the Upper
Tisza region and in Szolnok, whereas removal of se-
lected levees to increase the floodplain is, not surpris-
ingly, most emphasized in downstream Szolnok. It is
also not surprising that persons living in areas less
affected by floods prefer zoning restrictions on build-
ing in floodplains and stricter controls on individual
behavior.
The respondents were asked to give their opin-
ion on who should take the most responsibility for
reducing flood losses. The responses strongly indicate
that the public stakeholders believe that responsibil-
ity should be mainly in the hands of the central gov-
ernment rather than in the hands of property own-
ers living in high-risk areas. The central government
was ranked in first or second place (of four alterna-
tives) by 92% of the respondents, the neighboring
countries by 51% of the respondents, the municipal-
ities by 49%, and the property owners by only 10%
of the respondents. Although respondents from all
sample regions consider the role of the central gov-
ernment as the most important, significantly fewer in
the Upper Tisza region ranked the central govern-
ment as carrying most responsibility, and significantly
more respondents in this region ranked the upstream
countries as being mainly responsible. The role of the
municipalities and the property owners is considered
somewhat more important in the cities (Szolnok and
Sze´kesfehe´rva´r) than in the rural regions, perhaps be-
cause of the extreme financial problems facing smaller
communities.
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Fig. 2. Respondents’ views on reducing flood losses by region.
Given the strong stakeholder perception that
flood problems in the Upper Tisza region are greatly
aggravated by deforestation and other practices in up-
stream Ukraine and Romania, a question of how these
countries would finance mitigation measures was in-
cluded. Interestingly, as shown in Table IV, 80% of
the respondents thought that Hungary should help fi-
nance flood protection investments in the upstream
countries. This might include, for example, the con-
struction of levees in Romania and the Ukraine. This
support was somewhat stronger in rural areas.
4.3. Compensation and Risk Sharing
As shown in Table V, a large majority of the re-
spondents would fully or partially support Hungary’s
generous public compensation system on the grounds
of social solidarity. At the same time, switching to
more individual responsibility was also fully or par-
Table IV. To What Extent Should the Hungarian Government
Pay for Risk-Reducing Investments in Upstream Countries?
Upper
Tisza Szolnok Zala Sze´kesfehe´rva´r Total
Fully (%) 32 35 35 45 37
Partly (%) 45 44 43 38 43
Rather not (%) 7 19 13 17 14
Do not know (%) 16 2 9 0 6
tially supported by an equally large majority of the
respondents. Indeed, later questions on the form of
relief systems show a great deal of support for a joint
public-private insurance system for Hungary. A com-
munity based mutual insurance system was somewhat
less popular, but even this option received full or par-
tial support from 80% of the respondents.
There are major differences on this issue between
the regions. Not surprisingly, as shown in Fig. 3, gov-
ernmental compensation based on solidarity has more
sympathy in the higher-risk Upper Tisza and Szolnok
regions, whereas a system based on individual respon-
sibility and private insurance receives a more sympa-
thetic view in the less affected regions and in the cities.
Although persons not exposed to flood risks appear
less enthusiastic about helping those in risk areas with
their tax contributions, there is still an astonishing de-
gree of support across the regions. In a later ques-
tion, we see that this solidarity appears to stem from
the view that the Hungarian government is at fault
when private persons suffer flood losses. Moreover,
the survey confirmed statements made by the active
stakeholders that there is a great deal of suspicion of
commercial insurance companies, which may explain
the apparent popularity of mutual insurance pools
across all the regions (Fig. 3). The respondents were
also queried about who should receive compensation
and to what extent. Table VI shows that the major-
ity of the respondents agree on a system in which all
victims would be compensated in proportion to their
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Table V. Government Compensation, Insurance, and Pooling
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Fully Agree% Partly Agree% Disagree% Do Not Know%
Social solidarity requires that government compensate flood 48 41 7 4
victims for damages that occur to their homes and livelihood
Everybody should take more responsibility for flood risks 40 50 6 4
and those who can afford it should purchase private insurance
Locals should pull together and create a fund that could help 37 43 14 6
flood victims in case of a disaster
It does not matter what you do, flood victims will lose a lot 7 29 51 13
losses. Significantly fewer respondents would approve
a system of equal compensation to everyone, and 14%
would approve a system of compensating only those
who have built their homes with permits. An even
lower number of respondents would make compen-
sation contingent on other conditions, such as low in-
comes of the recipients or their insurance coverage,
and only very few would not provide compensation at
all. It is remarkable that approximately 75% of the re-
spondents agree that the government should compen-
sate every victim regardless of the victim’s economic
circumstances or role in preventing losses.
Considering Hungary’s history of government
protection against flooding, it is not surprising that
Fig. 3. Respondents’ views on risk
sharing by region.
about half (51%) of the respondents justify relief
to flood victims on the grounds that flood protec-
tion is the responsibility of the government and
thus flooding is the fault of the government. About
one-quarter of the respondents (26%) justified vic-
tim relief on the grounds that the government
has always provided compensation, and only 19%
justified financial support to the victims on the sol-
idarity principle. Among the cons, 34% of the re-
spondents thought that compensation is too costly for
the taxpayers, 23% thought that compensation often
goes to the wealthy, and 22% were concerned that
compensation discourages people from purchasing
insurance.
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Table VI. Forms of Government Compensation to Flood Victims
After a major flood, the Hungarian Chosen
government should compensate . . . by (%)
All victims by a certain percentage of their losses 57
All victims by the same amount, above which 19
they can choose to have insurance
Only needy victims, that is, not owners of 7
vacation homes or well-to-do businesses
Only victims with flood insurance 3
Only victims who have not built their homes 4
in high-risk areas without a permit
Nobody 0
Turning to incentives for private mitigation, it can
be recalled that most respondents thought that flood
victims could do little to protect themselves. Even
so, another question showed that 65% of the respon-
dents were of the opinion that households, businesses,
and communities can be encouraged to take measures
to reduce flood losses, but mainly by not building in
high-risk zones. The differences between the regions
are high. For example, in the low-risk communities
of Zala, 83% of the respondents were of this opin-
ion compared to only 45% in the high-risk Upper
Tisza region. As shown in Table VII, most respon-
dents saw a top-down approach as most effective, for
example, the authorities not issuing building permits
in high-risk zones. Around half of the respondents
would agree on the government compensating only
those who have taken the necessary measures to re-
Table VII. How Should Households, Businesses, and
Communities Be Encouraged to Reduce Flood Losses?
Chosen by (%)
The local authorities should pass zoning 80
regulations and strictly enforce them
The central government should make 53
compensation after a flood contingent on
loss-reducing measures before the flood
Insurance companies should offer lower 39
premiums to households, businesses,
and communities that have taken
prespecified loss-reducing measures
Insurance companies should raise premiums 14
of those living in high-risk areas
to encourage people to leave and
discourage people building their
homes in these areas
The central government should compensate 4
far less of the losses from a flood
duce flood losses, and about one-third would support
lowered insurance premiums to reward private loss-
reduction measures. Significantly fewer respondents
consider incentives such as a reduction of government
compensation or an increase in insurance premiums
in high-risk areas as desirable.
It can be recalled from the interviews that there
is a great deal of support for protecting villages from
life-threatening floods, although in some cases it may
be cost effective to encourage, by decree or financial
incentives, the relocation of residents and even whole
villages out of very high-risk areas. In a question ad-
dressing this alternative, approximately two-thirds of
the respondents opposed relocation and were of the
opinion that every settlement at risk should be pro-
tected at any cost. However, the support came mainly
from the Upper Tisza area, where this opinion was
held by 93% of the respondents. In the safe Zala re-
gion, alternatively, only 42% were of this opinion,
and in downstream Szolnok, 32% of the respondents
supported financial aid to help high-risk communities
move to nearby, safer areas. Only 3% of the Upper
Tisza respondents found this policy attractive.
4.4. Insurance
Although a large majority of respondents are fully
or partially in favor of continuing Hungary’s gener-
ous public compensation system to flood victims, it
can be recalled from Table V that a majority of in-
terviewees were at the same time in favor of more
individual responsibility. Exploring this issue further,
as shown in Fig. 4, over 60% of the sampled persons
(but fewer in the Upper Tisza region) thought it de-
sirable that property owners have insurance against
flood losses, and only about half as many (but higher
in the Upper Tisza region) shared this opinion on the
condition that low-income individuals receive public
assistance in purchasing insurance. Of those holding
these opinions, 41% reportedly did so because insur-
ance could reduce government compensation to the
Fig. 4. Respondents’ views on the question of whether property
owners should insure themselves against flood damage.
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victims and 25% because private insurance companies
might assist governments in building flood defenses.
Only a small proportion of the interviewees justified
their opinion on fairness or efficiency grounds, that is,
that property owners should take more responsibil-
ity or that risk-dependent premiums would provide
incentives for loss mitigation. Although private insur-
ance was viewed for the most part as desirable, only
about one-third of the respondents thought it should
be mandatory and another third thought it should be
conditional on assistance to low-income persons.
The cross-subsidization of insurance premiums,
not surprisingly, received far more support from the
two high-risk areas (65% and 38% in the Upper Tisza
region and Szolnok, respectively). However, consid-
ering that this practice is contrary to the economic
interests of premium payers in low-risk areas, it is
remarkable that 24 and 31% of respondents in Zala
and Sze´kesfehe´rva´r, respectively, were supportive of
cross-subsidization. Again, social solidarity appears
to play an important role in the attitudes of many
Hungarians.
Turning to the question of financing losses to
public infrastructure, almost half the respondents
(45%) would not stray from the present practice of
restoring infrastructure damage at the expense of the
Hungarian taxpayer. Still, one-third of the respon-
dents (32%) would support the idea of municipal-
ities purchasing insurance (it can be recalled that
many mayors in the Upper Tisza region carry lim-
ited insurance on public structures). Putting the bur-
den on local taxpayers or putting it on future tax-
payers by taking loans are considerably less popular
measures.
The stakeholder interviews, combined with infor-
mation on the policy discourse, revealed a number of
possible options for a Hungarian flood-insurance sys-
tem. Four (incomplete) options were presented to the
questionnaire respondents, who were asked to choose
the one they preferred or to suggest an alternative.
The responses are shown below (10% of the respon-
dents had no opinion).
 All property owners must purchase private
flood insurance, and the private companies are
required to cover all flood risks at the same
premium regardless of risk (14% of the respon-
dents chose this option).
 All flood victims receive a fixed and equal
amount of compensation from the govern-
ment, regardless of the extent of their dam-
age. To cover losses above this amount,
property owners and businesses can voluntar-
ily purchase private insurance (50% of the re-
spondents chose this option).
 All households, farms, and businesses can vol-
untarily purchase flood insurance covering all
types of floods from the government (15% of
the respondents chose this option).
 Households, businesses, or farms form a mu-
tual insurance pool (11% of the respondents
chose this option).
Mandatory flood insurance was more preferred in
high-risk regions, whereas voluntary local associa-
tions were more preferred in low-risk areas. The pos-
sibility for purchasing flood insurance from the gov-
ernment is preferred mostly by urban respondents,
whereas the public-private insurance system is more
preferred in rural regions. Although there are regional
differences, it is interesting that half the respondents
support a mixed public-private system of victim relief.
This is consistent with earlier results indicating that
many Hungarians regard government compensation
and private insurance as complementary.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This study elicited views from stakeholders active
in the policy process and from the public on develop-
ing a flood risk management program for Hungary,
and particularly for the Upper Tisza region. From
an initial set of stakeholder interviews, three sce-
narios or policy paths emerged: a business-as-usual
path characterized by central government author-
ity and responsibility; a market path characterized
by individual responsibility; and an ecological path
characterized by fewer structural interventions and
more reliance on local initiatives. This study showed
the strongest support for the traditional, business-as-
usual role of the central government; however, there
was also strong support for complementing this path
with more individual initiative, and more limited sup-
port for the ecological policy alternatives. Considering
the long-standing tradition of the central government
providing comprehensive flood protection through-
out Hungary’s extensive floodplains, the strong mi-
nority views supporting more individual initiative and
ecological alternatives are noteworthy and policy-
relevant in light of the government’s intent to reduce
its budget deficit as a condition for European Union
membership.
Taking a business-as-usual path, the Hungarian
government can continue to absorb a large share
Flood Risk Management in Hungary 599
of the costs of mitigation measures and public re-
lief/reconstruction by persisting with its investments
in structural flood-mitigating programs and its gen-
erous relief to flood victims. This will protect vul-
nerable villages like those in the Upper Tisza and
allow farming to continue in the floodplains; however,
it will also lead to a worsening of the central gov-
ernment’s budget deficit, encourage undesired devel-
opment in the flood-prone areas, and increase flood
risks downstream. Despite the drawbacks, there was
strong stakeholder support for this policy path. The
most preferred mitigation measures included struc-
tural interventions, for example, strengthening and
heightening the levees, constructing new reservoirs,
and improving the monitoring system. Although the
public survey respondents also put a great deal of em-
phasis on ecological issues, such as deforestation, the
continuation of central government interventions was
hardly questioned. The emphasis on central govern-
ment responsibility also dominated opinions on gov-
ernment compensation of flood victims, which most
stakeholders viewed as highly desirable. Social soli-
darity for flood victims, even those with sufficient eco-
nomic means and those who have illegally located in
flood-risk zones, was strikingly apparent. The justifi-
cation for this solidarity was attributed largely to the
fault of the government in not protecting the victims
from the flood event.
Alternatively, the government can withdraw re-
sources from flood protection and relief and rely
more strongly on market forces to encourage in-
dividual responsibility for reducing losses and for
insuring against them. This would likely lead to in-
creased diligence on the part of households, farm-
ers, and landowners, and also to an increased burden
on an already vulnerable population, forcing more
out-migration and possibly the abandonment of some
historic villages in the area. Most interviewees and
questionnaire respondents rejected this radical shift
to individual responsibility, but many did support im-
portant measures in this direction. Except for the
view that landowners and communities should take
more responsibility for the problem of standing wa-
ter, there was little notion of individual loss-reduction
measures and, more remarkably, little acknowledg-
ment that public information could be useful. At the
same time, a majority of respondents, and a strong
majority in low-risk areas, saw a role for the govern-
ment in zoning regulations to restrict construction in
the vulnerable regions. However, this did not go so
far as supporting the relocation of residents out of re-
peatedly flooded villages. A majority of respondents,
regardless of their risks, held the opinion that all high-
risk settlements should be protected regardless of the
costs.
There was cautious support for voluntary pri-
vate insurance, and one of the most important re-
sults of this study from a policy perspective was the
widespread support of a mixed public-private system
for flood relief and reconstruction. Particularly those
in the Upper Tisza region, but also remarkably many
respondents facing no flood risks, held the opinion
that the government should compensate all victims re-
gardless of their individual circumstances and regard-
less of the precautions they had taken. Importantly,
most would combine government compensation with
private insurance and/or community self-insurance
schemes.
A third policy strategy is oriented to sustain-
able development and the ecological preservation of
Hungary’s floodplains with subsidized programs for
helping farmers change land-use practices, renatural-
izing the river by removing levees in some areas, refor-
estation, and providing infrastructure for soft tourism.
Many in the Upper Tisza region favored this strategy
but with little acknowledgment that it may require
relocation of villagers and farms and that it will not
in the short term solve the government’s budgetary
problem. Some elements of this strategy, particularly
reforestation, were attractive across regions, but other
elements were less popular, for example, removing
levees and renaturalizing the river. However, this later
strategy became significantly more salient for key pol-
icymakers following the most recent flood incident. In
1998, flood waters came within millimeters of topping
the levees, causing many to appreciate the marginal
benefit of allowing the river to flood some areas. From
a policy perspective, the new popularity of removing
levees in selected areas is another important result of
this study.
The public survey indicated that a flood risk man-
agement strategy in Hungary will likely not gain
widespread support from the active and public stake-
holders unless it combines elements of the business-
as-usual, market-based, and ecological policy paths.
Indeed, the importance of a combination of these
strategies was evidenced by the widespread view that
increasing flood losses can be attributed to the insuf-
ficient development of flood defense facilities, inap-
propriate land-use practices in the catchment area,
and the ecological imbalance. Moreover, a mixed
public-private system for the provision of victim re-
lief and reconstruction, which combines taxpayer
support with private insurance, was overwhelmingly
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supported. These insights have formed the basis for
developing policy scenarios as input to a catastrophe
model of the region. The simulated policy paths will
be presented to participants of an upcoming stake-
holder workshop on flood risk management for the
Upper Tisza region.
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Infrastructure in Developing and Transition Countries:
Risk and Protection
Paul K. Freeman1∗ and Georg Ch. Pflug1,2
This article examines two possible strategies for financing post-disaster infrastructure rehabil-
itation in developing and transition countries: relying on ex ante financing instruments (includ-
ing insurance, catastrophe bonds, and other risk-transfer instruments) and ex post borrowing
or credit. Insurance and other ex ante instruments will increase a country’s stability, espe-
cially if the government authorities have a difficult time borrowing or otherwise raising funds
after a major disaster; however, these instruments have an opportunity cost and can reduce
the country’s economic growth potential. The cost-benefit tradeoff is therefore one between
economic growth through infrastructure investment and added solvency and stability for the
economy. This article develops a model to illustrate this tradeoff. The model, which views
the infrastructure of a developing or transition country as a nondiversifiable portfolio that
generates returns, can provide a basis for evaluating alternative financing options depending
on the country’s objectives in terms of growth, solvency, and stability.
KEY WORDS: Natural catastrophes; infrastructure protection; risk management
1. INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency, natural disasters are
destroying infrastructure essential to economic de-
velopment in developing and transition countries. As
described by Munich Re,(1,2) in comparison to the
decade of the 1960s, the frequency of severe natural
catastrophes has increased by a factor of three and the
direct economic costs have increased by a factor of
nine. Although the direct damages of approximately
$70 billion a year from natural disasters seem evenly
split between the developed and developing (includ-
ing transition) countries, the per capita impact on the
developing or transition countries is nearly 20 times
as great as in the developed world.
1 IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis),
Laxenburg, Austria.
2 Institute of Statistics and Decision Support, 1090 Wien, Univer-
sita¨tsstraße 5, University of Vienna, Austria.
∗ Address correspondence to Paul K. Freeman at pkfree@
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Concern about these costs has generated con-
siderable activity in the international development
community. The United Nations declared the 1990s
the International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduc-
tion. The World bank created the Disaster Manage-
ment Facility to direct the bank’s responses to disas-
ter losses. Each of these organizations has spawned
a series of activities focused on natural disasters and
developing and transition countries.
In most countries, reconstruction of damaged in-
frastructure is financed by post-event measures. These
measures usually include increased borrowing or di-
version of existing budgeted funds to finance recon-
struction. The World Bank has provided $14 billion
in post-natural-disaster reconstruction financing dur-
ing the past 20 years.(3) This is nearly 250% of the
amount provided for reconstruction work following
civil disturbances.
During the past decade, the scientific under-
standing of the causes and consequences of natural
catastrophes has dramatically improved. Models to
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estimate the frequency and severity of catastrophic
events have been coupled with techniques to mea-
sure the vulnerability of capital stock to catastrophe
losses. This has not only improved the probability es-
timates of natural catastrophes, but also of the poten-
tial consequences of these events. Although sophisti-
cated modeling of both the nature and costs of natural
catastrophes exists for developed countries, little re-
liable data on the risks of natural catastrophes has
been developed for developing and transition coun-
tries. Further, in the developed world, the tool used
for complex financial planning to absorb the costs of
catastrophes is modeling. Today, insurance absorbs
more than half of the economic losses from natural
catastrophes in the developed world. Also, the use of
catastrophe-insurance-related tools has been increas-
ing significantly in recent years. In contrast, less than
2% of losses from natural disasters are insured in the
developing world.
Ex ante financial planning for natural disaster re-
construction financing does not practically take place
today as a result of a wide-ranging number of factors.
Among those is the lack of theory to support ex ante
risk transfer for a country. This article develops a the-
ory for countries based on the behavior characteris-
tics of insurance companies. The premise is simple.
Developing countries own a portfolio of assets neces-
sary to sustain economic growth. Among those assets
is publicly owned infrastructure. From these assets, an
expected annual return is anticipated. The assets are
in geographically defined regions and subject to loss
from natural disaster events. This loss between assets
is a correlated loss. Assuming that solvency and stabil-
ity are the objective of the policymakers, ex ante risk
transfer is more efficient than ex post reconstruction
financing. Solvency is the ability to meet all payment
obligations within the observation period. Although
countries do not go bankrupt, insolvency causes tur-
moil and should be avoided. Stability refers to a pre-
dictable growth path without ups and downs of the
economic development, expressed, for example, in
GDP (see Section 4.1).
The article proceeds along the following path.
Section 2 describes a developing or transition coun-
try’s portfolio of infrastructure assets. The section
draws a parallel between the portfolio of infrastruc-
ture assets owned by a developing or transition coun-
try and the portfolio of insurance policies owned by
a geographically constrained insurance company. It
suggests that a country may benefit from reducing the
variance of its portfolio through risk transfer, just like
a small insurance company. Section 3 outlines the risk
of loss to the portfolio described in Section 2. Section 4
describes a model to measure the benefit of risk trans-
fer for the infrastructure portfolio. Section 4.1 posits
two objectives, solvency and stability, to evaluate the
optimum behavior of a developing or transition coun-
try. These two constraints are those classically im-
posed to evaluate risk transfer decision processes. Sec-
tion 5 reports the simulation results. Finally, Section 6
draws policy conclusions. The Appendix details the
mathematical specifications for the model and the im-
pact of correlated risk on a portfolio of assets.
2. THE PORTFOLIO OF PUBLIC
INFRASTRUCTURE
In what follows we compare the benefits of risk
transfer versus ex post reconstruction financing for
developing and transition countries. A useful starting
place is to examine why private entities in the devel-
oped world engage in risk transfer for catastrophes.
The answer to this problem lies in understanding the
distinctive nature of catastrophic risk.
Catastrophic risk is typified by its low frequency
and high severity. The high severity of damage results
from the correlation of damages in a geographically
defined region. If an earthquake occurs, it will gen-
erally cause damage to all property within its prox-
imity. Floods and windstorms have similar character-
istics: they tend to cause damage to most property
within a geographically defined region. For insurance
companies, this causes a particularly difficult prob-
lem. Because of the law of large numbers, insurance
works best for frequent independent risks with rela-
tively small damage per event.(4) Geographically con-
strained insurance companies cannot reduce the risk
in their portfolio of insurance policies by adding more
policies, which would be the outcome if the law of
large numbers worked to their benefit. Rather, they
reduce the risk of their portfolio of insurance policies
by purchasing reinsurance that acts as a hedge for
their accumulated portfolio risk. In fact, the biggest
purchasers of catastrophe reinsurance in relationship
to their capital base are smaller capitalized, geograph-
ically constrained insurers.(5)
This behavior of the small, geographically con-
strained insurance companies is consistent with port-
folio theory of risk spreading. The theory would ad-
vise the insurance company to reduce the variance of
the risk of its portfolio by adding negatively correlated
risk to its portfolio. By so doing, it reduces the vari-
ance of its whole portfolio. This article will explore
these phenomena in more detail later.
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Can we learn anything from this behavior of small
insurance companies that may be helpful in address-
ing the desirability of risk transfer for developing and
transition countries? This article argues that govern-
ments of developing and transition countries “own” a
portfolio of risk with peculiar characteristics that may
benefit from risk transfer.
3. THE RISK OF INFRASTRUCTURE LOSS
Most developing and transition country gov-
ernments own a large portion of the infrastructure
needed for their development.(3) Depending on the
size of the country, its exposure to natural hazard loss,
and its stock of infrastructure, losses from natural haz-
ards impacting the country can cause significant loss
to the infrastructure stock. Annually, approximately
U.S. $20 billion of infrastructure is lost from natural
catastrophic events.(6) Since a catastrophe could im-
pact a significant portion of the infrastructure within a
country, the losses to the infrastructure are correlated.
In this sense, a geographically constrained country is
similar to a small, geographically limited insurance
company. Is there a portfolio strategy available that
will reduce its exposure?
The portfolio of loss to the infrastructure of a de-
veloping or transition country has some distinctive
characteristics. The portfolio consists of fixed assets.
Once in place, infrastructure, like most real property
assets, tends to be permanent. The investment in the
infrastructure is presumed to have a fixed rate of re-
turn over the life of the asset. The rate of return is
generally based on a cost-benefit analysis made at the
time of the original investment decision. The World
Bank estimates the infrastructure projects for which it
has provided financing have annually earned on aver-
age 17% of the cost of the project.(3) The infrastruc-
ture is exposed to damage loss, either from natural
disasters, civil disruption, or lack of proper mainte-
nance. Portfolio theory generally applies where the
total amount available for investment is known, but
the rate of return on the assets is unknown. Portfolio
theory explains how to maximize the rate of return
within defined constraints. The primary planning tool
is changing the individual assets owned in the port-
folio. With a portfolio composed of correlated assets,
maximizing return at reduced risk is aided by adding
to the portfolio assets with return characteristics that
are not correlated to the return characteristics of the
existing portfolio.
The portfolio strategy to deal with the risk of
loss of the infrastructure of a developing or transi-
tion country is different. This portfolio consists of a
set of assets that are expected to create a predeter-
mined rate of return. The risk is in the loss of the
asset base through damage by natural catastrophe.
The asset base is geographically fixed. The risk of loss
from natural catastrophes is correlated both tempo-
rally and spatially, as subsequent sections of the article
will detail. The portfolio strategy is aimed at reducing
the risk of loss from natural catastrophes to infras-
tructure and preserving the expected return from the
infrastructure investment.
4. DESIGN OF THE MODEL
For purposes of this article, we assume a coun-
try with an initial infrastructure base of 100. The
infrastructure depreciates over a 30-year period. An-
nually, the country has the ability to borrow an
amount equal to 10% of its existing infrastructure
base. This assumption captures the ability of a country,
based on existing economic performance, to increase
external borrowing related to infrastructure. The ad-
ditional borrowing can be used for one of three pur-
poses: add new infrastructure, replace damaged in-
frastructure lost through natural catastrophic events,
or purchase risk-transfer protection for the existing
infrastructure. This assumption is based on existing
experience with developing and transition countries
and how they finance losses from natural catastro-
phes. Some studies suggest that a portion of new loans
for developing countries are made to replace lost in-
frastructure, and that previously approved loans are
diverted to pay for losses.(7) Generally, the new and
diverted credits are structured to remain within a per-
ceived borrowing limit for a country based on its ex-
isting economic performance. We arbitrarily assume
that the perceived borrowing limit for infrastructure
purposes is 10% of the existing level of infrastructure.
The assumed interest rate for all borrowing is
8%, which is a blended rate of the average of 17%
now paid by developing countries on commercially
issued sovereign debt and the much lower conces-
sional interest rate on borrowing for developing and
transition countries from international development
banks. Deutsche Bank estimates that the blended rate
for developing countries for all borrowing is 8–9%.(8)
Principal and interest on all borrowing is amortized
over a 10-year period. It is assumed that the rate of re-
turn on the infrastructure investment is 15%, whether
existing or new infrastructure. This is slightly lower
than the average return of 17% returned on existing
World Bank infrastructure projects. It is assumed that
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the infrastructure is subject to risk of loss of 25% of
total infrastructure once every 25 years (a 4% event).
It is assumed that risk transfer to cover a full 25%
loss of infrastructure can be purchased at a rate equal
to 1.25% of the infrastructure. This rate represents
the risk rate of 1% (equivalent to the event likeli-
hood multiplied by the size) and an expected return
to the professional risk taker equivalent 25% of the
risk rate. Under current pricing for catastrophe risk
transfer, this rate would be very high.(9)
With these assumptions in mind, we propose the
following structure of a model to address policy op-
tions to deal with the cost of catastrophes.
1. The total value of the infrastructure owned
by the government in the country under con-
sideration in year t is I(t). Infrastructure de-
preciates at a rate of d. A catastrophic event
may destroy the fraction δ(t) of infrastructure,
where δ is a random variable.
2. The strategy of the government is to take ev-
ery year 100 w% of the previous year’s value
of infrastructure as loans. This amount is in-
vested in infrastructure.
3. The loans have to be paid back with fixed an-
nuities within 10 years and interest rate of q.
4. The yearly return R(t) is 100 v% of the value
of the infrastructure.
5. The government may purchase an insurance
that covers damages up to 100 δmax% of the in-
frastructure in year t. The risk premium is γ . If
the infrastructure is insured, then damages up
to 100 δmax of the infrastructure value are fully
insured. If the damage exceeds this threshold,
only the insured part (that is exactly 100 δmax
of the infrastructure value) is reconstructed.
4.1. Solvency and Stability
Why should the government prefer insurance
over ex post financing? As we will argue and illus-
trate in a numeric example, insurance increases two
desired properties of the economic development path:
solvency and stability.
Solvency is the ability to fulfill payment obliga-
tions. We propose probability to be able to fulfill the
payment obligations within the considered period as a
measure of solvency risk.
Stability refers to the property of constant growth.
An economy that grows steadily at a predictable rate
is more attractive to foreign investors than an econ-
omy that grows at the same rate but for which the
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Fig. 1. An unstable path and its nearest stable path.
growth values fluctuate and exhibit negative growth
in some years.
We measure the instability of an economy by an
instability index, which is defined as follows: if G(t) is a
path of an economic quantity, like GNP, tax revenue,
or net income, let G˜(t) be the path that is closest to
G(t) and has constant growth. To be more precise we
define:
G˜(t) = exp(a + bt),
where the constants a and b are chosen such that the
distance
T∑
t=1
[log G(t) − log G˜(t)]2 (1)
is minimized. To put it differently, log G˜(·) is the linear
regression line associated to the data (t, log G(t)), t =
1, . . . , T. We call the minimal value in Equation (1)
the instability index of G(·). Notice that the instability
index is zero if the path G(t) has constant growth. It
increases with the fluctuations of the growth values
G(t+1)−G(t)
G(t) of the path.
As an illustration Fig. 1 shows an unstable path
and its nearest stable (= constant growth path). The
instability index of this path is the (squared) distance
between the two curves.
5. THE SIMULATION RESULTS
The model described above and specified in de-
tail in the Appendix was simulated for 30 years using
1,000 random trajectories.
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Fig. 2. Thirty typical paths of the profit R(t) − O(t) over 30 years
with no insurance. The thick line represents the nominal path (no
event path).
Denoting the returns from infrastructure gener-
ated in year t as R(t) and the payments for annuities
and insurance as O(t) the net profits are R(t) − O(t).
Figs. 2 and 3 show an important tradeoff with in-
surance: stability and solvency are increased but at the
price of a slightly lower mean growth. These figures
demonstrate typical sample paths, but not how likely
these paths are. To gain an insight on the probabilistic
structure, we have plotted the probability distribu-
tion of net profit for Year 15 (see Fig. 5). To visualize
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Fig. 3. Thirty typical paths of the profit R(t) − O(t) over 30 years
with insurance. The thick line represents the nominal path (no event
path).
95% quantile
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Fig. 4. Visualization of random distributions using a box plot.
selected parameters of the probability distribution,
we use a box plot with specifications as set out in
Fig. 4.
Fig. 5 shows that with insurance the probability
distribution of the net profit becomes more concen-
trated: the extremes (high and very low profit) disap-
pear and the range of possible values becomes smaller.
To put it differently, insurance makes the profit more
predictable.
We also calculated the solvency and instability
index for this example. Recall that solvency is defined
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Fig. 5. The probability distributions of profit in Year 15 without
insurance (solid line) and with insurance (dashed line), and box
plots. The box plots at the bottom visualize the characteristics of
the distributions.
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Fig. 6. The distribution of the instability index without insurance
(solid line) and with insurance (dashed line), and box plots. The box
plots at the bottom visualize the characteristics of the distributions.
as the probability that all financial obligations can be
fulfilled within the 30 years period.
No Insurance With Insurance
Solvency 94.5% 100.0%
The instability index (see Section 4.1) varies from
path to path. We show in Fig. 6 the distribution of
this index in the two cases (without insurance and
with insurance). It is evident from this picture that
instability decreases considerably with insurance.
The results are not surprising. It is well known
that risk transfer by insurance decreases variability
and uncertainty at the price of reduced expected
return.(11,12) We have introduced the notion of stabil-
ity and defined a stability index to quantify this effect.
A similar effect is the increase in solvency. Also, sol-
vency can be quantified and put in relation with the
costs of a reduced growth in the case of no event.
6. POLICY CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a portfolio model for infras-
tructure investment and protection for developing
and transition countries. Our emphasis was on show-
ing the effect of ex ante risk transfer on a country’s
solvency and stability.
Our approach considers insurance instruments as
a means to improve a government’s solvency and sta-
bility. Our analysis provides two broad policy conclu-
sions. Risk transfer incurs cost in the current period,
which reduces funds available for other uses. The clas-
sic question is whether the current cost and lost po-
tential returns are justified. As this exercise suggests, a
benefit is the increased stability of performance within
a narrower range. Risk transfer reduces volatility of
performance at the cost of potentially higher overall
performance. This is intuitively obvious. For a devel-
oping country, the issue is whether guaranteeing min-
imal economic performance (i.e., earning sufficient
income to guarantee interest payment on externally
incurred debt) outweighs the potential loss of some
economic performance. The modeling provides a ba-
sis for evaluating the alternative options based on the
desired mix of policy outcomes. A second general con-
clusion is not one the authors have seen explored else-
where. Because of the correlated nature of the risk of
damage to infrastructure, the addition of more infras-
tructure in the same region increases the variability of
loss for the whole portfolio of infrastructure assets. If
the risk was not correlated, the addition of new infras-
tructure would decrease variability through the law of
large numbers. This conclusion could have significant
policy implications. It would mean that the more in-
frastructure that is in place, the greater is the benefit
of risk transfer.
Related work was done by McKellar et al.(13,14)
but with the focus on the question of how a lending
institution like the World Bank can anticipate catas-
trophic events in its policy in order to guarantee (at
least to a certain extent) stability of growth.
APPENDIX
Mathematical Specification
In this section, we present the equations of the
model following the notation given in Section 4 of the
text.
(a) The total value of the infrastructure owned by
the government in year t is I(t). Every year, an
amount of L(t) is borrowed and invested in the
infrastructure. Infrastructure depreciates at a rate
of d. In addition, a (random) catastrophic event
may destroy a fraction δ(t) of infrastructure.
The system equation for infrastructure is
I(t) = (1 − δ(t))[(1 − d)I(t − 1) + L(t)]. (A1)
(b) Every year the government borrows 100 w% of
the previous year’s value of infrastructure.
L(t) = w · I(t − 1). (A2)
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(c) The loans have to be paid back with fixed annu-
ities within 10 years and interest rate of q. There-
fore, a loan of L in year t requires payments of
f · L in years t + 1, t + 2, . . . , t + 10, where
f =
[
1
1 + q +
1
(1 + q)2 + · · · +
1
(1 + q)10
]−1
= q
1 − (1/(1 + q))10 .
(d) The yearly return R(t) is 100 v% of the value of
the infrastructure.
R(t) = v · I(t). (A3)
(e) The government may purchase insurance that
covers damages up to 100 δmax% of the infras-
tructure in year t for a price of
p(t) = [(1 − d)I(t − 1) + L(t)]
×E[min(δ(t), δmax)](1 + γ ),
where γ is the risk premium.
The outpayment (annuities) to be paid in year t is
O(t) = f
t−1∑
s=t−10
L(s). (A4)
If the infrastructure is insured, then damages up to
100 δmax of the infrastructure value are fully insured.
If the damage exceeds this threshold, only the insured
part (that is, exactly 100 δmax of the infrastructure
value) is reconstructed.
If insurance was purchased, the distribution of the
(noninsured) damage is
δ¯(t) =
{
0 if δ(t) ≤ δmax
δ(t) − δmax if δ(t) > δmax
In the case of insurance, Equation (A1) has to be re-
placed by
I(t) = (1 − δ¯(t))[(1 − d)I(t − 1) + L(t)] (A1′)
and because the insurance premium has to be paid,
the payment Equation (A4) changes to
O(t) = f
t−1∑
s=t−10
L(s) + p(t). (A4′)
The model in the noninsured situation follows Equa-
tions (A1), (A2), (A3), and (A5), whereas the in-
sured situation is described by Equations (A1′), (A2′),
(A3′), and (A4′).
To summarize, introducing c = E[min(δ, δmax)]
(1 + γ ) and g = (1 − d + w) we have introduced the
following set of equations:
In the case of no insurance:
I(t) = (1 − δ(t)) · g · I(t − 1)
R(t) = v · I(t)
O(t) = f · w
t−2∑
s=t−11
I(s)
In the case of insurance:
I(t) = (1 − δ¯(t)) · g · I(t − 1)
R(t) = v · I(t)
O(t) = c · gI(t − 1) + f · w
t−2∑
s=t−11
I(s)
Parameter Specification
The following parameter settings were used in the
simulation:
Symbol Meaning Value
I(0) value of infra-structure in year 0 100
d depreciation of infrastructure 0.033
q interest rate 0.08
v yearly return on infrastructure 0.15
w borrowing limit in relation to
existing infrastructure 0.10
δmax fraction of insurable infrastructure 0.25
γ risk premium for insurance 0.25
The distribution of δ is specified in the next section.
The Random Damage Model
The damage caused by natural catastrophes is cor-
related in time and space. Temporal correlation for all
hazards, eq. earthquakes is a phenomenon observed
by earth scientists, when disasters appear in a clus-
tered way (see, for instance, data collected for U.S.
windstorms(15)). In this section, we describe the model
used to account for these correlations.
Let, in year t, N(t) be the number of items (build-
ings, bridges, kilometers of streets, railroads, pipelines
etc.) in the infrastructure portfolio. For simplicity, as-
sume that each item has a value of V.
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There is a random catastrophic event process with
values 0 or 1. ξ(t) = 0 means that in year t, there
is no event, whereas ξ(t) = 1 means that an event
occurs.
To account for temporal correlation, we model
ξ as a homogeneos Markov chain with the following
transitions:
P(ξ(t + 1) = 0 | ξ(t) = 0) = 1 − p(1 − ρ)
P(ξ(t + 1) = 1 | ξ(t) = 0) = p(1 − ρ)
P(ξ(t + 1) = 0 | ξ(t) = 1) = (1 − p)(1 − ρ)
P(ξ(t + 1) = 1 | ξ(t) = 1) = 1 − (1 − p)(1 − ρ)
(A5)
Here, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 are two parameters. It
is easily seen that for a stationary chain, P(ξ = 1) = p
and that ρ is the correlation between ξ(t) and ξ(t − 1).
The spatial correlation of the damage is taken into
account by considering the following model for the
damage for item i of our infrastructure portfolio in a
specific year t.
If an event happens (ξ(t) = 1), the damage to
item i in the infrastructure portfolio is Yi (t). Because
of the spatial correlation, these random variables are
not independent: there is an individual independent
risk of damage Zi (t) to which each item i in the in-
frastructure portfolio is subject. However, with some
probability r, the damage equals a common damage
Z0(t) (catastrophic event, which because of spatial
structure hits more items at the same time), i.e., for
1 ≤ i ≤ N,
Yi (t) =
{
Z0(t) with probability r
Zi (t) with probability (1 − r)
Assume that all Zi (t) and Z0(t) are independent
for all i and t and have the same distribution. Then
Corr(Yi (t), Yj (t)) = r2, for i = j . The Yj (t) are inde-
pendent, if r = 0.
Denote byηi (t) the switch variableP{ηi (t) = 1} =
1 − P{ηi (t) = 0} = r .
Since the value of the portfolio in year t is
V · N(t), the relative damage to the portfolio in
year t is
δ(t) =


1
V·N(t)
∑N(t)
i=1 Yi (t) if ξ(t) = 1
0 if ξ(t) = 0.
Notice that
δ(t) = ξ(t) 1
V · N(t)
[
N(t)∑
i=1
Zi (1 − ηi (t)) + Z0(t)ηi (t)
]
= ξ(t)
[
1
V · N(t)
N(t)∑
i=1
Zi (t)(1 − ηi (t))
+ 1
V
Z0(t)
1
N(t)
N(t)∑
i=1
ηi (t)
]
.
By the law of large numbers, as N(t) grows to infinity,
we get the following limit expression:
δ(t) = ξ(t)
[
1
V
E[Zi (t)](1 − r) + 1V Z0(t)r
]
.
Therefore we rewrite the model:
δ(t) = ξ(t)[E(ν(t))(1 − r) + rν(t)],
where ν(t) = 1V Z0(t) is a sequence of independent
random variables with values in [0,1], which indicate
the relative size of the damage in the case of an event.
In particular, the following specification is used:
Symbol Meaning Value
p the event probability 0.04
ρ the temporal event correlation 0.05
r the spatial damage correlation 0.6
ν the relative damage per event Unif[.0,.5]
In case of an event, the distribution of the relative loss
δ is Uniform [0.1, 0.4], since this is the distribution of
[E(ν)(1 − r) + r · ν].
The expected insured loss isE(min(δ(t), δmax)). In
our parameter setting, the value is 0.04(0.175 · 0.5 +
0.25 · 0.5) = 0.0085.
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Sovereign Cat Bonds and Infrastructure Project Financing
David Croson1∗ and Andreas Richter2
We examine the opportunities for using catastrophe-linked securities (or equivalent forms
of nondebt contingent capital) to reduce the total costs of funding infrastructure projects
in emerging economies. Our objective is to elaborate on methods to reduce the necessity for
unanticipated (emergency) project funding immediately after a natural disaster. We also place
the existing explanations of sovereign-level contingent capital into a catastrophic risk manage-
ment framework. In doing so, we address the following questions. (1) Why might catastrophe-
linked securities be useful to a sovereign nation, over and above their usefulness for insurers
and reinsurers? (2) Why are such financial instruments ideally suited for protecting infras-
tructure projects in emerging economies, under third-party sponsorship, from low-probability,
high-consequence events that occur as a result of natural disasters? (3) How can the willingness
to pay of a sovereign government in an emerging economy (or its external project sponsor),
who values timely completion of infrastructure projects, for such instruments be calculated?
To supplement our treatment of these questions, we use a multilayer spreadsheet-based model
(in Microsoft Excel format) to calculate the overall cost reductions possible through the judi-
cious use of catastrophe-based financial tools. We also report on numerical comparative statics
on the value of contingent-capital financing to avoid project disruption based on varying costs
of capital, probability and consequences of disasters, the feasibility of strategies for mid-stage
project abandonment, and the timing of capital commitments to the infrastructure investment.
We use these results to identify high-priority applications of catastrophe-linked securities so
that maximal protection can be realized if the total number of catastrophe instruments is ini-
tially limited. The article concludes with potential extensions to our model and opportunities
for future research.
KEY WORDS: Catastrophe-linked securities; contingent capital; natural disasters; infrastructure; project
finance
1. INTRODUCTION
Insurers and reinsurers, private entities who bear
risk on behalf of their clients, use catastrophe-linked
securities to protect themselves against insolvency in
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the case of a natural catastrophe.(1,2) Although pri-
vate enterprise has already begun to find catastrophe-
linked securities useful in reducing the variation of
its costs, this hedge against disaster comes at a price:
100% of the expected cost of these catastrophes, plus
a generous premium for assuming the risk, is paid to
investors.(3–5)
To our knowledge, there has been neither a the-
oretical analysis nor even a compendium of poten-
tial motivations for sovereign governments to use
such instruments. Given this lack of analysis, it is
not surprising that no sovereign governments (or
third-party infrastructure project funders, such as the
611 0272-4332/03/1200-0611$22.00/1 C© 2003 Society for Risk Analysis
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World Bank) have issued such securities to protect
themselves against catastrophe. We therefore address
the question, “Why might the sovereign government
of an emerging nation be interested in employing
catastrophe-linked instruments to protect infrastruc-
ture investments, funded by a third party, from low-
probability, high-consequence events such as natural
catastrophes?”
2. GOVERNMENT CONCERN
WITH CATASTROPHES
A private insurer or reinsurer worries about
catastrophes because they trigger financial obli-
gations, which may result in insolvency. It uses
catastrophe-linked securities to prevent this insol-
vency and preserve its franchise value as a profitable
ongoing concern.(6)3
A sovereign government worries about catastro-
phes because they trigger obligations to preserve the
welfare of its affected citizenry, in addition to damag-
ing infrastructure projects in progress. Catastrophes
generate sudden funding requirements for emergency
humanitarian aid, and at the same time they gener-
ate additional funding requirements to continue with
works in progress. The consequence of omitting (or
skimping on) such humanitarian aid is not insolvency,
but increased suffering for the population, as well
as political unpopularity, potential civil unrest, and
a potentially guilty conscience for politicians. In par-
ticular, disbursing such humanitarian aid at generous
levels seems incentive-compatible for government of-
ficials, who act as agents for the citizens, as well as
prescribed by the charter of the government. That
efforts of government officials to succor the popu-
lace will be pursued at a maximal level is practically
guaranteed by political and media pressures (in ad-
dition to the force of genuine heartfelt sympathy for
afflicted citizens). A government may find it worth-
while to issue state-contingent catastrophe securities
to assure its ability to provide humanitarian aid at an
efficient level, completely independent of any other
reasons.
A relatively risk-averse government may also
wish to protect its investment in wholly owned infras-
tructure features such as roads, schools, dams, elec-
tric utilities, and the telecommunications infrastruc-
3 The wish to avoid or reduce costs of financial distress and
bankruptcy costs is a major rationale for a firm’s demand for
risk management tools. Detailed discussions of motivations for
corporate risk management and, in particular, for risk-averse
entrepreneurial decision making are given, e.g., by Mayers and
Smith,(7) Greenwald and Stiglitz,(8) and Doherty.(9)
ture, rather than self-insuring as most governments
do.4 These infrastructure investments, almost by def-
inition, have the characteristic of offering high social
benefit but diverse/scattered individual benefits, and
so cannot be efficiently organized by the private mar-
ket. Although the expected capital requirements for
completing these projects are completely known ex
ante, the stochastic character of the capital require-
ments (which we will term “emergency repair costs”
in our example) requires some contingency planning
to ensure that needed project funds are available. The
government may in particular wish to assure liquid-
ity immediately after a catastrophe, given that it ra-
tionally anticipates that all liquid resources will be
devoted to humanitarian aid, to assure that these
projects can be completed in a timely manner and
without extraordinary costs caused by interruption.
Such possibility of either sudden and unexpected fi-
nancial distress due to catastrophe, or the adoption
of inferior construction strategies because of the po-
tential for future financial distress, leads to higher
expected costs to complete such projects. The sim-
ple strategy of holding “capital inventory” to avoid
these costs is, unfortunately, very costly for emerging
economies.
3. BASIC STRUCTURE OF
CATASTROPHE-LINKED SECURITIES
A catastrophe-linked security (or cat bond) is a
contract between an issuer and an investor. The in-
vestor puts up a sum of cash at the beginning of the
coverage period; this cash is held in escrow (under the
control of a neutral third party) and invested in low-
risk short-term securities until either a catastrophe
occurs or the coverage period ends, whichever occurs
sooner. The issuer offers to supplement this escrowed
principal with a coupon payment, provided that no
catastrophe occurs during the coverage period, at the
end of the period and return both principal and inter-
est to investors. The escrowed funds are not available
for general-purpose use in the interim. In the event
of a catastrophe, the investors will receive no coupon
payment and some, or all, of their principal may be
distributed to the issuer.5
The major benefit that these instruments offer to
the issuer is an instantaneous inflow of cash (here, to
4 Particularly for emerging-economy governments, high capital
costs, representing large opportunity costs of future investment
and consumption if the nation’s capital base is depleted by a catas-
trophe, may make the role of “insurer of last resort” unattractive.
5 For structures and conditions of recent cat bonds, see Reference 5.
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the government) immediately following a prespeci-
fied catastrophic event (such as a flood, earthquake,
or hurricane). This payment flows from an escrow ac-
count established at the time of issuance, and is not
a loan or sovereign obligation—the principal need
not ever be repaid by the government to any party,
whether a catastrophe occurs or not. If there is no
catastrophe during the coverage period, the escrowed
principal is returned to the investors with the country
having never had the use of it. If there is a catastro-
phe, the escrowed principal flows to the country free
and clear of any repayment obligations. Under no cir-
cumstances does the country get the use of the capital
under an obligation to repay it. This feature is likely to
be quite important to an emerging economy, which al-
ready carries a substantial debt burden—particularly
if the country’s existing (senior) sovereign debt car-
ries a covenant restricting the amount of additional
debt that can be assumed.
Given the rather substantial premium that in-
vestors receive in return for accepting the risk to their
principal, we might ask “Why might such a state-
contingent catastrophe-linked security be more at-
tractive to a sovereign government than more tradi-
tional types of financing?”
1. Funds of the magnitude required to rebuild
damaged infrastructure investments may not be
available to emerging economies in advance.
Although substantial amounts of borrowing
at the sovereign level may be desirable to sup-
port economic growth, the total amount of
sovereign debt that a government can sup-
port may be sharply limited, either through
explicit restrictive covenants on existing debt
or by the market’s unwillingness to advance
additional funds for general purposes. A gov-
ernment nearing its total allowable-debt con-
straint has a substantial incentive to ensure
that this constraint will not be violated in case
of a catastrophe.
2. Even if these rebuilding funds would be avail-
able during normal circumstances, they may
not be available after a sufficiently severe
catastrophe. Unless provisions for emergency
capital are arranged in advance, investors
may be reluctant to make large new capi-
tal commitments if a catastrophe occurs that
is sufficiently severe to threaten the stabil-
ity of the national currency, create civil un-
rest, or cause default on outstanding sovereign
debt. A rational response before making ad-
ditional investment might be to “wait and
see” whether the country’s ability to repay
the new debt has been compromised by the
catastrophe.
3. Portions of these funds are required im-
mediately after the catastrophe to address
catastrophe-induced difficulties. The demand
for liquid funds immediately after a catastro-
phe is extremely high, and the short-term op-
portunity cost of not having capital available
immediately after a catastrophe is consider-
able, both for emergency humanitarian aid
and for reconstruction. It is this high short-
term social value of liquid assets that leads
governments to divert capital flows earmarked
for sponsored infrastructure projects to emer-
gency humanitarian aid when all other sources
of liquid assets have been exhausted. This
short-term cash-flow problem is exacerbated
when the infrastructure projects themselves
suffer damage from the catastrophe and re-
quire reconstruction. A new roof for a nearly
finished school may be required after a hur-
ricane hits the area, for example; if this roof
is not immediately installed, rain damage may
dramatically increase the total cost of finish-
ing the school. Delays in the availability of
emergency-repair funds may therefore gener-
ate significant costs of financial distress after a
disaster.
4. The government may not desire to borrow more
money in the future, even if allowed to do so at
a competitive rate. The government’s overall
financial strategy (prior to a catastrophe, but
rationally anticipating its possibility) may be
to reduce its overall level of borrowing, or to
maintain its current optimal level, rather than
potentially increase it if a catastrophe were to
occur. The government may be willing to pay a
premium to avoid disruption of the rationaliz-
ing of its financial structure on a national level,
in much the same way we describe the gains
from avoiding disruption on the project level
in our later analysis. Furthermore, the nation’s
existing (senior) sovereign debt rating would
benefit through a reduced anticipated default
rate; lenders would presumably offer more fa-
vorable terms (or larger amounts at equivalent
terms) if the risk of default due to a natural dis-
aster (a disruptive event whose cash-outflow
requirements that might contribute to default,
if sufficiently severe), is lessened.
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5. The cost of capital for an emerging economy
is high. A sovereign government may be able
to handle a larger deductible than a private
company and still exhibit an aversion to self-
insuring. Holding excess funds idle in inven-
tory, against the possibility of unexpected cash
needs, has a very high cost for an emerging
economy—either an explicit cost of borrow-
ing in the capital market, or a high opportunity
cost based on depriving a socially desirable in-
vestment project of capital. It does not make
sense to withhold large amounts of capital ev-
ery year simply to hedge against an event that
occurs only one year in ten.
3.1. Introduction to Project Disruption Costs
Funds may be diverted from infrastructure
projects—even despite the sovereign government’s
genuine long-term commitment to the desirability of
investing in these projects—to assuage short-term hu-
manitarian and political needs immediately following
a catastrophe. The timely application of these loaned
funds to infrastructure development is a condition of
the original loan agreement. Such diversion creates
not only a technical default on the original agreement,
but also a shortage of capital to be invested in the
ongoing project. This unexpected lack of funds will
certainly lead to increased costs over and above the
damage that might have been done to the infrastruc-
ture project itself.
These costs may be explicit, through increased
costs of project completion due to the disruption in a
smooth flow of capital (requiring unexpected moth-
balling of the construction projects, relocation of con-
struction materials, equipment, and personnel, as well
as frictional hiring-and-firing costs and forced idling
of capital equipment). These costs may also take the
form of implicit, or opportunity, costs simply through
the inevitable delay in having the completed project
come online, and therefore pushing the onset of bene-
fits from the completed project further into the future.
In the special case of a durable investment (where,
once paid for, the stream of benefits continues indef-
initely) a one-year delay (for example, the comple-
tion of a technical institute) amounts to losing one
year’s worth of service (for example, one full gradu-
ating class of engineering students) forever. Sovereign
governments value the stream of services from such
infrastructure projects as direct contributions to so-
cial welfare, even if their returns are noncash items
(a graduating class of engineers). In our cost anal-
ysis, we therefore include the opportunity losses of
these foregone benefits from project completion to
capture the full economic cost of project failure or
delay.
Although the government’s decision to divert
funds to humanitarian needs is certainly a justifiable
one (and may, indeed, represent the best use of avail-
able funds given that a catastrophe has occurred), it
exerts an unintended negative externality on project
costs. Planning for the contingency that all available
liquid funds will be diverted can thus reduce the to-
tal expected costs of project completion. By assuring
a ready source of capital when needed, construction
progress on the infrastructure project can continue,
avoiding not only project disruption costs but also de-
lays in the project coming online.
The external sponsor of the infrastructure project
may also benefit from the creation of a source of liquid
capital, to be accessed only in the case of catastrophe.
The sponsor is frequently forced to renegotiate the
terms of the loan under unfavorable conditions, with
the diversion of the original loan principal a fait ac-
compli. Additional loan capital is requested to finish
the partially complete project, even though the social
benefits (and, thus, the potential pay-back capabili-
ties) from the completed project have not increased.
Although this unfavorable prospect (and the govern-
ment’s revealed history of unilateral renegotiation)
would seem to discourage a lender from advancing
more funds at the beginning of a project, the lender
may feel compelled to invest additional funds in the
middle stages of a project. Because, without additional
funding, investments previously sunk into the project
will amount to nothing—and the original loan prin-
cipal will need to be written off as unrecoverable—
the benefits from such previous investments are effec-
tively “held hostage” to the funder’s acquiescence to
these terms. Borrowers’ commitment to project com-
pletion may improve lenders’ long-term willingness
to provide funds, as we examine in Section 5.
Prearranged sources of contingent capital, such as
event-triggered cat bonds, can generate cash quickly
and thereby capture the benefit of immediate liquid-
ity. On-the-spot post-catastrophe arrangements may
take several weeks to accomplish, even for a credit-
worthy country far away from its maximal debt con-
straint using previously established contacts at in-
vestment banks.(10,11) A financial device, such as a
catastrophe-linked security, will thus reduce the costs
of financial distress and thereby generate value to a
sovereign government and external project sponsors
to the extent it can:
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1. Eliminate the risk of project disruption due to
damage to infrastructure projects in progress
when emergency repair funds are not other-
wise available, by supplying these emergency
repair funds immediately upon damage to the
project; and
2. Provide a ready source of immediate con-
tingent capital for project completion when
humanitarian aid requirements force diver-
sion of all liquid resources, including ongoing
project funding, even when the project itself is
not damaged.
3.2. Enabling Commitment to Continued
Project Funding
A sovereign government desires to split its cur-
rent expenditures between consumption (emergency
humanitarian aid after a catastrophe) and investment
(continued funding for projects in progress). Its obli-
gations extend first to the welfare of its citizenry, and
only secondarily to the continued success of its in-
vestment projects (even though the fruits of these
projects will determine future welfare of future cit-
izens). Even though the optimal decision involves an
intertemporal tradeoff balancing present humanitar-
ian aid with future investment gains, there is always
a strong temptation (particularly in a democracy) for
the current government to overspend on present citi-
zens. Resisting this temptation, although good for the
country in the long term, may be politically infeasible
(or undesirable) in the short term.
A government may therefore be able to improve
its intertemporal capital management by investing
in instruments that generate benefits that cannot be
used for humanitarian aid, and that thereby commit
the nation to continuing investment in infrastructure
projects—a classic example of benefiting by following
rules rather than discretion.(12)
This commitment benefit cannot be captured if
the proceeds from catastrophe securities are paid in
cash (which is, of course, fungible between invest-
ments in infrastructure and current consumption) to
the government itself (which is the party caught in
the invest/consume dilemma). For the government to
create and capture this commitment benefit, the pro-
ceeds must be either:
1. Paid in a “currency” that advances the infras-
tructure investment task but cannot be readily
converted to cash (e.g., bulldozers, construc-
tion labor, etc.); and/or
2. Distributed not to the central government, but
rather to a party that has no temptation to
spend on immediate emergency aid at the ex-
pense of investment. Whether the most effec-
tive distribution mechanism is to disburse di-
rectly to local project managers, to the third-
party sponsor, or a wholly disinterested party
remains a topic for future research.
4. MODEL OF EXPECTED COSTS
OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS
As we have discussed, a multitude of costs may
be avoided, and social benefit realized, by avoid-
ing project disruption due to financial distress—
whether through enabling defense of previously sunk
costs against instantaneous depreciation due to the
catastrophe, supporting cost-minimizing construction
strategies, or accelerating the coming online of the
new project. We now turn to a model of the size of
these costs, and explicitly calculate values of these
costs in a series of numerical examples.
We use a simple model to illustrate the magnitude
of potential advantages from a sovereign cat bond or
other form of state-contingent access to capital, such
as a prearranged nonrecourse line of credit. We fur-
ther assume that all projects currently underway are
worth continuing.6 We consider a sovereign acting as
project manager for a certain project with a deferred
payoff b, which is to be realized only on successful
project completion. For convenience we assume two
periods of required investment before the benefit oc-
curs.
4.1. Project Cost Structure
The necessary investments are i1 at the beginning
of the first period and i2 at the beginning of the second.
Both investments must be made to achieve the benefit
b at the end of Period 2.
6 If this condition is not currently satisfied in the portfolio of funded
investments, a simple supplementary method to free capital for re-
pairs would be to discontinue those projects for which incremen-
tal future costs exceed incremental future benefits. We assume
that the infrastructure investment portfolio has already been so
rationalized before the decision about cat risk financing arises.
If external contingent capital is available, only projects that are
attractive given that contingent capital is available should be be-
gun. As will be seen in our example, there will be situations when
the initial attractiveness of the project depends critically on the
availability of capital to see it through to completion.
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The risk faced by this project is “catastrophic” in
that (1) 100% of the value of the project is destroyed
if not immediately repaired, and (2) the costs of re-
pairs are large compared to the total amount of capital
available to the project sponsor. A catastrophic event
causes damage to the project with probability p in
each period.7 If a disaster occurs, all progress made
on the project to date will be completely lost unless
the project is “defended” by immediately carrying out
an emergency repair. In the event of a disaster, the
costs of emergency repair (e1 and e2 in Periods 1 and
2, respectively) must be invested by the end of the pe-
riod in which the disaster occurred. If the emergency-
repair investments are not made, the project returns
to the original state and must be started over at the
beginning of the next period.8
4.2. Information Structure
The magnitudes of e1 and e2 are known ex ante, as
are other relevant parameters such as the net present
value of the social benefit (b) that accrues to the coun-
try once the project is completed, the probability of a
disaster (p), which is the same across all periods, and
the discount rate (r). This is a single-decisionmaker
problem; the probability of disaster is assumed to
be independent of any model parameters, financing
arrangements, or construction strategies used by the
project manager.
4.3. Strategy Alternatives
The project manager chooses an investment strat-
egy to maximize the (expected) net present value of
the project opportunity. A strategy for this investment
problem is thus characterized by the decisions con-
cerning emergency repair in case of a disaster occur-
ring in the different project stages. Assuming that no
additional information can be derived during the pro-
cess (e.g., on the disaster probability), and if there are
no limitations to the availability of funds for emer-
7 Although we assume that disasters in Period 1 and Period 2
are independent, our model is easily adapted to account for se-
rial correlation (either positive or negative) of disaster likeli-
hood, allowing the capture of some interdependencies among
events.
8 Each time the project is allowed to fail we assume it will indeed
be begun again in the next period, as the project was initially
attractive and has the same (positive) expected NPV at the point
immediately following the disaster, independent of its history, as
it did at the initial decision point.
gency repair if needed, the decisions do not depend on
the project history—in particular, on whether a disas-
ter has already occurred. There are then five strategies
a project manager must choose from.
 (R,R): Emergency repair will be done if a dis-
aster occurs in the first period, the second pe-
riod, or in both.
 (F,R): Emergency repair will be done only in
the second period; if a catastrophe occurs in
the first period, the project will be allowed to
fail and restart.
 (R,F): Emergency repair will be carried out
only in the first period; if a catastrophe occurs
in the second period, the project will be al-
lowed to fail and restart.
 (F,F): No emergency repair will be carried out,
regardless of timing; the project will be allowed
to fail and restart after any catastrophe.
Of course, the project manager also has the option
of not investing at all (0), which will be chosen if
the expected net present value of the result of the
best strategy among (R,R), (F,R), (R,F), and (F,F) is
negative.
4.4. Strategy Selection
The optimal strategy for the problem described
above depends on whether it is attractive to pay for
emergency repair in one or both project stages. Con-
sider first the situation without any capital constraints,
which means that there is always enough capital avail-
able to defend the project after a disaster if doing
so would form a part of the optimal solution at that
stage.
We want to derive explicit expressions for the
net present values under the different strategies:
NVR,R0 , NV
F,R
0 , NV
R,F
0 , and NV
F,F
0 . The discounted
cash flows for these strategies and the possible sce-
narios are given in Table I. δ denotes the discounting
factor, δ = 11+r . Note that since we assume that the
project is restarted if a disaster happens and no emer-
gency repair is carried out, the expected net present
values themselves appear in the table as a cash-
flow component whenever the project is let fail and
restarted.
Considering each row of the table in turn, weight-
ing each outcome by its probability and solving for the
expected net present values of the project opportunity
under the four strategies described gives
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Table I. State-Contingent Cash Flows
Resulting from Repair Strategy Choices
Outcome
Event (only) Event (only) Event in
No Event in Period 1 in Period 2 Both Periods
Probability (1 − p)2 p(1 − p) p(1 − p) p2
(R,R) −i1 −i1 − e1δ −i1 −i1 − e1δ
−i2δ −i2δ −i2δ − e2δ2 −i2δ − e2δ2
+bδ2 +bδ2 +bδ2 +bδ2
(F,R) −i1 −i1 −i1 −i1
−i2δ +NVF,R0 δ −i2δ − e2 δ2 +NVF,R0 δ
+bδ2 +bδ2
(R,F) −i1 −i1 − e1δ −i1 −i1 − e1δ
R
ep
ai
r
St
ra
te
gy
−i2δ −i2δ −i2δ −i2δ
+bδ2 +bδ2 +NVR,F0 δ2 +NVR,F0 δ2
(F,F) −i1 −i1 −i1 −i1
−i2δ +NV0F,Fδ −i2δ +NV0F,Fδ
+bδ2 +NV0F,Fδ2
NVR,R0 = δ2 · b − i1 − δ · i2 − δ · p · e1 − δ2 · p · e2,
NVF,R0 =
1
1 − p · δ ·
[
δ2 · (1 − p) · b − i1 − δ
· (1 − p) · i2 − δ2 · (1 − p) · p · e2
]
,
NVR,F0 =
1
1 − p · δ2
· [δ2 · (1 − p) · b − i1 − δ · i2 − δ · p · e1],
and
NVF,F0 =
1
1 − p · δ − p · δ2 + p2 · δ2
· [δ2 · (1 − p)2 · b − i1 − δ · (1 − p) · i2].
The optimal investment strategy 〈(i∗, j∗) | i, j ∈
{R, F}〉 = arg max NVi, j0 and the value of the pro-
ject is thus V(i∗, j∗) = max0, NVR,R0 , NVF,R0 NVR,F0
NVF,F0 . Consider the following numerical example:
Example 1 : r = 0.1 i1 = 10 i2 = 10 e1 = 10
e2 = 15 p = 0.1 b = 40
The values of the expected net present value
(NPV) generated from the different repair strategies
are shown in Table II.
The best of these strategies would be NVR,R0 —
to carry out emergency repair each time a disaster
Table II. NPV of Investment Strategies with Unlimited Capital
NVR,R0 = 11.82 NVF,R0 = 11.5 NVR,F0 = 10.63 NVF,F0 = 10.3
occurs—which yields an initial expected NPV for the
project opportunity of 11.82. Since NVR,R0 is positive,
this strategy is preferred to the strategy (0), which
yields a payoff of 0.
4.5. Financial Distress
Financial distress occurs when, during the invest-
ment process, a catastrophe occurs and a shortage of
capital forces the sovereign to let the project fail in a
case where emergency repair would otherwise be the
preferred solution. Although financial distress does
not occur in the absence of a catastrophic event, the
potential for the costs of financial distress must be
included in the original calculation of the value of
the project opportunity. The expected cost of finan-
cial distress (ECFD) can be measured as the reduc-
tion in the expected net present value of the project
opportunity due to the constraint-induced switch of
strategy.
We denote the funds available for emergency re-
pair by f . These funds represent, conceptually, the dif-
ference between the project manager’s initial capital
endowment and the funds that would be earmarked
for the construction of the project (i.e., i1 and i2) if no
catastrophes were to occur. Formally,
ECFD = NV∞0 − NV f0 ,
where NV∞0 represents the value of the project oppor-
tunity if an infinite amount of capital were available
for emergency repair, and NVf0 represents the value
of the project opportunity given that only f units of
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capital are available for emergency repair, and thus
that strategies possibly requiring amounts greater
than f are infeasible.
4.5.1. Noncontingent Repair Strategies
Consider, as an illustrative example, the extreme
case of no capital being available for emergency repair
(i.e., f =0) in a situation when (R,R) would be the
best strategy given unlimited capital. Here the only
feasible strategies are (0) and (F,F). Thus the expected
cost of financial distress can easily be quantified as
minNVR,R0 , NVR,R0 − NVF,F0 , the lesser of the entire
project value (i.e., the difference between NVR,R0 and
0) or the difference between NVR,R0 and NV
F,F
0 . This
cost of financial distress is always equal to NVR,R0 −
NVF,F0 > 0, assuming that the emergency repair cost is
not prohibitively high and that the project is attractive
to begin in the first place.
Using the numbers introduced in Example 1 and
under the assumption f = 0, the best feasible strategy
(i.e., the best strategy that does not require the avail-
ability of any emergency-repair capital) is (F,F). So the
expected cost of financial distress is ECFD = NVR,R0 −
NVF,F0 = 1.52 for the parameters in Example 1.9
4.6. Contingent Repair Strategies
To calculate the cost of financial distress for the
general case we first must introduce one additional
possible strategy, which allows the decision of whether
to repair in the second period to depend on the out-
come of the first period:
 (R, R˜): Emergency repair will be carried out in
the first period if necessary; in case of a catas-
9 Note that the ECFD as introduced above should be seen as a
lower bound to the expected opportunity cost of financial dis-
tress. We calculate expected net present values under the as-
sumption that, in the case where the project is destroyed and
no emergency repair is done, the project can be restarted imme-
diately. This immediate restart, however, requires the availabil-
ity of funds covering the necessary initial investment i1 and the
guaranteed availability of i2 in the following period. In a finan-
cial distress situation, these funds, even if they are lower than
the emergency repair costs, might be available only later. The net
present value of this restart would then, of course, need to be
discounted to reflect the effect of the delayed start on the future
benefits from project completion. Incorporating this aspect of the
opportunity costs of financial distress caused by the delay in the
project’s restarting, however, would only strengthen the point be-
ing made here about the usefulness of immediate availability of
emergency funds, such as offered by state-contingent catastrophe
securities.
trophe in the second period, the project will be
defended only if there were no disaster in the
first period.
Of course, this strategy cannot be more favorable
than the ones mentioned above in the case of no
capital restrictions (being inferior to either (R,R) or
(R,F)), but it might be a constrained-optimal (second-
best) solution if the project manager has just enough
capital to carry out emergency repair one time, but
not twice. The cash flows associated with strategy
(R, R˜) are shown in Table III.
The expected net present value under (R, R˜) is
thus
NVR,R˜0 =
1
1 − p2 · δ2 ·
[
δ2 · (1 − p2) · b − i1 − δ
· i2 − δ · p · e1 − δ2 · (1 − p) · p · e2
]
.
As can be easily verified, (R, R˜) turns out to be
the constrained-optimal strategy for Example 1 in all
cases where 15 ≤ f < 20. (In particular, if f = 15,
(R, R˜) is the best strategy that does not ever require
more than 15 units of capital; when f > 20 there
is enough capital to pursue strategy (R,R).) (R, R˜)
yields an ENPV of NVR,R˜0 = 11.71 and a substantially
lower cost of financial distress (ECFD = 0.11) in com-
parison to the f = 0 case.
From this simple example, we can make two
observations.
1. The optimal strategy of whether to defend the
project in Period 1, Period 2, or both depends
on the amount of capital available. Also, the
decision of whether to begin the project at
all depends, via the choice of strategy, on the
amount of capital anticipated to be available
to conduct emergency repairs.
2. The costs of financial distress can be greatly
reduced (by 93% in our example) by holding
enough capital in reserve to accommodate one
disaster. For events that are individually toler-
able but become catastrophic when they occur
in series, this is a powerful strategy. The reduc-
tion in ECFD for insuring against the second
disaster in the series (in our example, 0.11) is
modest compared to the benefit from insuring
against the first disaster (in our example, 1.41).
We will now use a series of comparative static
analyses to show the effects of varying important
parameters.
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Table III. State-Contingent Cash Flows
Resulting from Repair Strategy Choices
Outcome
Event (only) Event (only) Event in
No Event in Period 1 in Period 2 Both Periods
Probability (1 − p)2 p(1 − p) p(1 − p) p2
(R,R) −i1 −i1 − e1δ −i1 −i1 − e1δ
−i2δ −i2δ −i2δ − e2δ2 −i2δ − e2δ2
+bδ2 +bδ2 +bδ2 +bδ2
(F,R) −i1 −i1 −i1 −i1
−i2δ +NVF,R0 δ −i2δ − e2 δ2 +NVF,R0 δ
+bδ2 +bδ2
(R,F) −i1 −i1 − e1δ −i1 −i1 − e1δ
−i2δ −i2δ −i2δ −i2δ
+bδ2 +bδ2 +NVR,F0 δ2 +NVR,F0 δ2
R
ep
ai
r
St
ra
te
gy
(F,F) −i1 −i1 −i1 −i1
−i2δ +NVF,F0 δ −i2δ +NV0F,Fδ
+bδ2 +NVF,F0 δ2
(R, R˜) −i1 −i1 −e1δ −i1 −i1 −e1δ
−i2δ −i2δ −i2δ −e2δ2 −i2δ
+bδ2 +bδ2 +bδ2 +NVR,R˜0 δ2
4.7. ECFD as a Function of Initial Capital
First, we consider how the expected cost of finan-
cial distress depends on the amount of capital avail-
able for emergency repair. Based on the parameters
given in Example 2, Fig. 1 shows the relationship be-
tween the value of EFCD and f .
Example 2 : r = 0.1 i1 = 10 i2 = 10 e1 = 10
e2 = 15 p = 0.1 b = 40
f varies from 0 to 40
Note that, in accordance with intuition, the expected
cost of financial distress is very high for the case of
f = 0 (no capital being available for emergency re-
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capital available for emergency repair
Fig. 1. ECFD and initial capital.
pair). On the other extreme, because the best strat-
egy is (R,R) in our example, the ECFD equals 0 only
when the initial capital suffices for repairs in both
periods.
In this example, the emergency-repair cost in the
second period is higher than in the first. In the case
of amounts of available capital that allow defending
the project only in the first period but not in the sec-
ond, the best feasible strategy becomes (R,F) and the
EFCD drops slightly from its highest level. The most
dramatic incremental reduction of EFCD can be ob-
tained by setting f = 15, enabling the project manager
to repair in either the first or the second period, but
not both—equivalent to having capital available to as-
suage one catastrophe but not two. This leads to the
strategy (R, R˜) being optimal, which results in a dif-
ferent outcome from (R,R) only if catastrophes occur
in both periods.
We thus note that the strategy (R, R˜), in con-
junction with a limited amount of emergency capi-
tal reserves, can thus accomplish a significant portion
of the benefit of the strategy (R,R) with an unlim-
ited capital reserve. Note that this limited emergency
capital reserve might be provided through a contin-
gent financing instrument such as a cat bond, rather
than representing idle funds held in inventory against
the rare event of two sequential catastrophes. A cat
bond designed to eliminate most of the costs of fi-
nancial distress, while limiting the total amount of
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Fig. 2. ECFD vs. time structure of required investment.
investor capital at risk to that of a single disaster,
ought to be constructed to pay for the first disaster
that occurs, regardless of whether this disaster oc-
curs in Period 1 or Period 2. A cat bond that pays
for the second occurring disaster will be tapped much
less often, but will also create much less reduction
in ECFD.
4.8. Sensitivity of ECFD to Time Structure
of Required Investment
We now consider how the expected cost of finan-
cial distress depends on the speed with which capital
is committed to the project, that is, for a given project
cost, what percentage of this cost must be committed
during the first period, and how much may be deferred
until the second.10 Based on the parameters given in
Example 3, Fig. 2 shows the relationship between the
value of EFCD and this time structure of required
investment.
Example 3 : f = 0 r = 0.1 i1 + i2 = 20 e1 = 10
e2 = 15 p = 0.1 b = 40i1/(i1 + i2)
varies from 0 to 1
From Fig. 2, we see that ECFD rises with the per-
centage of the total construction costs that must be
committed during the first period. The dependency
is piece-wise linear, as can be seen directly from the
equations governing ECFD. For a low percentage of
first-period investment commitment, the project man-
ager would tend to choose to let the project fail (and
restart) if a disaster were to occur in Period 1, even
10 Note that in Example 3, i1 + i2 = 20 in all cases; only the balance
between i1 and i2 will be changed.
if unlimited repair capital were available. The larger
this fraction of first-period commitment, the more at-
tractive is the strategy (R,R). The kink in the curve
marks the switch from (F,R) to (R,R) as the best un-
constrained strategy.
4.9. Sensitivity of ECFD to the Cost of Capital
We now consider how the expected cost of finan-
cial distress depends on the cost of capital. The same
cost of capital, r, is assumed to apply both for the
pure rate of discounting project benefits (effectively,
the opportunity cost of not having a project’s bene-
fits sooner) and for the implied rate of return paid on
borrowed funds (effectively, the explicit cash outflow
for interest payments). It should be noted that we as-
sumed that r is relatively high for sovereign project
managers in emerging countries, either based on high
time value of incremental infrastructure investments
or based on high borrowing costs in the financial mar-
kets. Based on the parameters given in Example 4,
Fig. 3 shows the relationship between the value of
EFCD and this cost of capital.
Example 4 : f = 0 i1 = 10 i2 = 10 e1 = 10
e2 = 15 p = 0.1 b = 40
r varies from 0% to 60% per period
For the important region, the ECFD behaves like
a function concave in the cost of capital and, in ad-
dition, does not react in a highly sensitive manner
to small changes in the cost of capital. It should be
mentioned that ECFD first increases and then de-
creases, reaching a local max at approximately 0.25
in Example 4. In this example (R,R) is always the un-
constrained best strategy and (F,F) is the best capital-
constrained strategy as long as these strategies both
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Fig. 3. ECFD vs. cost of capital.
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have positive NPVs. The first kink of the curve is
linked to the switch of the constrained best strategy
from (F,F) to (0) at approximately r = 0.4; this oc-
curs when the cost of capital becomes so high that the
project is no longer attractive to begin (i.e., has a neg-
ative NPV). Once (0) becomes the best alternative
strategy to (R,R), the ECFD decreases rapidly in the
cost of capital—not because the problem of contin-
gent capital is solved (because f = 0, no repairs can be
made in any event), but simply because the attractive-
ness of the project falls rapidly in r but the constrained
best outcome does not decrease any further.
An interesting extension to the model would be
to incorporate the costs of borrowing the optimal
amount of capital at the beginning of Period 1 with the
goal of maximizing the overall expected benefit from
the project including these capital costs. This optimal
amount of capital to borrow would depend on the
cost of capital both directly and indirectly. The direct
effect of the cost of capital on the optimal amount to
borrow comes about because interest payments would
need to be made (and, implicitly, made from available
cash) whether a disaster occurs or not—an expensive
proposition when disasters are rare. The indirect ef-
fect occurs through the borrowings increasing f and
thereby reducing ECFD, which itself depends on the
cost of capital as shown in Fig. 3. The sensitivity anal-
ysis of the ECFD to the cost of capital if the optimal
amount of capital were borrowed for each value of r
would differ significantly from our analysis in Fig. 3,
which assumes that a fixed amount (here, 0) is bor-
rowed regardless of r.
4.10. Sensitivity of ECFD to the Probability
of Disaster
We now consider how the expected cost of
financial distress depends on the probability of a dis-
aster occurring in any given period. The severity of
the disaster is assumed to stay constant, although its
probability changes. Based on the parameters given
in Example 5, Fig. 4 shows the relationship between
the value of EFCD and this probability that a disaster
occurs.
Example 5 : f = 0 r = 0.1 i1 = 10 i2 = 10
e1 = 10 e2 = 15 b = 40
p varies from 0 to 1 per period
In the left-hand portion of the curve, the net value
of the constrained best strategy ((F,F) in this exam-
ple) falls much more quickly than that of the uncon-
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Fig. 4. ECFD vs. probability of disaster.
strained best strategy (R,R). Defending the project,
especially in the second period, becomes more ben-
eficial as p increases. One major difference between
(R,R) and (F,F) as strategies is that (R,R) guaran-
tees that the project will come online at the end of
Period 2, at which time the benefit b will be realized
for certain (albeit at a random cost). As p increases,
the expected length of time until the project is com-
pleted increases under the (F,F) strategy. In addition,
defending the project in Period 2 is particularly valu-
able as p increases because a completed project does
not need to “run the gauntlet” of two periods of rela-
tively frequent risks.
The kink in the curve (at around p = 0.3 in our ex-
ample) is due to the switch from (F,F) to (0) as the op-
timal capital-constrained strategy. For large enough
values of p, the project will suffer catastrophe so of-
ten that it should never be begun (i.e., will have neg-
ative NPV) if no emergency capital is available. In
this case, the cost of financial distress (i.e., the op-
portunity cost of not having enough capital to defend
the project, and therefore not enough to make begin-
ning the project worthwhile) will thus be the same as
the full project value under the unconstrained best
strategy (R,R). This is the maximum possible level
of ECFD, representing the loss of the entire project
value for certain regardless of whether the disastrous
events occur. This project value, in turn, decreases
in p because the expected project completion cost is
increasing (incorporating the expected costs of emer-
gency repair) while its benefit remains constant. After
a certain critical level (approximately 0.63 in our ex-
ample), the likelihood of disaster is so large, and the
expected damages before project completion so great,
that the project manager is dissuaded from beginning
the project even if an infinite amount of capital is avail-
able for emergency repairs.
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Example 6 : f = 0 r = 0.1 i1 = 10 i2 = 10
p · e1 = 1 p · e2 = 1.5 b = 40
p varies, but p · e1 and p · e2 are
held constant
Fig. 5 shows that expected costs of financial dis-
tress caused by project disruption are higher for more
frequent, less severe events than for infrequent but
very severe events. The initial choice of (F,F) when
severe events occur but rarely negates the impact of
limited capital. If funding to repair a project is not
going to be available in any event (either because
the capital is not available, or because restarting the
project is cheaper than repairing it), it does not mat-
ter to ECFD whether the disaster causes a $10,000
loss that will not be repaired or a $1 million loss that
cannot be repaired. The frequency of the loss, how-
ever, increases either the expected length of time un-
til this completion occurs (when these small losses
cause the project to be restarted under the optimal
repair strategy), which does not affect ECFD, or the
expected costs of project completion (if these small
losses would be repaired under the optimal repair
strategy, but these repairs are impossible due to cap-
ital limitations). Frequent losses that cannot be re-
paired lead to substantial increases in ECFD; once
these losses are frequent enough (which occurs at ap-
proximately p = 0.3 in Fig. 5), the project is no longer
attractive, and ECFD achieves its maximum.
5. SUMMARY OF BENEFITS FROM
PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT
At the level of the sovereign government or the
third-party sponsor, the reduction in ECFD will cre-
ate three types of benefits that will increase the num-
ber of projects that can be accomplished on a given
capital budget. For example, consider a capital budget
of $15 billion, $12 billion of which is to be committed
to new capital projects and $3 billion to be kept in
reserve for emergencies.
First, at the simplest level, a reduction in ex-
pected completion costs of a representative project
from $120 million to $100 million allows 120 such
projects to be funded rather than 100. Alternately, the
sponsor may be able to use this incremental savings
of $200 million to fund some projects less attractive
than the initial 100 that otherwise would not be in a
priority position to receive capital.
Second, reducing the variance of the capital re-
quirements of individual projects enables the govern-
ment or third-party project sponsor to more efficiently
commit its limited capital. The general structure of
this financial optimization problem is as follows. Nor-
mally, the government or sponsor would commit less
than 100% of its available capital, withholding a
portion (here, $3 billion) to deal with extraordinary
and unexpected funding requirements such as those
caused by natural disasters (whether directly by dam-
age to the ongoing infrastructure project, or indirectly
due to unilateral diversion of project funds to hu-
manitarian efforts). The optimal percentage of cap-
ital to reserve for these emergencies balances the
costs of over-committing (using almost 100% of cap-
ital available at all times, maintaining only a small
reserve for contingent funding, and thereby running
the risk of inadvertently causing project disruption
when several portfolio projects require extraordinary
infusions of cash at the same time) against the costs
of under-committing (allowing capital to lie fallow,
which could otherwise be directed toward socially
beneficial projects).
By increasing the predictability of required
project financing, even if the expected amount of
project funding remained unchanged, this utilization
percentage could be increased without taking on ad-
ditional risk of over-commitment—an increase in cap-
ital efficiency that comes at no one’s expense. So,
for example, availability of external contingent cap-
ital could allow the sponsor’s effective $12 billion of
infrastructure budget to grow to $14 billion of com-
mittable capital (with $1 billion left in reserve, rather
than $3 billion). This effect combines with the reduc-
tion in project cost to enable 140 projects at the new
lower cost and lower variance (again compared to 100
projects at the higher cost and higher variance) for the
same $15 billion.
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Finally, this effective 40% increase in efficiency
(in terms of projects completed per dollar invested)
may well attract additional capital into such project
financing—a demand effect.11 If the original $15 bil-
lion total allocation for capital projects were to grow
to $20 billion because of this increased efficiency, the
sponsor could accomplish 200 representative projects
versus the baseline of 100—a 100% increase in ef-
fective infrastructure projects, without increasing the
risk to the investors, based on only a 33% increase in
capital.
6. MODEL EXTENSIONS AND TOPICS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We have addressed the question: Why might the
sovereign government (or third-party project spon-
sor) of an emerging nation be interested in employing
catastrophe-linked instruments to protect infrastruc-
ture investments, funded by a third-party project spon-
sor, from low-probability, high-consequence events
such as natural catastrophes? We conclude by present-
ing some additional topics—requiring analysis be-
yond the scope of this article—related to the ques-
tions of how the government might use these bonds,
how the instruments might be designed, and to what
extent the market for such securities interacts with
information conditions and government policy.
6.1. Challenges and Limitations Specific
to Sovereign CAT Bonds
There are many challenges to implementing
catastrophe-linked securities; these challenges have
been discussed elsewhere. We consider only one, a
unique issue for a sovereign government possessing
widely dispersed infrastructure assets.
When considering only infrastructure projects,
the sovereign government is the monopoly provider
of these projects, and the monopsony buyer of cat
risk protection. No other party (except, perhaps, for
11 If we consider investment in infrastructure projects as a good to
be consumed, this necessary condition for the sponsor to increase
the total amount of capital committed as the price of project com-
pletion falls is that the elasticity of demand for projects to spon-
sor exceeds unity, i.e., that abs(ε)>1. If the third-party sponsor
is indeed the monopoly supplier of sponsorship, that this condi-
tion will always be satisfied follows directly from the first-order
condition of optimal quantity (choosing quantity in the elastic
portion of the demand curve). Thus, this demand effect will al-
ways increase the amount of funding devoted to these types of
projects.
a third-party sponsor such as the World Bank) has an
obvious insurable interest in these projects. The gov-
ernment can thus be thought of as having 100% mar-
ket share in insuring its infrastructure, even though
this infrastructure may be spread out over a very
large geographic region. On the one hand, this 100%
market share would seem to offer an opportunity to
design a countrywide cat bond with low basis risk,
as catastrophe-related damage to the entire country
would correlate well with catastrophe-linked dam-
age to countrywide projects. A portfolio of similar
projects (such as a highway system) spread evenly na-
tionwide could thus be protected by a country-level
index instrument. Geographical dispersion of a high-
way system prevents the asset from being totally de-
stroyed by a local phenomenon (such as a flood or
earthquake), a form of built-in diversification and re-
sistance to catastrophic damages from geographically
concentrated risks.
Some countries incorporate such extremely large
and diverse geographic scope (e.g., China) that it may
be difficult to define appropriate triggers for such
catastrophe-related instruments on a national scale—
paradoxically, the infrastructure projects, even though
geographically widespread, are not sufficiently uni-
formly subjected to or affected by disaster for na-
tional coverage to be a good proxy for project cov-
erage. Thus, the same geographical dispersion makes
it a challenge to design an instrument to protect the
asset without introducing massive basis risk.
Ideally, however, instruments to protect specific
infrastructure investments would be designed project
by project to incorporate customization both at the ge-
ographic level (insuring against the appropriate haz-
ards) and at the project level (generating the appro-
priate cash flows for reconstruction). This project-by-
project design is relatively simple to do for a project of
limited geographical area (such as a dam or a nuclear
power plant) but very difficult to do for an infrastruc-
ture asset that, by its very nature, is geographically
dispersed (such as a fiber-optic network or a highway
system). Such projects may be too widespread for cus-
tomized project coverage, yet not uniform enough for
country-level coverage. It is not clear how this coinci-
dence between common ownership and geographical
dispersion can be resolved.
6.2. Leveraging Investment in Project Monitoring
The structure of the project funding arrange-
ment may offer additional opportunities to support
catastrophe risk transfer. Infrastructure projects in
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emerging economies generally involve a third-party
sponsor, such as the World Bank, that provides cap-
ital and investment advice to the sovereign govern-
ment, and may have a supervisory presence during
project completion, but that does not generally con-
trol the day-to-day management of the project. In-
vestors in project-tied CAT risk securities can rely
on the project sponsor to provide at least partial
monitoring—especially on large-scale infrastructure
projects in emerging economies, for which the sponsor
may well have an advisory team onsite during critical
portions of the project. This structure allows for the
investors in the catastrophe-linked instrument to take
advantage of the “delegated monitoring” provided
by the project sponsor,(13) reducing investors’ costs
of providing financing for these risks. Indeed, invest-
ments facing severe risks will likely draw more spon-
sor attention and financial commitment, rather than
less (a situation analogous to that examined by Calem
and Rizzo(14) in the private sector). The project spon-
sor may thus serve an informational role in project
management, as a well as a financial role.
If investors can rely on the third-party sponsor
for documentation of damage done to the project,
recommendations for cost-minimizing ways to con-
duct emergency repairs, and similar reports—even in
the event that a disaster occurs—this monitoring will
presumably reduce the extent of moral hazard. Of
course, to ensure that the amount of monitoring per-
formed (and the focus of the information gathered)
will be optimal, considering the interests both of the
sponsor and the investors, requires that the sponsor
of the project either be the investor in the catastro-
phe bonds or have some sort of high-powered incen-
tives as part of a contractual agreement to act in a
way consistent with being the investors’ agent. Even if
this alignment of incentives is only partially achieved,
however, some reduction in moral hazard should en-
sue. Given that the barrier against constructing per-
fect hedges against catastrophe involves a tradeoff of
moral hazard versus basis risk,(15,16) this reduction in
moral hazard, in turn, allows the catastrophe-linked
instruments to be constructed so as to behave more
like excess-of-loss reinsurance and therefore reduce
basis risk.12 This moral hazard may already be con-
12 The optimal design of this security will thus need to trade off
efficient incentives for investment in mitigation (arguing for a
state-contingent payoff, statistically correlated to but causally
independent of the actual losses to the project) versus incentives
for accurate reporting of damages done to the project (arguing
for an excess-of-loss payoff structure, which can reduce basis risk
if payments are conditioned on truthfully reported actual losses).
tained by the sponsor’s monitoring; quantifying this
reduction, and communicating it to investors, will re-
duce the cost of catastrophic risk coverage provided
by financial markets.
6.3. Interaction of Project Financing
and Moral Hazard
One reason catastrophe-linked securities hold
such promise is that, unlike other insurance markets
such as health or automobile coverage, the probabil-
ity with which disasters occur, and the severity of the
disaster measured purely in terms of natural forces
(e.g., wind speed, flood height of a river, earthquake
magnitude, etc.) cannot be affected (for good or for
ill) by any actions of the government, its citizens, or
any party interested in the payoff of the catastrophe-
linked securities. The damages caused by a disaster of
arbitrary magnitude may be increased, however, be-
cause of the effects of moral hazard (either through
lack of effective mitigation investments before a dis-
aster occurs, or error-prone claims adjustment tech-
niques and lack of attention to cost-minimizing re-
pair techniques after a disaster occurs). Determining
how the costs of these ex post opportunities for moral
hazard can be contained is an interesting subject for
further research and simulation.
6.4. Comparing Sovereign and Private
Corporate Capital Structures
The sovereign position of the project sponsor for
infrastructure projects has both benefits and draw-
backs. In addition to the politically motivated commit-
ment problem noted above, sovereign governments
operate under capital constraints that private compa-
nies do not. A corporation can finance its operations,
investments, and expansions through issuing equity,
issuing debt, or retaining earnings from operations.
Sovereign governments cannot issue equity and typi-
cally do not retain earnings; their financing is, by ne-
cessity, primarily debt. Therefore, all else equal, gov-
ernments will have less flexibility in (and, presum-
ably, higher costs of) financing than would an oth-
erwise similar large corporation who had the choice
to issue either debt or equity. Furthermore, govern-
ments value smooth growth in gross domestic prod-
uct (the equivalent of return on equity for private
ventures) but are restricted in their ability to diver-
sify; they are limited to investing in infrastructure
projects inside their own borders, unlike private in-
vestors who can diversify their portfolios as a first
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line of defense against catastrophe. A government’s
cost of capital will also rise faster than an equivalent
company’s in case of losses that would lead to insol-
vency (default on traditional sovereign debt) because
an emergency equity recapitalization is not possible.
Incorporating catastrophe-linked securities into the
expansion path that a government desiring economic
growth might pursue will require additional analy-
sis, to integrate the risk-hedging abilities of the cat
risk securities with the lower (but still significant, for
emerging economies) costs of traditional sovereign
debt.
6.5. Optimal Construction Technique—Embedding
Efficient Levels of Flexibility
The correct method of organizing projects—in
terms of materials used, completion schedules, and
tradeoffs among amounts of capital, labor, energy,
and materials to be committed to the project—will
also depend on how project risk is to be handled.
Catastrophe-linked instruments expand the choice set
for how project managers can handle such future risks.
As we have seen, risk management techniques that
eliminate costs of financial distress can lead to re-
ductions in expected completion costs. The main al-
ternative to contingent capital availability for creat-
ing resilience to unforeseen project risks is embed-
ded real options. Even optimally organized projects
suffering from capital-availability risk may incorpo-
rate such real options as a hedge that increase pro-
duction costs in high-probability scenarios to reduce
production costs in disaster scenarios.(17) Inasmuch as
such real options are costly to embed in the project,
there may be gains from changing the organization
of projects, if risk can be hedged using financial in-
struments, through substituting external sources of
capital for the most costly of these embedded real
options.13
Either embedded options or contingent capital
may produce reduced total expected cost of comple-
tion, as argued analogously by Simon.(18) cat bonds
will reduce total cost when these real options are ex-
pensive to embed and where their removal or omis-
sion will reduce project completion costs when the cat
bonds assume their risk-bearing function.
13 Of course, if these embedded options reduce the expected costs,
even absent their benefits of reducing uncertainty and the cost-
increasing effects of uncertainty, they should be left in—even if
contingent capital is also used to further reduce costs.
6.6. Interactions Between Catastrophe
and Fiscal Policy
A natural catastrophe leads to an instantaneous
depreciation of a nation’s capital stock. The opti-
mal speed of replacing this stock depends on many
macroeconomic variables. Questions for macroeco-
nomic theory analysis include: Is there any difference,
in terms of fiscal stimulus, between a macroeconomic
shock caused by disaster versus the traditional multi-
plier on government spending? and How should gov-
ernment fiscal policy be adjusted both immediately
after the disaster, in terms of trading off present con-
sumption and future investment (especially the opti-
mal speed of rebuilding the destroyed capital)?
6.7. Hidden Benefits of Catastrophe Through
Forced Modernization
In this article, we have focused on completing
projects in process, rather than protecting existing
capital in place. Not all capital in place, however, is
created equal. Some capital in place is particularly
productive and carries high opportunity costs of de-
struction; some is obsolete. What completed projects
may incorporate an implicit advantage of having ob-
solete capital destroyed and replaced with newer vin-
tage capital, funded by cat bond payments? What
implications follow for evaluating various types of
infrastructure assets’ economic vulnerability to dis-
aster? In particular, which completed-project assets
should be so insured, and at what level of coverage?
To what extent are there additional benefits from us-
ing a state-contingent risk-transfer instrument to pro-
tect such complete-project assets by providing one
large reimbursement at the national level, rather than
purchasing traditional “replacement cost” coverage
for each asset individually? These questions can be
addressed through a model similar to ours, empha-
sizing the true opportunity cost of foregone project
benefits rather than the “book value” of completed
projects.
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The Financial Management of Catastrophic Flood Risks
in Emerging-Economy Countries
Howard C. Kunreuther1∗ and Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer2
This article examines the potential of pre- and post-disaster instruments for funding disas-
ter response and recovery and for creating incentives for flood loss mitigation in countries
with emerging or transition economies. As a concrete case, we discuss the disaster recovery
arrangements following the 1997 flood disaster in Poland. We examine the advantages and
limitations of hedging instruments, which are instruments for transferring the risk to investors
either through insurance or capital market-based securities. We compare these mechanisms
with financing instruments, whereby the government sets aside funds prior to a disaster or
taps its own funding sources after the event occurs. We show how hedging instruments can be
designed to create incentives for the mitigation of damage to public infrastructure using the
flood proofing of a water-treatment plant on the hypothetical Topping River as an illustrative
example. We conclude that hedging instruments can be an attractive alternative to financing
instruments that have been traditionally used in the poorer, emerging-economy countries to
fund disaster recovery. Since very poor countries are likely to have difficulty paying the price
of protection prior to a disaster, we suggest that international lending institutions consider
innovations for subsidizing these payments.
KEY WORDS: Flood; extreme events; disaster financing; mitigation; insurance; catastrophe;
risk management
1. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the potential of pre- and
post-disaster instruments for creating incentives for
flood loss mitigation and for financing disaster re-
sponse and recovery in emerging economies. We
focus on emerging-economy countries and, more
specifically, on the transition countries of central and
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eastern Europe, where Poland serves as an example.
These countries face distinct and serious problems
in preparing for and responding to major floods and
other disasters. Low incomes for most of their res-
idents combined with very limited private insurance
have placed the burden of investing in loss prevention
measures and aiding the recovery process of disaster
victims primarily in the hands of the government.
In addition, a large share of flood disaster losses
in emerging-economy countries occur in the public
sector, namely, to public buildings and infrastructure,
where the impact on the entire economy can be sub-
stantial. For example, damage to electricity lifelines
for any length of time can cause business interrup-
tion losses and lead to the insolvency of some com-
mercial enterprises, not to mention the impact this
may have on the residential sector. The governments
of emerging-economy countries are ill prepared to
627 0272-4332/03/1200-0627$22.00/1 C© 2003 Society for Risk Analysis
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assume the financial costs of flood loss mitigation, re-
sponse, and rehabilitation. After a disaster, these gov-
ernments often experience difficulty raising funds to
assist the recovery process because of fiscal, political,
and other constraints on borrowing, taxes, or diverting
funds from other domestic budgets or internationally
financed projects. This is particularly true following
large-scale disasters where the damage is high rela-
tive to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP),
as with Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Honduras
in 1998.
There are two principal types of mechanisms
available to governments to fund the costs of recov-
ery: hedging instruments and financing instruments.3
Hedging instruments are pre-disaster arrangements
in which the government incurs a relatively small cost
in return for the right to receive a much larger amount
of money after a disaster occurs. Since the financial
risk of the losses from future disasters is borne by
another party, these hedging instruments are also re-
ferred to as ex ante risk transfer mechanisms. Insur-
ance and capital market-based securities are exam-
ples of hedging instruments. The government obtains
financial protection after a disaster by either paying a
premium for insurance or interest on a capital market-
based security.
Financing instruments are arrangements whereby
the government either sets aside funds prior to a dis-
aster or taps its own funding sources after the event
occurs. An example of a pre-disaster measure is a pub-
lic catastrophe fund where the government implicitly
self-insures by setting aside money to finance some
of the recovery needs following a disaster. Alterna-
tively, the government can mobilize its own financing
sources by such policy instruments as imposing taxes,
borrowing domestically or internationally, or divert-
ing from the public budget.
To make the discussion of these two types of in-
struments more concrete, we focus on the impact of
the 1997 Polish flood in the next section. Section 3
then examines the advantages and limitations of hedg-
ing instruments and how they compare to more tradi-
tional financing instruments. In Section 4, we show
how insurance and capital market-based securities
can be designed to create incentives for the mitiga-
tion of damage to public infrastructure using the flood
proofing of a water-treatment plant on the hypotheti-
cal Topping River as an illustrative example. We con-
clude that hedging instruments can be an attractive al-
3 This distinction between hedging and financing instruments has
been made by Doherty.(1)
ternative to the financing instruments that have been
traditionally used in emerging economies to fund dis-
aster recovery. Since very poor countries will have
difficulty paying the price of risk-transfer instruments,
we suggest that international lending institutions con-
sider innovations for subsidizing these payments.
2. FINANCING DISASTER REHABILITATION:
THE CASE OF THE 1997 POLISH FLOOD
In the summer of 1997, torrential rains caused
several major rivers to break through flood dikes and
cause disastrous flooding in southwestern Poland, the
Czech Republic, and the eastern part of Germany.
Poland was the hardest hit with more than 100 per-
sons losing their lives and thousands left destitute.
The flood was classified as having less than a 1 in
1,000 chance of occurring despite the possibility that
climate change may be playing a role in increased
precipitation.(2)
Direct property damage from the 1997 Polish
flood has been estimated at about U.S. $3 billion or
2.7% of Poland’s GDP.(3) As shown in Fig. 1, these
losses were to household property (12%), business
property (25%), agriculture (22%), and public build-
ings and infrastructure (41%). These damage figures
do not include indirect losses in production and busi-
ness disruption, which can be quite significant. In the
discussion that follows, we focus on the financial re-
sponses of the private and public sectors to overall
losses from the Polish flood disaster.
Business 
Property
25%
  House-
hold 
Property
12%
Public Infra-
structure
41%
Agriculture
22%
Source: Polish Statistical Bureau(3) (adapted).
Fig. 1. Direct losses from 1997 Polish flood.
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Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies(4) and Kuc(5).
Fig. 2. The 1997 Polish flood: response as percent of losses.
2.1. The Role of the Private Sector
Traditionally, the Polish central government has
provided relief by compensating victims for their pri-
vate losses, which has added significantly to the gov-
ernment’s post-disaster expenses incurred from re-
pairing or replacing damaged public infrastructure.
As Fig. 2 illustrates, the private and public expenses
incurred from the 1997 flood were financed by private
insurance, international aid and loans, a credit from
the national bank, and diversions from other govern-
mental budgets.
This financing, however, did not fully reimburse
public and private victims for their property and in-
frastructure losses. The difference of about 46% of
losses that was not covered by donations, insurance,
and loans is illustrated in Fig. 2 by the GAP.
In Poland, the concept of individual responsibility
and a viable private insurance market for providing
protection are in their infancy. As shown in Fig. 2, only
about 10% of the losses from the 1997 flood were cov-
ered by insurance (International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies).(4) Prior to 1997,
the Polish General Insurance Company (Powszechny
Zaklad Ubezpieczen) was offering an insurance pack-
age covering natural disasters, including flood risk.(6)
However, this insurance was rather expensive, and
most households and firms in the region did not pur-
chase coverage.4 Private insurers recorded close to
4 Poland is not an exception in this regard. Globally, only about 8%
of flood losses are insured, mainly in countries, such as the United
States or France, with public insurance programs.(11)
U.S. $0.25 billion in claims from the 1997 flood. Ap-
proximately half of these insurance losses were ab-
sorbed by international reinsurers.(7)
One hindrance to the private insurance market
in Poland and throughout much of Europe is the lack
of a concept of individual responsibility for the risks
and losses. People increasingly expect protection from
government against floods and hold the public sec-
tor responsible for compensating the victims. Floods
are only partially seen as natural disasters or “acts of
God” and are often framed as policy disasters, for ex-
ample, lack of effective public policies for prevention
and mitigation.(8) In a recent survey of the Hungarian
public, the majority of the respondents viewed the
government as primarily responsible for preventing
losses from floods, as well as for compensating flood
victims for their losses.(9)
Similarly in Poland, the public viewed the cen-
tral government as largely responsible for the 1997
flood damage, mainly through its neglect in main-
taining the system of dikes and preventing excessive
exploitation of the forests.(4) Indeed, as the Polish
flood waters rose, the prime minister made a pub-
lic statement that uninsured victims had only them-
selves to blame for their financial losses and should
not expect government help. This remark raised such
a public outcry that the prime minister was forced to
apologize.(10)
2.2. The Role of the Public Sector
The Polish public budget financed the 1997 post-
disaster recovery and rehabilitation in three main
ways: emergency response and cleanup; direct com-
pensation or subsidized loans to the victims; and re-
pair of damage to public property and infrastruc-
ture.(10) In the summer of 1997, the Polish govern-
ment responded to the flood with more than half a
billion U.S. dollars in private flood relief. In addition,
there was extensive damage to public buildings and
infrastructure—to more than 500 schools, more than
3,000 kilometers of roads, around 2,000 kilometers of
rail lines, and hundreds of bridges. These damages
have been estimated to be close to U.S. $1.2 billion
or 41% of the total direct losses (see Fig. 1). A large
share of the infrastructure damage was to water and
sewage-treatment facilities. This underlines the im-
portance of mitigating damage to water-treatment fa-
cilities, a topic we will turn to in Section 4.
The Polish government was not prepared for
these financial outlays. In the absence of a catas-
trophe reserve, funds were initially diverted from
other budgeted expenses, resulting in the freezing of
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public construction projects.(4) As shown in Fig. 2, the
central government provided funds to cover approx-
imately 15% of the total losses with a credit from the
National Bank. The drawback of financing disaster
recovery with this type of credit is that it is potentially
inflationary, although in Poland the credit was quickly
repaid at the market rate of interest.(5)
Even after borrowing from the National Bank,
the Polish government was not able to fulfill all its
promises and obligations for relief and infrastructure
repair in a timely manner.(10) For example, it was es-
timated that due to lack of funds it would be sev-
eral years before all the roads and bridges were re-
paired.(7) Limited financial assistance was provided
from outside the country. For Poland and the Czech
Republic, the United Nations Disaster and Humani-
tarian Aid agency recorded U.S. $10.3 million in relief
assistance. Assuming that half of this sum was allo-
cated to Poland, this covered only about 1% of the
total direct losses (see Fig. 2).5
In Poland, aid in the form of low-interest loans
from other countries covered about 23% of the losses
(see Fig. 2). The European Investment Bank and the
World Bank each approved U.S. $300 million to re-
pair public infrastructure (roads, railways, bridges,
and water facilities). In addition, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development offered ECU
100 million in loans to damaged Polish and Czech
cities.(4) Because the future taxpayers in Poland re-
pay loans, only the subsidized interest counts as
international disaster assistance.
With plans to join the European Union, the flood
caught Poland in a tight fiscal austerity program.
Hence, the central government declared that in the fu-
ture it would transfer at least partial responsibility for
disaster relief to new regional authorities. The second-
level administrative authorities (voivodeships) have
since been consolidated and given more financial re-
sources. A third-level authority, the district, has been
established to link the voivodeships with the commu-
nities. These regional authorities may play a more sig-
nificant role in implementing risk management strate-
gies for dealing with floods and other natural disasters.
2.3. Issues and Questions Raised by the Polish Case
In sum, the floods of 1997 in Poland illustrate the
important role the Polish government plays in financ-
5 Throughout the developing world, international aid for natural
disasters is relatively small. In 1996, for instance, catastrophe aid
on the part of OECD countries was considerably less than U.S.
$3 billion.(12)
ing relief and rehabilitation after a flood disaster. The
reasons for this include: (1) the lack of a concept of
private responsibility and limited availability of pri-
vate insurance; (2) the view that reducing the dam-
ages from natural disasters and compensating victims
is primarily the collective responsibility of the gov-
ernment; (3) the relatively high losses to public build-
ings and infrastructure from the flood; and (4) the
relatively small contribution of international aid and
other forms of international loss spreading.
Individual households or businesses can take
steps to prevent losses from floods, such as using
water-resistant materials and water-tight closures for
doors, windows, and other openings, building new
structures at higher levels, or even moving out of
flood-prone areas. Few, however, adopt these mea-
sures. In Poland, where per capita GDP is only slightly
more than U.S. $4,000, the population living in high-
risk areas cannot afford even relatively inexpensive
measures to retrofit buildings or to relocate out of the
floodplain.
The pre- and post-disaster response of the Polish
government raises the following general questions re-
garding the financial risk management of disasters in
Poland and other emerging-economy countries that
we will address in the remainder of this article.
 What are the financial options available for
governments to finance disaster recovery?
 What are the advantages and disadvantages, as
well as the political constraints, of these finan-
cial options?
 What equity considerations need to be consid-
ered in choosing among these options?
 How can financing options provide positive in-
centives for the adoption of cost-effective loss
mitigation measures?
3. GOVERNMENT OPTIONS FOR FUNDING
DISASTER RECOVERY
Following the 1997 floods, ex post financing did
not cover Poland’s full losses and there were delays
in repairing private homes and businesses, as well as
roads, transmission lines, and other critical infrastruc-
ture. In poorer emerging-economy countries, these
difficulties can be far more severe. In contrast to
Poland, these countries’ national debt burdens may
make it impossible to issue government bonds or turn
to other forms of borrowing following a major dis-
aster. Additionally, the tax burden on the public may
already be so high that there is no possibility of raising
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funds domestically. This makes these countries depen-
dent on subsidized loans and other forms of interna-
tional aid.
Especially for very poor countries, some combi-
nation of hedging and financing instruments may be
essential for aiding recovery from disasters. New in-
fusion of capital is needed, given the small amount of
private insurance, the limited ability of government to
issue more debt or tap its reserves after a disaster, and
the usually small amount of voluntary international
aid that can be expected. Delays in infrastructure re-
pair if recovery funds are not available will increase
the length of household disruption and business in-
terruption. These indirect costs are likely to greatly
exceed the direct losses from the disaster.(13)
Such delays can also lead to secondary eco-
nomic effects, such as deterioration in trade and
government budget imbalances and increased inci-
dence of poverty.(14,15) A timely recovery, on the other
hand, will positively influence economic growth in the
country. Macroeconomic models suggest that disaster
shocks and rapid recovery periods following major
catastrophes can have a significant positive effect on
economic growth in the country.(16)
As we discuss below, the relative merits of hedg-
ing instruments versus financing instruments will de-
pend on their costs, the political constraints, the risk
aversion of those who absorb the catastrophe losses,
and equity considerations. After discussing the char-
acteristics of the different instruments, we examine
the case for considering hedging instruments as an
additional source of funding for future disasters.
3.1. Hedging Instruments
Like a private company, a government can hedge
its risk of incurring large capital expenditures for
post-disaster response and rehabilitation either by
purchasing traditional insurance or issuing insurance-
linked securities, such as catastrophe bonds, that can
be bought and sold in the capital markets. A catastro-
phe bond (CAT bond) is an instrument whereby the
investor receives an above-market return when a spe-
cific catastrophe does not occur (e.g., an earthquake
of magnitude 7.0 or greater in the vicinity of Tokyo),
but shares the insurer’s or government’s losses by sac-
rificing interest or principal following the event. With
CAT bonds or other capital market instruments, in-
surers and reinsurers (and governments as insurers)
can pay to transfer catastrophe risk to investors.
These relatively new instruments have been made
possible mainly because of new scientific studies, engi-
neering analyses, and advances in computerized catas-
trophe models that make it possible to estimate the
risks and potential losses of future disasters more
accurately than in the past.6 The idea that govern-
ments in addition to private insurers and reinsurers
might benefit from new hedging instruments has re-
cently been proposed by Freeman et al.(18) Govern-
ment or sovereign risk-transfer instruments could be
designed in much the same way as they are for insur-
ers. The main benefits of these instruments are that
governments avoid having large capital outlays after
the event and have a timely source of capital for dis-
aster expenditures. If premium or interest payments
are taken from general tax revenues, these hedging
instruments spread the flood or other disaster burden
to the general tax-paying public.
The size of the U.S. capital market alone is in
the order of U.S. $26 trillion(19) and the average an-
nual damage from floods is around U.S. $23 billion.(2)
Hence these losses could be easily absorbed using
these new financial instruments as sources of funds.
However, these instruments have an associated cost
to the risk-ceding government. In an ideal world, the
wide distribution and diversification of catastrophic
risks would result in premiums on insurance contracts
or interest on CAT bonds that approximate the actu-
arial contract loss. In practice, the costs of risk transfer
are above the actuarial fair price of these instruments.
The fair premium does not account for the adminis-
trative costs, marketing expenses, and risk manage-
ment services of the insurer/reinsurer. For insurance
and CAT bonds that are tailored to reflect the specific
conditions of the country and the hazard, these costs
can be higher than for more routine risks.(19)
With regard to catastrophic insurance coverage,
the relationship between the premiums and the actu-
arially fair price will vary depending on the available
funds that insurers and reinsurers have for providing
coverage. Several years ago, Froot and O’Connell(20)
contended that the premium for catastrophe protec-
tion was considerably above its actuarially fair price.
They attributed this differential to insufficient capital
reserves, imperfect competition in insurance and rein-
surance markets, ambiguity aversion by the insurer,
inefficient underwriting practices, adverse selection,
moral hazard, and/or government regulation.7 More
6 For more detail on these computer-based models and their op-
portunities, as well as their limitations, see Reference 17.
7 The insurance premium may also reflect additional risk manage-
ment services that need to be taken into account. We are indebted
to Paul Freeman for clarifying this point.
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recently, however, the premiums for catastrophic loss
coverage offered by the insurance and reinsurance
industry declined due to the large amounts of funds
available for providing protection. Following the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11 there was increasing
concern by the investment community about provid-
ing coverage for catastrophic events and the price for
this protection has risen; in the case of terrorist cov-
erage, such insurance became unavailable or extraor-
dinarily expensive.(21)
The interest premium on catastrophe bonds also
reflects a concern by investors for the uncertainty of
the risks associated with catastrophic events. An im-
portant question for the viability of catastrophe bonds
is whether these high costs reflect only a temporary
unfamiliarity on the part of investors with this new as-
set class. Bantwal and Kunreuther(22) suggest that the
high spreads on CAT bonds may result from more
fundamental issues that need to be resolved before
they can play a significant role in transferring catas-
trophic risks. In particular, they contend that ambi-
guity aversion, myopic loss aversion, and fixed costs
of education can account for the reluctance of insti-
tutional investors to enter this market.
If there are further declines in insurance premi-
ums and/or the interest premium on CAT bonds de-
creases, can we expect these hedging instruments to
become important for financing public disaster recov-
ery in emerging-economy countries? Like any insur-
ance instrument, this will depend on the degree of
risk aversion of the government purchasing the in-
strument. This risk aversion, in turn, will depend on
how the costs are passed on. If, for example, they are
spread across many taxpayers such that no one indi-
vidual bears significant losses, then in theory the gov-
ernment will be risk neutral. The importance of hedg-
ing instruments in the portfolio of a public author-
ity will mainly depend on their relative attractiveness
compared to more conventional financing options.
3.2. Financing Options
The public authorities in emerging-economy
countries have several alternatives for financing disas-
ter response and rehabilitation, including a catastro-
phe tax, a catastrophe reserve fund, government debt
instruments, international bank loans, and a diversion
of funds from their current budgets.
3.2.1. Catastrophe Tax
After a disaster, the government can raise funds
for disaster rehabilitation with a tax. Like hedging
instruments, a tax spreads the costs of the disaster
response across the general public. If there is a so-
cial consensus that those not affected by the disaster
should absorb a portion of the losses, a tax will be
considered a fair way of paying the costs. If the public
is risk averse and prefers smaller tax payments on a
regular basis to the risk of a larger disaster tax, this
would be a reason for the government to pay the extra
costs for a hedging instrument. A tax also has the dis-
advantage that there may be large transaction costs to
its implementation, and the funds will not be immedi-
ately available. For these reasons, in Poland, a tax was
considered but rejected following the 1997 floods.(4)
Finally, a catastrophe tax is often not possible for the
governments of very poor countries since their tax-
payers are already at the limit of what they can pay.
3.2.2. Catastrophe Reserve Fund
Many countries maintain a catastrophe reserve
fund financed from tax revenues and invested in read-
ily liquid assets. This financing option also spreads the
costs among the taxpayers, but it differs importantly
from a post-disaster tax. There is an additional cost
equal to the foregone return from maintaining liquid
funds and an additional benefit in having the funds
immediately available with less transaction costs. A
major problem with a fund is that it may not be able
to supply sufficient funds, especially if the disaster
occurs shortly after the fund is created. In princi-
ple, insurance companies also operate with a reserve
to cover large outlays; however, private insurers are
more concerned than the government that their re-
serves are sufficient to avoid insolvency and for this
reason they diversify their insurance portfolio. In the
absence of a solvency constraint, the government can
assess the comparative attractiveness of a catastrophe
fund by weighing the costs of holding liquid reserves
in comparison with the costs associated with hedging
instruments.
3.2.3. Government Debt Instruments
A common way for emerging-economy govern-
ments to raise funds after a disaster is to borrow from
their central bank reserves or to issue government
bonds. In Poland, a credit from the National Bank
covered 15% of the 1997 flood losses. Although the
interest on government-issued bonds will generally be
less than the interest on CAT bonds or the premiums
on insurance, there are disadvantages to this form of
financing. There may be concerns about transferring
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the part of the disaster costs to future generations
who will be burdened by this debt. In addition, issu-
ing bonds or borrowing from central bank reserves
will contribute to the budget deficit. This financing in-
strument may also transfer a part of the burden to the
domestic and international investors in these bonds to
the extent that the government defaults on its debt.
The bond rating will depend on this default risk, which
determines the cost to the government of borrowing
funds.
3.2.4. International Loans
Emerging-economy governments have the op-
portunity to borrow at low interest rates from interna-
tional lending organizations. This is a major financing
source in the developing world. The World Bank esti-
mates that it has loaned U.S. $14 billion over the last
two decades to aid developing countries in their nat-
ural disaster response and rehabilitation,(15) and the
Asian Development Bank estimates that 5.6% of its
loans in the last decade were for this purpose.(23) In
Poland, loans totaling about 22% of the direct losses
from the 1997 flood were provided by the World Bank,
the European Investment Bank, and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.(4)
Of course, the low interest charged on these loans
makes them a very attractive financing instrument to
emerging-economy governments. Through the inter-
est subsidies, a portion of the costs is passed on to
the shareholders of the international lending orga-
nizations and, eventually, to the taxpayers from the
countries who provide funds to these organizations.
Depending on the terms of the loan, the rest of the
costs are paid by the present and future taxpayers of
the borrowing country.
3.2.5. Budget Diversions
Governments of emerging-economy countries
raise money for disaster response and rehabilitation
by diverting funds from other budgeted items such as
ongoing public infrastructure projects. This was the
case in Poland after the 1997 floods, where the gov-
ernment froze infrastructure projects and used the
freed-up funds for disaster recovery. This can be a
rational response to a disaster if the marginal value
of the funds for disaster response is higher than from
its originally intended use. However, there may be
hidden costs that are not taken into account, such as
the costs of disruption of projects and the longer-term
negative signals this sends to the international invest-
ment community.
International lending organizations are con-
cerned about this form of disaster financing, since
often funds are diverted from infrastructure projects
that they are financing. The World Bank estimates, for
example, that during the past decade up to 35% of its
lending for infrastructure projects in Mexico has been
diverted to finance disaster relief.(15)
3.3. The Case for Hedging Instruments
The relative merits of hedging instruments versus
financing instruments will depend on their costs, the
political constraints, the risk aversion of those who
absorb the catastrophe losses, and equity considera-
tions. The government should take account of these
relative merits in deciding on the appropriate mix of
financing and hedging instruments for covering the
costs of future disasters.
In contrast to poor countries, most developed
country governments have highly rated bonds and
practically unlimited possibilities for post-disaster
borrowing. For this reason, the case for these govern-
ments using hedging instruments as a cost-efficient
alternative is greatly diminished. According to a rep-
resentative of the Austrian Finance Ministry, raising
post-disaster funds by issuing highly rated Austrian
bonds is less expensive than an ex ante hedging in-
strument.(24) The transaction costs are lower for stan-
dard government bond issues, as are the interest rates,
since there is little risk to the investors. After a de-
clared catastrophe, the Austrian National Bank does
not need the approval of the parliament for a bud-
get change, so it can issue these bonds at very short
notice. There may still, however, be equity advan-
tages to a hedging instrument, since all the costs are
borne by present-day citizens rather than by future
generations.
The case for hedging instruments for Poland and
other emerging-economy countries is not so clear. In
a study of risk-transfer instruments for financing flood
losses in Poland, Lizak(25) concludes that conventional
financing instruments will have lower expected costs
to the government. Yet, if a flood predicted to occur
once every 100 years should occur early on in that
period, the government authorities would incur less
costs if they had purchased a CAT bond at the mar-
ket rate. This study does not take into consideration
the constraints the Polish government may have on
financing alternatives, for example, the political con-
straints on government borrowing due to the fiscal
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austerity necessary for European Union membership.
Yet, even this constraint is flexible as the Maastrich
Treaty makes allowance for an exceptional and tem-
porary budget deficit above the specified 3% if it re-
sults from an unusual event outside the control of the
member state concerned.8
The case for hedging instruments is stronger for
very poor countries that have difficulty raising funds
after a major disaster because of low per capita GDP
and an associated high risk of defaulting on their
debt.9 For “mega” disasters in very poor countries,
there are clear advantages to taking steps in ad-
vance by purchasing hedging instruments. These in-
struments not only provide funds that would other-
wise be difficult or impossible to raise, but the money
is available immediately after a disaster (unless the
trigger for the hedging instrument is based on losses
from the disaster that may take time to fully estimate).
By hedging its losses, the country will be able to ac-
celerate its recovery.
Turning from the national government to the mu-
nicipal and regional levels, there may be other consid-
erations regarding the desirability of hedging. For in-
stance, hedging instruments could play an important
role for national governments to diffuse the respon-
sibility for recovery to lower-level authorities if there
is a view that those affected by the risk should bear
some or all of the financial responsibility for recovery.
In Hungary, the municipal governments already per-
ceive little assistance from the national government
and, for this reason, many authorities have insurance
on public infrastructure. In other cases, the national
government might lessen its financial responsibility by
requiring the local or regional authorities to protect
their infrastructure with insurance or by the purchase
of CAT bonds. Otherwise, the political pressure at the
local level for federal disaster relief may be too great
to resist. If, on the other hand, there is a social ethic
that disasters are the responsibility of the general tax-
payer, then such requirements for financial protection
at the local level would be inappropriate.
Financing instruments may also be difficult or
very costly to implement. In some circumstances, for
example after the Chernobyl accident, countries have
imposed a disaster tax. But politicians are generally
8 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 of July 7, 1997, Article
104s(2).
9 This was not the case in Poland, where the default risk on Polish
debt as viewed by the investment community did not change sig-
nificantly following the 1997 flood. One reason for this was that
domestic demand for the Polish bonds remained stable after the
disaster.(26)
reluctant to turn to this unpopular alternative, and the
citizens of very poor countries may be at their taxation
limit. A catastrophe reserve fund may be politically
more expedient, but there are high costs to holding
a large reserve of liquid funds and the fund may not
have time to accumulate sufficient capital before the
disaster occurs. Finally, budget diversions are not only
costly, but they disrupt government planning. More-
over, if the funds are diverted from internationally
financed projects, they can diminish investor confi-
dence in the country.
The expense of and constraints on government
borrowing after a disaster may be the most com-
pelling reason for governments to engage in the use
of hedging instruments. Yet, as pointed out above,
emerging-economy governments cannot easily afford
the premium on insurance or the interest payments on
catastrophe bonds. Organizations that provide loans
to these countries, such as the World Bank, may be
able to play an important role here.
To illustrate, the World Bank could serve as a
broker by purchasing these bonds from emerging
economies at a low interest rate and then issuing them
to private investors. This would enable the govern-
ment to obtain the bonds at lower cost while protect-
ing the World Bank’s investments in these countries.
This type of arrangement would reduce the World
Bank’s need to provide subsidized disaster assistance,
a role it played following the Polish floods of 1997.(4)
In fact, humanitarian aid may be able to cover most
of those losses that are uninsured.
4. LINKING LOSS PREVENTION WITH
INSURANCE AND CATASTROPHE BONDS
A critical consideration in deciding on the com-
parative merits of hedging versus financing instru-
ments is the effect this decision will have on the extent
of anticipated damages. This section examines how in-
surance and hedging instruments in the form of catas-
trophe bonds can be combined with loss mitigation
measures to reduce the overall damages of future dis-
aster. We illustrate these concepts by focusing on a
specific mitigation measure—flood-proofing a public
structure to reduce future water damage.
Flood-proofing a structure involves the use of
water-tight seals, water-resistant materials, water-
tight joints, improving the strength of walls against
hydrostatic presses, sealants that are impervious to
water, and water-tight closures for doors, windows,
and other openings.(27,28) Such measures have proven
to be highly successful for preventing contact with or
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entry of flood waters and reducing damages from any
water that does permeate the structure.
The structure we will focus on here is a water-
treatment plant that provides clean water to resi-
dents and business in the surrounding area. Water-
treatment plants are often located in floodplains so
they are near well fields or the surface water that sup-
plies the system. If the plant is flooded, this can have
severe impacts on the operation of businesses as well
as on the daily lives of residents in the area who rely
on water from the plant.
The costs of shutting down a water-treatment
plant can often be much greater than the repair of
the structure itself. For example, the 1993 Mississippi
River floods in the United States flooded the Des
Moines (Iowa) Water Works plant that serves the city
of Des Moines and adjoining communities. The plant
was out of operation for 12 days and water was not safe
to drink for another seven days. Businesses and gov-
ernment offices were forced to close because of lack of
fire protection; bottled water and portable toilets had
to be provided the residents. In fact, utility loss result-
ing from the 1993 midwest floods was a much more
important cause of business closure in Des Moines
than direct flood damage. Many businesses in the city
had to suspend operations because of the loss of elec-
tricity, water, and sewer and wastewater services than
because of a lack of customers and employee access to
the business.(29) Contaminated water was also a major
problem during the 1997 flood in Poland because there
was considerable damage to water-treatment plants.
Health officials broadcast warnings to the thousands
of evacuees returning home that they should use only
bottled water, in fear of outbreaks of dysentery, hep-
atitis, salmonella, and typhoid. In response, volunteer
organizations from Austria and other countries set up
temporary water-treatment facilities in the stricken
areas.(4)
4.1. Estimating the Costs and Direct Benefits
of a Mitigation Measure
To determine whether it is worthwhile to under-
take a specific mitigation measure, one will want to
undertake some type of benefit-cost analysis. Con-
sider the decision on whether to flood-proof a water-
treatment plant located on the banks of the hypothet-
ical Topping River. One first needs to determine the
costs associated with a specific set of mitigation mea-
sures. These include the relevant materials, person-
power, and time associated with making the plant
more flood resistant. It generally is not easy to specify
these expenditures precisely, so some upper and lower
estimates should be provided to reflect the nature
of this uncertainty. The government can then evalu-
ate the desirability of a particular mitigation measure
over a realistic range of estimates regarding the costs
of the project.
Mitigation measures reduce the direct and indi-
rect impacts to the region following a disaster. Both
of these effects need to be specified in evaluating the
flood-proofing of a water-treatment plant. To under-
take such an analysis, it is necessary to assess the
degree of flooding of the Topping River. Hydrolo-
gists and engineers need to determine the probability
that the Topping River will rise to certain levels and
estimate the resulting direct damage to the water-
treatment plant with and without flood-proofing. If
the only losses incurred from flooding were the costs
of repairing the water-treatment plant, then it would
be a relatively simple matter to calculate the expected
benefits from the loss-reduction measure. One would
compare the damage to the plant for floods of dif-
ferent heights with and without flood-proofing the
structure. The reduction in damage associated with
each flood height would then be multiplied by the
probability of this type of flood occurring. One would
then sum all the figures to obtain the expected benefits
from flood-proofing for any given year.
It is then necessary to consider the number of
years that the plant would be operational and discount
each future year’s benefit to the present time period
by using some agreed-upon discount rate. This would
enable one to determine the expected discounted ben-
efit of flood-proofing the plant. The mitigation mea-
sure would be considered attractive if the total costs
of flood-proofing the water-treatment plant were less
than its expected discounted benefits.
4.2. An Illustrative Example
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, as-
sume that there is only a single type of flood that can
occur on the Topping River and that the probabil-
ity of such an event and the resulting losses are con-
stant over time. We can characterize the problem as
to whether the government should mitigate the water-
treatment plant by defining the following terms:
 C = up-front cost of mitigation measure
 p = annual probability of flood (e.g., p = 1/100)
 L = damage to water-treatment plant without
flood proofing (e.g., L = 500)
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 L′ = damage to water-treatment plant with
flood proofing (e.g., L′ = 300)
 d = annual discount rate (e.g., d = 0.10)
 T = relevant time horizon (e.g., T = 10 years)
The decision as to whether to invest in a risk mitigation
measure is determined by comparing the up-front cost
of mitigation (C) with the expected discounted bene-
fits [E(B)]. Assume that if a flood occurs on the Top-
ping River within the T-year time horizon, the water-
treatment plant will be restored to its pre-disaster con-
dition and be functional again. Then [E(B)] can be
characterized as follows:
E(B) =
T∑
t=1
p(L − L′))/(1 + d)t (1)
Consider the following simple example using the
figures illustrating the notation above. Equation (1)
now becomes:
E(B) =
T=10∑
t=1
(1/100)(500 − 300)/(1.10)t (2a)
E(B) =
T=10∑
t=1
2/(1.10)t = 12.3 (2b)
On the average, the mitigation will yield twice the di-
rect expected annual benefits so that over the 10-year
time horizon it will yield total discounted expected
benefits of 12.3. If the mitigation measure costs less
than 12.3, then it is cost effective for the government
to flood-proof the structure based on an analysis of
direct expected benefits. If the water-treatment plant
were expected to last for more than 10 years, E(B)
would, of course, be greater than 12.3.
4.3. Indirect Benefits of Mitigation Measures
Floods and other disasters produce indirect or
secondary impacts over time, such as family trauma
and social disruption, business interruptions, and
shortages of critical human services. These impacts
need to be considered in evaluating specific mitigation
measures.(30) The costs of some indirect impacts are
easy to quantify, such as the expenditures associated
with providing bottled water to residents because the
water-treatment plant was not functioning. Other in-
direct impacts are less easy to determine and quantify.
For example, how do you put a value on the loss of
“community” associated with wholesale destruction
of neighborhoods, of stress on families due to loss of
homes or of fear and anxiety about having another
home destroyed in a future flood?
In evaluating the benefits of a specific mitigation
measure it is important to consider these indirect ef-
fects. Mitigating damage to water-treatment plants
through flood-proofing would reduce the need to pro-
vide bottled water and toilet facilities to those resi-
dents who are not able to receive water. If a function-
ing water-treatment plant could have prevented some
business interruptions, with the attendant disruptive
effects on employees and the social fabric of the com-
munity, this would be considered an additional benefit
of flood-proofing.10
More generally, one needs to take into account
the externalities associated with disruption of a par-
ticular facility. The damage to the water-treatment
plant created a set of losses to residents and businesses
specifically because they could not receive pure water.
In the context of the Polish case, had the feared
outbreak of disease from contaminated water during
the 1997 floods actually occurred, then the human suf-
fering and deaths, as well as the hospital costs and loss
of work time, would have been additional costs of the
damaged water-treatment plant.
4.4. Financial Incentives to Encourage Mitigation
In most emerging-economy countries, the author-
ity and financing of disaster management is divided
between the national, regional, and municipal au-
thorities. In the past, municipalities in many central
European countries have been dependent on the na-
tional government for their financial base, but this is
changing as national governments place more respon-
sibility on lower-level authorities. As pointed out in
Section 2, there are newly formed regional authori-
ties in Poland to implement risk management strate-
gies for natural disasters. In Hungary, the 1995 Water
Management Act continued state responsibility for
operating and maintaining all state-owned structures,
such as flood levees, through the 12 regional water au-
thorities, but made local governments responsible for
operating and maintaining municipal structures, such
as water-treatment facilities.(31)
There are several reasons why these munici-
pal and regional authorities may be reluctant to
utilize some of their budget for investing in cost-
effective mitigation measures to reduce future flood
10 To the extent that other operations in Poland not affected by the
disaster fill in the gap opened up by nonfunctioning businesses,
then this is a transfer rather than a loss. If Poland needs to rely on
imports from other countries because its own businesses cannot
provide goods and services, then this is a loss to Poland.
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losses for facilities such as a water-treatment plants.
For one thing, the responsible public officials may
underestimate the risks associated with a future flood
by assuming that it will not occur over the next few
years. Even if these authorities correctly perceive the
chances of a flood occurring and the resulting damage
with and without flood-proofing, they may underesti-
mate the aggregate benefits of the mitigation measure
by being myopic. For example, if a public official com-
putes the benefits of flood-proofing only during his or
her term of office, say three to five years, the mitiga-
tion measure may not be seen as cost effective. In the
above example, a flood-proofing cost of 11 could be
justified for a 10-year horizon but not for a five-year
period.
In addition to short-time horizons, governments
face severe budget constraints. A municipal or re-
gional authority may decide not to incur the up-front
cost of flood-proofing a facility, preferring to allocate
these funds to measures that provide immediate ben-
efits to the residents in his or her area, such as con-
structing a new school or hospital. Finally, there may
be a lack of interest in loss-prevention measures if the
local or regional authority anticipates disaster assis-
tance from the national government for repairing the
facility after a flood.
4.4.1. Role of Insurance
One way to provide post-disaster funds to munic-
ipal or regional authorities to cover the costs of repair-
ing water-treatment plants and other public facilities
would be through an insurance policy. If these author-
ities have readily available funds to repair infrastruc-
ture after a disaster, they will rationally not purchase
insurance at a higher cost to them. Also, if the national
governments are prepared to allocate post-disaster
funds, which has been the case in many emerging-
economy countries, the authorities will have little in-
centive to purchase insurance. However, with declin-
ing national budgets for disaster relief and rehabil-
itation, many municipal and regional authorities in
the emerging-economy countries of central Europe
have to depend increasingly on their own financial
resources.
It is too early to assess the experience of the Polish
regional authorities with regard to their disaster man-
agement strategies, including their portfolio of hedg-
ing and financing instruments. Taking another exam-
ple, Hungary, it is notable that most municipal au-
thorities voluntarily carry private insurance on public
structures but not on their content. Ideally, the pur-
chase of insurance can become an incentive for the lo-
cal or regional authority to invest in cost-effective mit-
igation measures. More specifically, if a private insurer
were to provide coverage against repairing damage
to a water-treatment plant, it would base its premium
on the figures provided by hydrologists and engineers
with and without flood-proofing.
To illustrate how insurance could be utilitzed to
encourage the flood-proofing of a water-treatment
plant, consider again the Polish regional authority and
the illustrative example in Section 4.2. Assume that an
insurer offers to provide the authority with full cov-
erage, such that it would pay for repairing the entire
damage to the plant if a flood occurred. If the re-
gional authority decided not to flood-proof the water-
treatment plant, then the actuarially fair insurance
rate would be determined by multiplying the proba-
bility of a flood (i.e., 1/100) by the resulting damage
to the plant (i.e., 500) resulting in a premium of 5. If
the plant were flood-proofed, then the actuarially fair
premium would be 3 (i.e., 1/100 × 300). This means
the insurer could reduce its premium for flood cov-
erage by a 2 to reflect the expected annual reduction
in claims it would have to pay the government for
repairing damage to the water-treatment plant.
If Poland’s regional authority were faced with
budget constraints that made it difficult to incur the
up-front costs of mitigation, then one option is for
a commercial bank or an international organization
such as the World Bank to provide it with a long-term
loan for covering these costs. For example, if the cost
of flood-proofing the water-treatment plant was 11,
then a 20-year loan at an annual interest rate of 10%
would require an annual payment of 1.06. The annual
premium reduction of 2 for undertaking this mitiga-
tion measure would mean that the local or regional
authority would save 0.94 (i.e., 2 – 1.06) each year.
The decision to invest in cost-effective flood-proofing
would have to be viewed positively if the authorities
carried insurance and could acquire a long-term loan.
4.4.2. Role of Catastrophe Bonds
As pointed out in Section 3, catastrophe bonds
can provide an additional source of funds to aid the
recovery effort. They also provide an incentive for the
local or regional authority to engage in loss-mitigation
measures. Suppose in Poland that the regional author-
ity knew that if a future flood of the Topping River
occurred it would receive a certain amount of zlo-
tys to aid the recovery effort, and this amount would
be based on the height of the river when it flooded.
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To the extent that damage to public facilities and
infrastructure could be reduced through mitigation
measures, there would be a lower expenditure on re-
building these facilities. This would enable the re-
gional authority to allocate more money to disaster
victims than in the case where the facilities had not
been flood-proofed.
The important point is that catastrophe bonds
and insurance can be coupled with incentives and
other regulatory mechanisms to reduce future disaster
losses. They decentralize the decision-making process
to the regional level by providing economic incentives
to take steps now in order to save money later.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The governments of emerging-economy coun-
tries are largely responsible for flood disaster re-
sponse and rehabilitation, as well as mitigation of
the losses. Yet, they often experience difficulties in
providing funds for these purposes. These difficulties
can have long-term effects on the economies of these
countries and the welfare of the public.
We have compared the relative merits of pre-
disaster hedging instruments, such as insurance and
catastrophe bonds, with financing instruments, such
as post-disaster taxes and government borrowing. We
have shown that this comparison is multifaceted. It
depends on the costs and availability of these instru-
ments, the risk aversion of those who will ultimately
absorb the losses, political constraints, and equity con-
siderations. We were particularly interested in the im-
pact these instruments have on the adoption of disas-
ter loss prevention measures.
The comparative attractiveness of pre-disaster
hedging instruments will also depend on the nature
of the hazard and the circumstances of the coun-
try. Building on experience from the 1997 flooding in
Poland, there are a number of factors that may con-
strain the availability of financing alternatives in the
future. In particular, post-disaster borrowing may be
limited by fiscal considerations and the political diffi-
culties of imposing a disaster tax or transferring funds
from other budgetary commitments.
Hedging instruments may be particularly impor-
tant for financing disasters in countries anticipating
disasters that comprise a large proportion of their
GDP. After such events the governments of poor
countries will have an extremely difficult time rais-
ing sufficient funds from traditional sources. Interna-
tional lending organizations, such as the World Bank,
will feel pressure following these events to provide
loans to aid the recovery process, thus diverting funds
from other development projects. If the country has
insurance or has purchased CAT bonds in advance of
the disaster, this will channel funds from international
capital markets to aiding the recovery effort.
An additional advantage of hedging instruments
is the economic incentives these instruments can cre-
ate for preventing losses, thus encouraging munici-
pal and regional government authorities to invest in
cost-effective mitigation measures. For these and per-
haps other reasons, it may be necessary to develop
a set of requirements coupled with financial incen-
tives to encourage the adoption of cost-effective mit-
igation measures. We have focused in this article on
financial incentives, but recognize that a risk manage-
ment strategy will also need to include well-enforced
regulations, such as building codes and land-use
regulations.
Poor countries will have great difficulty paying
the costs of ex ante transfers. Since the World Bank
and other lending organizations are concerned about
the losses on their investments in these countries by
having funds diverted to disaster relief, innovative fi-
nancing mechanisms to aid these countries might be
considered. Helping poor countries to afford these
pre-disaster protective measures may not only be de-
sirable on equity grounds, but would avoid having in-
vestors depicted as capitalizing on the potential catas-
trophic losses facing poor countries from future nat-
ural disasters.
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